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Abstract 
This dissertation develops and evaluates a structural theory of protest onset, applied to 
the Russian case. Russian stability has become a pressing international political concern, as 
Putin has annexed the Crimea, fomented one war, in Ukraine, and become a major player in 
another, in Syria.  In December 2011, thousands of Russians gathered in Moscow, Saint 
Petersburg, and other cities for the largest set of protests since the fall of the USSR. Waves of 
protest have reappeared sporadically since. Each time, events create islands of dissent, spread 
widely, but unevenly, throughout the country—in a picture reminiscent of the pre-collapse Soviet 
Union. 
The dissertation argues that only an integrated theoretical framework can adequately 
explain protest onset variation. Such a framework must include three leading positions: social 
mobilization capacity, grievances, and political opportunity structure. It must include an additional 
element as well: state capacity, which is only weakly present in the theoretical canon of Social 
Movement Studies. The project requires novel sub-national data to test the integrated framework.  
Independent variable data derives from the Russian Federal Statistics Service. Dependent 
variable data derives from activist-curated web collections. 
According to statistical results, structural factors do, in fact, systematically explain 
variation in Russian protest from 2007 to 2013. A time series negative binomial regression model 
reports that protests are most likely in federal subjects featuring highly urbanized populations,
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 high unemployment, and low social spending. These structural factors provide a probabilistic 
explanation of Russian protest variation over the time horizon. A paired case study, focused on 
Novosibirsk and Krasnoyarsk Krai, evaluates quantitative results and offers model specification 
suggestions. Conclusions indicate that targeted public spending serves as a tool with which the 
Russian state can coopt public obedience; local governments can employ revenues as a tool to 
maintain social order. These finding generate novel international political implications, particularly 
connected with commodity price fluctuation and wars in Ukraine and Syria. 
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Executive Summary 
Major Findings  
1) Structural factors provide a probabilistic explanation of relative protest frequency, across 
Russian federal subjects, from 2007-2013.  
2) State capacity to coopt, through targeted public spending, and grievances best explain 
protest frequency variance.  
3) Social mobilization capacity (other than total population and urban population 
percentage), political opportunity structure, state capacity to coerce, by force, and state 
capacity to cooperate, by generating loyalty to the ruling United Russia party, do not 
explain protest frequency variance. 
4) Russian federal subjects characterized by large, urban populations, scant public 
spending, and high unemployment are the most likely to host protest events; low public 
spending per capita and high unemployment are the most robust drivers. 
5) A paired case study of Siberian federal subjects validates statistical findings. 
Major Contributions 
1) The project represents the first ever systematic exploration of Russian protest onset. 
2) Theory work identifies, and corrects, major problems plaguing research programs in 
Social Movement Studies and contentious political studies. 
3) Independent variable work contributes to the cottage industry of state capacity 
operationalization.  
4) Dependent variable work enhances an existing sub-national Russian protest database.
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5) An overview of event data, driven by news worthiness theory, offers a cautionary tale to 
scholars using newspaper data in general, and automated event databases in particular. 
6) Use of activist data offers an alternative to traditional dependent variable sources. 
Limitations 
1) The project adds to an existing database, rather than creating a new one. 
2) A more systematic critique of extant event data sources would require additional time and 
resources. 
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Motivation 
This dissertation project argues that Russian protests are of interest to non-academic and 
academic audiences alike.  For observers outside of academia, Russian protests demanded 
international attention in December, 2011, when tens of thousands filled squares and streets from 
Saint Petersburg to Vladivostok, the Baltic Sea to the Bering Strait.  Disputed Duma elections 
marked the start of a consistent wave. In February 2012, the words Bolotnaya Square obtained a 
new, defiant symbolic meaning. Standard bearers Pussy Riot toured late-night studios and 
college campuses, laughing with David Letterman and winning supporters. After a few relatively 
quiet years, the phenomenon reappeared in 2017. Alexei Navalny—persona non grata and literal 
he-who-shall-not-be-named of Russian state television—organized country-wide anti-corruption 
protests. Each time, events created islands of dissent, spread widely, but unevenly, throughout 
the country—in a picture reminiscent of pre-collapse Soviet Union. 
Understanding why Russian protests occur, why they occur in some regions more 
frequently than others, is an important target for social inquiry. The phenomenon holds 
importance—even urgency— for a number of groups: the current Russian government, the 
United States and NATO, liberal civil society groups, and investors. The United States treats 
social unrest in Russia as a potential path towards political or ideological change. The now 
famous feud between Vladimir Putin and Hillary Clinton began when Clinton, as secretary of 
state, allegedly stoked protests around the 2011 election. Over the past decade, the Kremlin has 
built insurance against an Arab-spring like movement carried out by activists. For example, the 
Ministry for Internal Affairs held a 40,000-troop exercise against a simulation of the Maidan 
protests, during which troops operated water cannons and tear gas while under attack from 
stones and Molotov cocktails. Liberal civil society groups monitor protests as a potential site for 
human rights abuses. Investors monitor protests as a threat to earnings and market sentiment. In 
short, numerous stakeholders watch Russian protest patterns with a wary eye.  
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This dissertation project is an attempt to generate useful knowledge, to broaden 
understanding of an urgently important phenomenon. Until now, the academic space has 
remained nearly entirely empty, populated by descriptive studies (Robertson 2013; Lankina 2015; 
Lankina and Voznaya 2015).  
I argue that only an integrated theoretical framework can adequately explain protest 
onset variation. Such a framework must include each of the three dominant positions: social 
mobilization capacity, grievances, and political opportunity structure. It must include an additional 
element as well: state capacity, which is only weakly present in the theoretical canon of Social 
Movement Studies. My integrated position, titled the Idea of the State, an allusion to Barry 
Buzan’s work on state capacity, predicts high levels of protest in the following structural 
conditions: where social mobilization capacity is high, or grievances are high, or political 
opportunity structures are open, or state capacity is weak; it predicts low levels of protest under 
inverted conditions.  Each element is, alone, a probabilistically sufficient factor, but not a 
necessary one. An explanation that focuses on any one element only would potentially suffer 
from omitted variable bias—a major problem plaguing the field. Theoretical motivation thus arises 
from an opportunity to test leading theories, and at the same time, to challenge the prevailing 
state of the field in Social Movement Studies. For academic audiences, modern Russian protest 
offers an arena in which to test and improve theoretical tools.  
A Geography of Micro Events 
Only a disaggregated approach can produce explanations valued by non-academic and 
academic audiences. Protest onset is an important phenomenon regardless of size, regardless of 
location. Events that brought the world’s attention to Russia were large, with tens of thousands 
marching in major metropolitan centers. This project is not an attempt to gain an understanding of 
mass protest only, however, but rather protest onset in general. It explores where and when 
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Disaggregation facilitates an explanation of protest onset that appeals to observers 
concerned with small and large events alike.  Even small protest can be considered “dress 
rehearsals” that incrementally contribute to future mass mobilization (Wolchik 2012), and even 
spark major upheaval in the short term, as in Tunisia and Syria (Noueihed and Warren 2012). 
Initial cleavages and coalitions can reappear, magnified, when the curtain rises. This project 
takes methodological inspiration from recent work that eschews monolithic treatment of social 
unrest. Only a sub-nationally-defined dependent variable exposes the streams and strains 
characterizing the modern Russian socio-political environment.  
Theoretical testing likewise requires a dependent variable defined at the sub-national 
level. Causal mechanisms driving grievances, mobilization resources, political opportunities and 
the state’s capacity to discourage activists—all operate primarily at the local level.  
Operationalizations compiled at the national level are misleading analytic abstractions, often 
created for the sake of expediency and data availability. Indeed, scholars have created decades 
of specious findings by collapsing numerous dissimilar sub-national polities into a single figure. In 
the parallel, high-profile field of civil war studies, corrective sub-national studies have exposed 
flawed conclusions regarding socio-political grievances, and ethnic divisions (Buhaug, Cederman, 
and Gleditsch 2014). As Welzel and Inglehart (2008) have argued, emergent environmental 
effects may interact with local conditions to drive outcomes.  An evaluation of “socio-tropic” 
effects is relevant only once proximate drivers are understood. Such work falls outside of this 
project’s scope. 
The project generates novel sub-national dependent variable data. It significantly adds to 
an existing event database. Since 2007, a team of Russian sociologists have maintained a virtual 
chronicle of protest—housed on the website namarsh.ru. The team gathers dispatches from 
regional print and web journalists. Dispatches cover protest events triggered by any type of 
grievance, from environmental degradation, to wage conditions, to political corruption. The 
website is funded by opposition politician and chess grandmaster Gary Kasparov. Tomila Lankina 
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and Alisa Voznaya created a dataset from namarsh.ru reports, hand-coding the timing and 
location of protests. This project enhances existing data, coding an additional year of event 
reports to create a dependent variable dataset that covers the time period 2007-2013.  
Activist-based data offer a valuable alternative to mainstream event data sources, most 
of which are based on newspaper articles. News worthiness theory expects proximate, surprising, 
large-scale, violent events to make the news  (Galtung and Ruge 1965; Barranco and Wisler 
1999). In modern Russia—a sprawling land mass characterized by illiberal press—the theory 
predicts biased coverage.  Significant risks are compounded by mundane pitfalls of automated 
miscoding and foreign language translation accessibility. A brief vetting exercise reveals that 
major newspaper-based data sources are indeed poor—extremely poor. Where GDELT’s failure 
is overreporting, SPEED’s failure is dramatic underreporting, both sources exhibiting hundreds of 
errors. 
The enhanced Lankina and Voznaya dataset reveals unexplained variation across 
Russia. In recent years, the county has experienced thousands of protest events, occurring 
unevenly across federal subjects.  An initial look at the data reveals concentration in the two 
federal cities. Over 1,400 protests occurred in Moscow, and over 500 in Saint Petersburg. 
Despite such high frequencies, the data further show that the majority of Russia’s 4,500 protests 
occur outside the two major cities (more than 70% of the total figure). Frequency varies widely 
across the eighty three federal subjects. The histogram displayed in Figure 2 below offers a quick 
look at variation. Twenty regions experienced over fifty events from 2007-2013. Seventeen 
regions experienced between twenty five and fifty events. Nineteen regions experienced from ten 
to twenty five. And twenty seven regions experienced ten events or less.  
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The Troubled State of the Art 
The project identifies and addresses two major problems rife in Social Movement 
Studies. A historical literature review exposes the insufficiency of the dominant political process 
model and problematic operationalization practices.  
First, state capacity is largely absent from Social Movement Studies. Recent consensus 
on the elements of the political process model fails to adequately represent the statist position, 
originated by Tilly (1976), that the state as actor shapes protest potential. In an overview, 
McAdam (1996) identified the constituent elements of the dominant model, across numerous 
articulations. McAdams identified a list of four dimensions: relative openness of formal political 
institutions; stability of elite alignments within a polity; presence of allies, among elected officials 
and among civil society groups; and finally, state capacity and propensity for repression. Only the 
fourth dimension describes the state as actor. Tilly and other contentious politics scholars 
demonstrate that repressive capacity is but one element of a much more complex whole. 
Second, when scholars do operationalize state capacity, two additional problems 
emerge. Twin pitfalls of observational equivalence and over-aggregation threaten construct 
validity. The use of GDP in civil war studies offers a clear example. Two oft-cited studies 
identified a common link between GDP and onset frequency, then proceeded to produce 
divergent conclusions. Collier and Hoeffler (1998) encouraged governments to highlight job 
creation as a path to peace. Fearon and Laitin (2003) would divert resources to government 
military command and control structures instead. But, here, the policy recommendations derive 
from an identical evidence base. The GDP per capita operationalization transforms state capacity 
into an undifferentiated monolith. Theorists recognize numerous interrelated but distinct 
dimensions or elements of state capacity. All are elided when operationalizations fail to follow 
Levi’s (1988) call to disaggregate the state. 
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Not in Circumstances They Choose 
In a sense, the project features two competitions: the first, between structural and agent-
based explanations, and the second, within the structural methodological realm, a tournament of 
variables, a search for the most compelling explanation offered by decades of scholarly work. 
Contenders include the subcomponents of the integrated Idea of the State framework: state 
capacity, and the major strains of Social Movement Studies: political opportunity structure, 
resource mobilization theory, and grievance. 
The project argues that structural factors shape the relative likelihood of Russian protest, 
throwing a challenge to agent-based explanations such as New Social Movement Theory (NSM). 
The school of thought encompasses several strains of academic work first appearing in the 
1980’s and 1990’s. New social movement theorists describe their work as ‘new’ in reference to 
classical Marxism, eschewing the monolithic theory’s economic reductionism and class-based 
understanding of identity. The school is loosely connected (Buechler 1995), held together by a 
focus on temporary and fluid catalyzing factors.  Some scholars emphasize the ephemeral nature 
of networks undergirding social action (Melucci 1989); others sketch a similar story of socially-
constructed grievances and ideology, amorphous and unmoored to objective conditions (Laraña, 
Johnston, and Gusfield 1994). The key methodological standpoint cuts against the structuralist 
analytical gamble. Contributors are united by a methodological approach that places explanation 
with quickly-changing context-specific factors. The project places explanation, instead, on 
relatively-stable, structural factors that shape the relative likelihood of Russian protest.  
The project further argues that a dimensional understanding of state capacity is an 
essential component of any comprehensive understanding of protest onset.  Most commonly, a 
state’s capacity is considered high when would-be activists are deterred through force or the 
threat of force (McAdam 1996). Coercion is only one aspect of the state, however. Softer and 
more abstract forms of power are just as effective as boots and truncheons. States coopt their 
populations through measures aimed to ameliorate suffering, such as social spending programs 
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and access to social services. States can also develop cooperative power that engenders 
feelings of loyalty.  Fjelde and de Soysa’s (2009) tri-part taxonomy nicely captures the 
dimensions of capacity that shape variations in protest onset. A theory of state capacity expects 
high levels of protest where state capacity is weak along dimensions of coercion, cooptation, and 
cooperation. 
An Academic Desert 
To date, only one limited explanation of Russian protest onset exists. This attempt falls 
away as flimsy and not compelling upon examination. Lankina (2015), an international relations 
specialist at the London School of Economics, evoked political opportunity structure to explain 
variation in onset frequency. Instead of Eisinger’s original objective local political indicators, 
Lankina relied on a subjective index of regional democracy: an index compiled by the Moscow 
Carnegie Center and the Independent Institute of Social Policy. The index is based on expert 
opinions. Lankina’s evidence amounts to selectively highlighting a small group of regions 
exhibiting the expected relationship between political opportunity structure and social protest 
onset.  
Moreover, very few explanations of protest onset exist at all. The few structural studies—
focusing on any country—that operate at the subnational level do not comprehensively test 
theoretical drivers. For example, focusing on India, Wilkinson (2004) evaluated the forward 
effects of politically motivated transfer rates, ethnic composition of police and federal 
administration, and corruption. He did not find a significant relationship between onset and any of 
his measures.  Bohlken and Sergenti (2010) conducted a more recent study of social unrest in 
Indian federal states. The authors mimic the initial, invalid operationalization of GDP and report 
negative results. Gillezeau (2014) analyzed the relationship of federal spending at the state level 
and both the onset and severity of racially motivated protests in the United States. Recently, Arce 
and Mangonnet (2013) conducted a sub-national study of political opportunity structure and 
protest onset in Argentina. The state of the field, then, sees a small group of scholars studying 
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protest onset at the correct geographic level, all of whom apply an incomplete set of theoretical 
drivers. 
Statistical Findings 
After identifying and correcting major flaws in theory, independent variable 
operationalization, and dependent variable operationalization, the project produces statistical 
analysis. Random effects, time series negative binomial regression models test a set of nine 
hypotheses, derived from the Idea of the State integrated framework, in addition to three 
hypotheses from Russian Studies. 
 Coercive state capacity (crime rates) is a mitigating factor—Rejected 
 Cooptational capacity (social spending) is a mitigating factor—Accepted 
 Cooperative capacity (United Russia vote share) is a mitigating factor—Rejected   
 
 Social mobilization capacity (urban population) is a driving factor—Accepted  
 Social mobilization capacity (educated population) is a driving factor—Rejected 
 Social mobilization capacity (transport infrastructure) is a driving factor—Rejected 
 
 Grievances (unemployment) are a driving factor—Accepted 
 Grievances (morbidity rates) are a driving factor—Rejected  
 
 Open political opportunity structure (Carnegie Index) is a driving factor—Rejected 
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 Public employment (public employment share) is a mitigating factor—Rejected 
 
 Generous federal support (federal transfers) is a driving factor—Rejected 
In summary, more generously supported federal subjects, with small, dispersed 
populations experienced relatively low levels of protest onset. Where unemployment is low and 
the populace benefits from social spending, low levels are similarly expected. Empirical testing 
provided supportive evidence for only three of the 12 hypotheses. Switching to a fixed effects 
negative binomial regression model—one that draws more heavily on within region variation—
both population measures lost significance. For this reason, and due to the crude nature of 
population-based operationalizations, cooptational capacity and grievance offer the best 
statistical explanations of protest onset frequency in modern Russia. At least in this context, other 
drivers do not appear as important as initially theorized.  
Policy Implications 
Empirical results suggest that cooptational state capacity, measured at the sub-national 
level, conditions the frequency of protest in Russia from 2007-2013. Population measures and 
unemployment also shaped protest frequency. Only cooptational capacity, however, is completely 
within leaders’ control. The finding regarding state capacity to coopt is particularly interesting due 
to its magnitude. Ceteris paribus, a one thousand ruble increase in social cultural spending per 
capita results in a 3% decrease in expected onset potential. Such a strong relationship is not 
seen with the other significant independent variables. A one thousand ruble increase is relatively 
small, less than 3% of most Russian federal subjects’ current spending levels. 
As local governments allocate more funds to socio-cultural projects—to public health and 
education, to unemployment assistance, or to public park maintenance—the frequency of protest 
declines. It appears, then, that targeted public spending serves as a tool with which the state can 
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coopt public obedience; Russian local governments can employ revenue as a tool to maintain 
social order. These findings begin to outline the shape of the social contract across the Russian 
Federation. Moreover, these findings bring to light implications of international politics, particularly 
implications of commodity price fluctuation and ongoing wars in Ukraine and Syria. Oil and gas 
shocks would affect state revenue at both the central and local levels. Sanctions threaten 
revenue by jeopardizing the country’s general economic outlook. Further still, Putin’s costly 
military engagements could limit local governments’ capacity to coopt. 
Case Study and Moving Forward 
Case study evidence supports the major empirical findings. The project produces a most 
common systems design case study. Novosibirsk and Krasnoyarsk coincide along all 
independent variables except one. Novosibirsk exhibits lower cooptational capacity than its 
Siberian neighbor, as well as higher protest frequency. An in-depth analysis of protest 
environments evaluates the validity of statistical relationships and suggests model improvements. 
Analysis also explores interaction effects between cooptational capacity and grievances, the two 
most robust drivers. 
It appears that the sub-national Krasnoyarsk state was more inclined to employ 
cooptation capacity than its counterpart in Novosibirsk. And it appears that cooptational actions 
did, in fact, dissuade protestors from organizing demonstrations of dissent. This is not to say that 
Novosibirsk’s government completely refused to employ cooptation. Rather, in all years under 
analysis the northern-most region reported more incidents of “buying-off” protesters, despite 
reported fewer protests, fewer opportunities for such a response. In 2007, out of 8 quality of life 
movements, Krasnoyarsk demonstrated cooptational tactics in response to 4 of them.  
Novosibirsk, faced with 8 movements, responded with cooptation only in response to striking 
grain workers. In 2008, Krasnoyarsk leveraged cooptational state capacity to “buy off” auto-
owners, alumni factory workers and displaced airline workers, or 3 of 5 protest movements. In the 
same year, Novosibirsk reached an agreement with just one group, striking municipal bus drivers, 
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when faced with 8 quality of life movements. In 2009 and 2010, Krasnoyarsk’s protest 
environment was tranquil. Only four groups organized quality of life demands. The local state 
responded each time, three times with cooptation, and once with effective repression. Over the 
two years, 12 separate movements demanded assistance in Novosibirsk. Government responded 
twice, once to pay tractor factory workers threatening an official visit from Putin, and once to 
reverse a cut to subsidized transportation.  The difference in cooptational capacity appears to 
drive differing protest outcomes in the two regions. Against this backdrop, unemployment proved 
a steady driver of unrest—particularly when not met with cooptational response. 
Disaggregated statistical analysis represents one potential way forward. I am convinced 
that a quality-of-life/ideology dichotomy would improve the search for structural drivers of protest. 
The next step in the dialectic that is social scientific research—from hypothesis, to testing, and 
back again—would evaluate the notion that quality of life protests are structurally predictable, 
while ideologically-driven protests are not. Even this more disaggregated approach would face 
difficulties, however. The in-depth look at two Siberian provinces revealed consistent connections 
between quality-of-life protests and ideological protests. Categorical boundaries collapsed as 
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I - Introduction 
The Rise of Russian Protest 
In December 2011, thousands of Russians gathered in Moscow, Saint Petersburg and 
other cities for the largest set of protests since the fall of the USSR. Days earlier, the country held 
legislative elections across voting regions for seats in the State Duma. The ruling United Russia, 
led by Vladimir Putin and Dmitri Medvedev, won nearly 53% of seats over rival Communist, 
Liberal Democratic and Just Russia parties. United Russia’s victory, despite dropping in 
magnitude from 70% in the previous election, triggered wide-spread accusations of vote-fixing. 
Tens of thousands of people gathered in protest across the country. Activists convened the 
largest gathering near the Kremlin in Moscow to focus country-wide demands for new elections. 
Police estimates placed attendance at 25,000 people, while protestors claimed over 100,000, and 
news agencies in the United States and Europe reported a midpoint around 50,000. No matter 
the exact number, the event was, as The New York Times reported, “too large to be edited out of 
the evening news”(Barry 2011). 
Protests against 2011 Duma elections marked the beginning of two concurrent trends, a 
rise in protest activity, and a rise in international attention. In February, in the following year, tens 
of thousands of protesters again took to the streets across Russia, with the largest demonstration 
in Moscow’s Bolotnaya Square. Large-scale protests continued in response to the disputed 
electoral results, and in anticipation of Putin’s presidential campaign, announced after an 
interlude as prime minister.
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The election itself again mobilized activists, who cited irregularities despite Putin’s claim 
that he had “won a clean victory” (Herszenhorn 2012). The wave of protest beginning in 2011 
included the now famous arrest of Pussy Riot. On February 21
st
 2012, five members of the punk 
rock band/art collective donned masks and staged a performance at the Christ the Savior 
Cathedral in Moscow, during mass. The group’s “Punk Rock Prayer” denounced Putin’s 
relationship with the Russian Orthodox Church, repeating in verse the protest movement’s call of 
“Russia Without Putin” (Россия без Путина). Three members of the group spent over a year in 
prison on charges of destabilizing social order, before release under an amnesty law passed in 
the run-up to the Sochi Winter Olympics. Over the course of the group’s trial the members 
actively sought to connect Russia’s dissident movement with transnational justice and democracy 
movements. As Masha Gessen describes in a biography, the group’s name demonstrates their 
strategy in microcosm. The vulgarity is an attempt to catch observers’ attention. And the usage of 
English is an attempt to appeal to a broad audience—even when displayed in Russian media the 
band’s name appear in roman script (Gessen 2014). The strategy worked. HBO aired a 
documentary account of their story in 2014, and Russian protests have continued to garner 
widespread attention in the international press.  
Thanks in part to this English-language campaign, Russian protests have become a 
pressing international political concern, and as such, a pressing target for social inquiry. Recent 
events have focused the attention of Putin’s regime and the international community, as well as 
academic audiences working in the contentious politics tradition. Around the world, numerous 
actors would benefit from understanding the causal mechanisms underlying protest onset.   
This project is the first ever systematic exploration of protest onset in modern Russia. 
Large-scale events, those appearing in international headlines, are one element of a much larger 
phenomenon. For every action in Saint Petersburg or Moscow many more take place in provincial 
cities spanning the roughly 6,200-mile land mass. From 2007 to 2013, over 4,000 protest events 
occurred, nearly two-thirds outside of the twin capitals—according to my updated Lankina and 
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Voznaya dataset, discussed below. A glimpse at the data reveals significant variation in relative 
onset frequency. Of the eighty three federal subjects, some featured hundreds of events, others 
around fifty, and still others reported fewer than ten or none at all. What explains this variation? 
What drives some regions to become protest hubs? Theoretical tools offer a way forward. 
Scholars have argued that social mobilization capacity (e.g., Urdal 2006; Wallace and Weiss 
2013), grievances (e.g., Walton and Ragin 1990; Porta 2008), or political opportunity structure 
(e.g., Arce and Mangonnet, 2013; Voznaya, 2015) explain protest onset variation. Each individual 
approach, however, provides merely a partial, inadequate explanation.  
This project argues that only an integrated theoretical framework can adequately explain 
protest onset variation. Such a framework must include each of the three dominant positions. It 
must include an additional element as well: state capacity, which is only weakly present in the 
theoretical canon of Social Movement Studies. My integrated position, titled the Idea of the State, 
an allusion to Barry Buzan’s work on state capacity, predicts high levels of protest in the following 
structural conditions: where social mobilization capacity is high, or grievances are high, or political 
opportunity structures are open, or state capacity is weak. It predicts low levels of protest under 
inverted conditions.  As this chapter demonstrates, each element is, alone, a sufficient factor, but 
not a necessary one
1
. An explanation that focuses on one element alone would potentially suffer 
from omitted variable bias—a major problem plaguing the field, as outlined in Chapter 3. 
Theoretical motivation thus arises from an opportunity to test leading theories, and at the same 
time, to challenge the prevailing state of the field in Social Movement Studies. For academic 
audiences, modern Russian protest offers an arena in which to test and improve theory.  
The Idea of the State framework generates a set of falsifiable hypotheses, required to 
evaluate the effect of each sufficient but unnecessary driver. Due to the relatively early stage of 
                                                          
1
 The Idea of the State is based on a probabilistic understanding of causality. I here use the terminology 
sufficient and necessary in Douglas Dion’s (1998) sense: each element is not deterministically, but 
“probabilistically, sufficient,” increasing the relative likelihood of onset.  
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Russian protest research, hypothesis testing also evaluates the broader structuralist position: do 
there, in fact, exist systematic drivers of protest onset in modern Russia? Statistical models in 
Chapter 5 will evaluate the following: 
H*: Structural conditions systematically shape relative protest onset across Russian federal 
subjects. 
H1: State capacity is negatively correlated with protest onset. 
H2: Social mobilization capacity is positively correlated with protest onset. 
H3: Grievances are positively correlated with protest onset. 
H4: Open political opportunity structures are positively correlated with protest onset. 
The first several chapters establish preconditions for hypothesis testing. Chapter 2 builds 
theoretical tools, presents the Idea of the State as a synthesis of existing work in Social 
Movement Studies. Time and again, over decades of research, scholars return to the three 
leading theoretical positions. Time and again, purportedly comprehensive protest models under-
theorize the role of the state. My framework solves this problem by importing a rich, multi-
dimensional understanding of state capacity from contentious politics. In addition to coercion, 
state capacity to coopt, and state capacity to cooperate mitigate protest onset frequency (Fjelde 
and de Soysa 2014). Hypothesis H1 expands accordingly, to include: 
H1a: State capacity to coerce is negatively correlated with protest onset. 
H1b: State capacity to coopt is negatively correlated with protest onset. 
H1c: State capacity to cooperate is negatively correlated with protest onset. 
Chapter 3 operationalizes these three dimensions, in addition to social mobilization 
capacity, grievances, and political opportunity structure. Detailed analysis of existing 
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operationalization produces a cautionary tale. I avoid common pitfalls by measuring independent 
variables at the subnational level. As the final building block, Chapter 4 builds a dependent 
variable database, containing event data—the when and the where of protest onset. Comparative 
analysis leads me to eschew sources based on newspapers and traditional media, in favor of 
activist-curated web collections. Chapter 5 conducts statistical testing, before Chapter 6 subjects 
hypotheses to qualitative testing. Here, this introductory chapter provides motivation and 
delineates the phenomenon under investigation. In order to demonstrate the importance of the 
dependent variable, I will produce evidence that Russian protest events represent an area of 
concern for many actors. Protest event onset attracts scant scholarly attention (Lankina and 
Voznaya, 2015). For this reason, I will provide a lengthy, robust statement of motivation. I will first 
discuss the Russian government’s approach to recent events, an approach that includes a foray 
into predictive analytics. Next, I will demonstrate a similar level of concern from a variety of 
international actors: the United States, liberal civil society organizations and investors. By 
including perspectives from this array of actors, I indicate the broad appeal of a project dedicated 
to explaining the onset of Russian protest events. 
With motivation firmly established I then briefly demonstrate the superiority of an 
integrated approach over prevalent individual explanations. Three theoretical traditions offer tools 
for understanding social protest onset in Russia. Two recent scholarly papers have even 
addressed the topic explicitly (Lankina and Voznaya 2015; Lankina 2015). However, extant 
academic work does not provide an adequate explanation of the phenomenon. The academic 
terrain, relating to Russian protest onset— and protest onset in general, as discussed in Chapter 
3 and Chapter 4—is relatively bare. The few studies attempting to explain protest onset are shot 
through with serious problems regarding theory, independent variable operationalization, and 
dependent variable operationalization. I conclude the chapter with a road map for the rest of the 
dissertation, moving through the problem areas in chapters 2, 3, and 4, offering my solutions 
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along the way. With corrected fundamental elements in place, chapters 5 and 6 provide statistical 
and case study analysis.      
Motivation 
The onset of protest events in Russia is relevant to the country’s current governing 
regime. Putin and his allies are concerned with the causes of protests, historical and future. 
Evidence of regime preference is notoriously difficult to obtain, however. Country leaders often 
conceal true preferences behind rhetoric aimed at mollifying domestic audiences or international 
rivals. International relations scholars long ago called attention the “other minds problem,” the 
impossibility of accessing the thoughts of government leaders (Butterfield 1951; Jervis 1978). 
Words spoken at official events are carefully polished and may offer little evidence of true 
preference. Putin’s speeches are especially poor sources of evidence, given his reputation as a 
dishonest spokesman. For example, in April 2015 during a public question and answer session, 
the leader forcefully denied involvement in the ongoing Ukrainian crisis: “let me be clear, I will say 
this clearly: There are no Russian troops in Ukraine” (Demirjian 2015). During the early phases of 
the conflict heavily armed men seized control of local government buildings, wearing unmarked 
uniforms similar to those worn by Russian troops. Since the initial attacks, various news agencies 
have established the presence of military vehicles only owned by the Russian army, Russian-
made weapons systems, and videos of Russian units, including self-published social media 
footage from soldiers’ personal accounts (Ostrovsky 2015). Given the difficulty of capturing 
preference, and given Putin’s particular tendency to dissimulate, actions best demonstrate the 
Russian regime’s preferences.  
The Kremlin’s fluid response to recent protests shows a regime desperate to quell unrest. 
At first, in December 2011, the government employed what Lilia Shevtsova describes as it’s 
“usual harsh tactics,” beating and arresting hundreds of participants as it had throughout the 
1990’s and 2000’s. State-led repression, however, failed to discourage protestors. Worried about 
inciting further dissident support, the regime shifted to a “soft-kill” strategy of cooptation and 
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conciliation (Shevtsova 2012). Superficial legislative changes were the first element of the 
strategy. In March 2012 Medvedev proposed a law that would make it easier for parties to 
register for legislative elections. As a second element, the prime minister mobilized parallel 
protests each time dissidents organized. The parallel groups even echoed calls for clean 
elections. State-supported protestors attempted to discredit pro-democracy activists as Western 
puppets funded by foreign agents to incite revolution in Russia. Furthermore, the regime recruited 
pro-government groups from rural areas to intimidate urban protestors. Despite these strategic 
actions violent repression and arrests remained low (Shevtsova 2012). The soft-kill strategy 
further involved a curtailment of freedom of expression, especially the form of social media.  
According to Reporters Without Borders, a French non-profit dedicated to informational freedom, 
the Federal Security Service frequently acted to block accounts on VKontake. Moreover, 
thousands of Twitter accounts were flooded with pro-government slogans tied to opposition 
hashtags in order to dampen the site’s utility. Initially, the regime responded with force. When 
force appeared to strengthen dissident support, the regime quickly changed tactics. 
The eruption of revolutionary protests close to home, in Ukraine, marked the end of 
Russia’s soft-kill strategy. As Viktor Yanukovych fled protestors, the Russian government shifted 
back to harsh punishment. Instead of acting indirectly, through proxy groups, or acting 
conciliatorily, through legislative measures, the regime sent a harsh message to would-be 
dissidents. In February 2014, a group of protestors dubbed the ‘Bolotnaya Eight’ were sentenced 
to a combined total of 20 years in prison for participating in protests on the eve of Putin’s third 
inauguration. The farcical nature of the trial is clear from 22 year old Yaroslav Belousov’s fate—
he received an eighteen-month sentence for throwing a lemon, reported as an ‘unidentified yellow 
object’ which caused an officer ‘excruciating pain’ (Amnesty International 2014). Furthermore, the 
regime increased the legal measures of punishment. In Putin’s third term fines for participating in 
un-sanctioned protests have more than tripled (Ibid.). Although the Kremlin has moved away from 
the soft-kill strategy, it has maintained a commitment to social media control. Since 2012, 
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Russia’s Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass 
Media (Roskomnadzor) has frequently blocked access to websites and social media networks 
(Shevtsova 2012). Since initial protests, the Russian regime’s actions reflect learning from 
domestic and international experiences. With experience, the regime forged a counter-protest 
strategy that has fluctuated from leniency to severe repression, with constant control over social 
media. 
Putin’s government further demonstrated its concern over protest activity by creating a 
set of preventive programs. The Kremlin-affiliated Center for Research in Legitimacy and Political 
Protest recently announced the launch of a predictive analytical tool. The group’s program is titled 
Laplace’s Demon, a reference to the work of 19
th
 century French mathematician Pierre-Simon 
Laplace. In his Philosophical Essay on Probabilities, Laplace posited the existence of an 
intelligence so vast as to comprehend all causal forces at play in the natural world. For this being, 
or demon in subsequent interpretation, “the future, as the past, would be present in its eyes” 
(1812). For such a being, all uncertainty in planning would disappear. Members of the Center for 
Research in Legitimacy and Political Protest claim to offer the government just such a powerful 
tool, by aggregating social media posts across Russia. In a press release the Center’s chairman, 
Yevgeny Venediktov stressed the importance of the tool, of “software that would monitor social 
networks and warn in advance of protest onset in the country” (Maus 2015). The Kremlin’s 
preparations are not confined to the virtual realm, however.  Interior Ministry troops held a 40,000 
troop exercise against a simulation of the Maidan protests. During the exercise troops operated 
water cannons and tear gas while under attack from stones and Molotov cocktails. A domestic 
stability unit remains on call, ready to put training into action (Parfitt 2015).   
Thus, evidence suggests that Russian leadership considers protest a dangerous 
phenomenon, one that must be carefully managed and, if possible, prevented.  This concern is 
the reasonable product of learning from the Arab Spring revolutions. Like former leaders in Egypt, 
Syria and Libya, Putin heads a long-standing government that is, by some measures (Freedom 
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House, Polity IV, for example) authoritarian or anocratic. In the Middle East, protest movements 
eventually forced leaders to relinquish political control. And relinquishing political control meant 
not only loss of assets, but also loss of freedom, or even loss of life. Popular protests raise the 
threat of weakening Putin’s grip on power, the threat of replicating the fate of Hosni Mubarak or 
Muammar Qadhafi. Russia’s current rulers want to avoid a variation on the theme “authoritarians 
come to a bad end” (Shevtsova 2012). In August 2011 current chair of the Collective Security 
Treaty Organization (CSTO), Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko emphasized the 
importance of security in the wake of the Arab Spring. Leader’s agreed that social networks such 
as Twitter and Facebook played a crucial role in Egypt, Syria, and Libya. After the meeting, 
members of the security cooperative launched a joint cyber defense program. In the following 
years the CSTO has continued to share results and strategies of cyber monitoring and control, 
(Kucera 2011). Putin his allies across the Post-Soviet space have begun to perceive popular 
mobilization as an existential threat. 
Outside of Putin’s support structure, a wide range of international actors would benefit 
from an increased understanding of Russian protest event onset. Three sets of actors serve to 
demonstrate the breadth of interested parties. First, actors within the United States military and 
diplomatic communities exhibit interest, indirect or direct. The military has recently identified 
Russia as a security priority. And as academic work has demonstrated, domestic political 
configurations influence foreign policy positions (Katzenstein 1977; Solingen 1994, 2007). In this 
way the American military is indirectly interested in protest onset. The diplomatic corps’ interest is 
direct. The State Department has recently exhibited an ideological drive to protect freedom of 
individuals engaged in protest, as well as protecting democracy around the world. Members of a 
second group, liberal international civil society, serve their mission by monitoring the emergence 
of, and response to, protests under authoritarian regimes. And finally, investors both within and 
outside of Russia see in protest events, large and small, a source of financial risk. 
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Russia has recently risen in security importance for the United States. In the 2015 U.S. 
National Military Strategy, a document produced by the armed forces, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
identified Russia as a critical security concern. According to the document, Putin’s regime offered 
the potential for significant cooperation, especially in the realms of counter-narcotics and counter-
terrorism. Any contribution is outweighed, according to the document, by Russian unpredictability. 
Russia frequently violates signed agreements. In addition to annexing Crimea, the country 
recently violated the UN Charter, the Helsinki Accords and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear 
Forces Treaty. The military authors conclude that the ongoing tension in Crimea has increased 
the chances of interstate war between the two countries (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2015). Recent 
intervention in the Syria further heightens the strategic importance of Russia. Marine General 
Joseph Dunford highlighted this concern during his nomination speech for chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. Dunford stated that “ Russia presents the greatest threat to our national security,” 
and moreover that the country under Putin, “could pose an existential threat to the United States” 
(Lamothe 2015). Threats from Russia are heightened by the country’s stockpile of nuclear 
weapons. According to the last biannual exchange of data recorded under the New START 
Treaty, data gathered and published by the American State Department, Russia holds over 
1,6000 warheads across intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles 
and bombers. Including non-deployed weapons raises the total to over 8,000 warheads (2015).  
Because Russia is a foreign policy concern, the American military must pay close 
attention to domestic Russian politics. So-called second image theories of international relations 
have long established the connection between domestic political developments and foreign 
policy. Scholars called for a theoretical synthesis between the two political levels in a 1977 
special issue of International Organization. Peter Katzenstein organized a series of articles under 
the thesis that effective analysis of the international political system must “start at home” (1977). 
The link between foreign and domestic politics holds even for major actors in the international 
system. As one high-profile example, Jeffry Frieden (1988) demonstrated that American interwar 
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actions in the 1920s and 1930s are explicable only with reference to domestic socio-economic 
and political groups. More recently Etel Solingen’s work on military aggression (1994) and nuclear 
proliferation (2007) connected domestic and international politics. Her argument holds that, for 
costly actions such as making war or developing nuclear weapons, any state requires a domestic 
coalition to support the expense. According to this strain of international relations’ thought, the 
United States military community should be indirectly concerned with Russian protests as a 
potential catalyst for change in foreign security policy. The October Revolution of 1917, which 
upended Tsarist rule and spread communism throughout the globe, guarantees policy makers 
never forget the importance of domestic Russian political movements. 
It is not surprising that the United States has, in fact, demonstrated concern with Russian 
protest events. Actors within the United States’ diplomatic community took an active interest in 
the 2011 election protests and the continuing wave of events. Diplomats’ concern reflects a 
tension between two goals. First, the United States diplomatic community is committed to 
democracy and human rights.  This ideological commitment was on display in 2011. Former 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton criticized the Putin regime at a speech before the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), claiming that “Russian voters deserve a full 
investigation of electoral fraud and manipulation …regardless of where you live, citizenship 
requires holding your government accountable” (Pessin 2011). Clinton further claimed that a 
commitment to free elections “is part of who we are…it’s our values” (Ibid.). Again, academic 
work in international relations suggests a more nuanced reason for the United States to monitor 
domestic political unrest. Simply put, a shift in the dominant Russian ideology would alter world 
politics. In his 1999 book, Fred Halliday argued that revolution brings new ideologies to the 
international level. For example, the Cold War itself can be seen as a clash between the ideals of 
the Bolshevik Revolution and the West. If the communists had not overthrown tsarist rule, the 
subsequent trajectory of international politics would have been dramatically different (1999). By 
supporting pro-democracy protests, the State Department could facilitate the emergence of a like-
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minded, cooperative partner; by supporting certain protest elements in Russia, American 
diplomats could eventually influence foreign policy. But supporting unrest conflicts with the 
diplomatic community’s second goal vis-à-vis Russia. The United States has reason to value 
stability in the country. Successful regime change or prolonged unrest could undermine attempts 
to strengthen diplomatic connections. As Obama declared at the United Nations in September 
2015: “We need a strong Russia that can work with us to strengthen the international system as a 
whole” (Epatko 2015). For both its ideological and more pragmatic diplomatic goals, the United 
States has reason to monitor Russian protest events.  
International civil society organizations represent the second group of interested 
observers. Liberal organizations dedicated to freedom and human rights have an inherent interest 
in protests and associated state repression. These groups pursue a normative agenda, to protect 
and spread liberty and equality around the world. Such virtues find expression in democratic 
governance, freedom of speech, and civil rights—or John Locke’s life, liberty, and property. 
Protest events appear on the liberal agenda for two reasons. First, protestors often mobilize in 
reaction to curtailment of liberty or civil rights. And secondly, regimes’ repressive responses 
further exacerbate grievances: violent responses threaten bodily harm, and non-violent control 
mechanisms restrict freedom of speech and assembly. Liberal concern is heightened in an 
authoritarian or hybrid regime like Russia, where protestors cast their grievances in Lockean 
language. Not surprisingly, high-profile organizations have dedicated resources to monitoring 
Russian protest. Amnesty International, for example, tracks human rights violations around the 
world. The group published an analysis of Russian unrest, including the events in Bolotnaya 
Square (2014). A second group, Freedom House tracks civil freedom, which the Putin regime has 
curtailed in an effort to diffuse protest activity. The organization has chronicled, “a long list of 
[restrictions] that collectively testify to the shrinking of freedoms in Russia” (2015). And as a third 
example, Human Rights Watch highlighted Putin’s regime as particularly alarming in their 2014 
World Report. President Rachel Denber identified several problematic issue areas, including a 
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crackdown on freedom of expression, both in the virtual and physical realms. Denber’s group 
published an additional special report on human rights violations surrounding the 2014 Sochi 
Winter Olympics and protests against the Crimean occupation. Concerned with physical safety, 
and freedom from arbitrary governance, liberal groups serve their mission by closely monitoring 
Russian protests. 
In addition to members of the United States government and liberal organizations, a third 
set of actors, investors, are concerned with social unrest in Russia. Within the country, the 2011 
protests themselves triggered dips in the MICEX ruble-denominated index. Russian stocks listed 
on international exchanges similarly declined during this period (Gutterman 2011).  Protests 
turned market sentiment for two related reasons. First is the fear of hours lost due to social 
unrest. Large-scale protest events can lead to work stoppages, lost production, and therefore lost 
revenue. Labor protests and strikes explicitly shut down production as a bargaining tool. 
However, non-labor protests can similarly force shutdowns ( Robertson 2007). Protest events can 
thus damage economic activity directly. Investors are also indirectly affected by protest events, by 
the uncertainty associated with unrest. For example, Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov 
warned that negative investor sentiment led to significant capital flight during the wave of protests 
beginning in December 2011. Political risk analysis firms, such as the Eurasia Group, analyze the 
relationship between politics and market outcomes. The effect of the Kremlin’s information control 
measures is a clear example. Political changes have damaged IT firms’ commercial viability in 
Russia despite a cheap domestic labor market. In 2014 Google closed its engineering office in 
Moscow, in response to a law requiring all firms to store Russian residents’ personal data on 
servers that are physically located within the country (Luhn 2014). Adobe Systems canceled 
Russian operations in September of 2014 for similar reasons(Boyle 2014).  
Protest events in Russia are a phenomenon of interest for a wide range of actors, within 
and beyond the country’s borders. Putin’s regime, members of the United States government, 
international civil society groups, and investors would all benefit form an understanding of protest 
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onset, from an understanding of when and where protests are likely to occur. Social scientists are 
positioned to provide just such an explanation. Charles Ragin laid out criteria by which events or 
phenomena should be deemed worthy of social scientific inquiry: the rule of “double generality.” A 
phenomenon may first be deemed general if it affects many people directly or indirectly. The 
actors mentioned above are directly or indirectly affected by protests—in addition, of course, to 
participants on both sides of police barricades. A phenomenon secondly qualifies as general if it 
occurs frequently. Spending time and energy exploring the causes of a one-off or once-in- a-
generation event offers little generalizable knowledge. As I shall demonstrate below, such 
protests occur frequently. Thus, social scientists ought to consider Russian protest onset a 
phenomenon worthy of inquiry. This dissertation project will attempt to generate useful 
knowledge, to broaden understanding of this important phenomenon. 
The Dependent Variable 
For the project, I will borrow a dependent variable definition from social movement 
literature. Douglas McAdam provided a useful conceptual definition of protest in his 1982 book, 
Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970. According to the author, 
protests are “organized efforts to promote or resist changes in the structure of society or polity 
and nature of regime that involve recourse to non-institutional forms of political participation” 
(1982: 25). This form of expression can include demonstrations, marches, picketing, sit-ins and 
so forth. It is similarly important to clearly define what the dependent variable is not. In the 
umbrella discipline of contentious politics scholars have often studied protest alongside civil wars, 
ethnic violence, genocide and politicide (e.g., Goldstone et al. 2010). While my work is situated in 
the contentious politics tradition, it explores the causes of protest, not other forms of contention.  
As a further specification, my dependent variable is protest onset regardless of size, 
regardless of location. Events that brought the world’s attention to Russia were large, with tens of 
thousands participating. With this project I do not hope to gain an understanding of when and why 
only mass protests occur. I hope to gain an understanding of protest onset in general.  I hope to 
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gain an understanding of when and where citizens challenge the contours of society; I hope to 
gain an understanding of the social contract, the Idea of the State, in modern Russia. Mass 
protests are unarguably important events for potential audiences discussed above. Even small, 
local protests hold interest for civil society groups and investors. Human rights are at risk in any 
clash between state and society. Ildar Dadin, organizer of a set of one-man protests, was 
hassled, arrested, and reportedly tortured in prison. After Dadin became the center of an 
international human rights campaign Putin pardoned the man (Meduza 2017b). Seemingly minor 
events can similarly have an outsized impact on economic conditions. Small groups of striking 
factory workers are capable of shutting down production, as seen in agrarian equipment plants in 
Siberia (KPRF News, 2008c). In the hands of aggrieved transport drivers, a single freight truck 
can bring even Moscow rush hour to a standstill (Meduza 2017a). Justification for a 
disaggregated approach holds for the remaining audience as well: the United States government, 
and more generally, any actor concerned with regime (in)stability.  
Academic work suggests that contentious political events small and large, provincial or 
central, are often connected. Scholars have described mass protest as the product of a 
latticework of state-society friction. Large, destabilizing movements may have humble beginnings. 
And even small events that do not directly evolve into national movements establish a foundation 
for future protest—a foundation of networks and experience. Sidney Tarrow popularized the term 
“early risers” (1994) to highlight the catalytic nature of small gatherings. Building on this 
foundation, Debra Minkoff outlined a logical chain which she refers to as social movement 
sequencing (1997). Following Minkoff’s logic, early risers spark contagion by signaling elite 
vulnerability. As more and more people take part in protest actions, increases in “organizational 
density” then create a durable resource base for extant and future movements. The longer activist 
networks persist, the more likely new groups will emerge through “attribution of similarity” and 
imitation (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001).  As protests continue to spread, networks continue to 
grow and await precipitous political conditions. According to this theoretical position, then, 
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analysts hoping to understand the causes underlying mass protests would do well to consider the 
general context of protest. Otherwise, what may be the logical culmination of a sequence of 
conflict and organization will misleadingly seem to appear out of nowhere, or “out of never” 
(Kuran, 1991). 
Two examples demonstrate the importance of the disaggregated approach. The onset of 
civil war in Syria and the collapse of the Soviet Union offer cautionary tales. In each case, 
analysts who obscured the broader context of protest—the social movement sequence—were 
caught off guard by mass protest and eventual regime collapse. Neither Bashar Al-Assad nor 
Sovietologists working in the 1980’s were prepared for shocking upheaval. Working 
retrospectively, scholars have since identified the importance of small, provincial events in both 
cases.  
On the eve of calamity, President Bashar al-Assad asserted in an interview with the Wall 
Street Journal  (2011) that Syrians were not going to revolt because the country’s security forces 
had established ‘resistance credentials’. In hindsight, the leader confused center control with 
national control. What began as a set of provincial marches, organized in response to the 
imprisonment and torture of teenage vandals, steadily grew, and eventually spread across the 
country. For Reinoud Leenders and Steven Heydeman, local contextual factors explain the 
emergence of early risers, which in turn explains the emergence of mass protest. Contributors to 
social movement theory label this phenomenon “scale shift,” as small movements slowly increase 
in levels of coordination and participation. The authors argue that local context in Dar'a was 
conducive to mobilization precisely because observers considered the area secure. Assad had 
recently redirected regional troops and monitoring resources to the capital city (2014). Leenders 
and Heydeman argue that early risers in Dar’a and other areas played a key role in “animating 
and sustaining early mobilization” (2014). An overview of protest attendance figures offers means 
to trace mobilization sequencing. During the conflict’s first months relatively high levels of 
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participation were reported in Dar'a, Homs, Idlib and Deir Az-Zur, and only later in the capital of 
Damascus. 
For analysts ignoring the general context of fraying state-society relations, the fall of the 
USSR was similarly unexpected. Employing the social movement sequencing approach, Mark 
Beissinger describes the Soviet collapse, instead, as the product of “accumulating inevitability” 
(2002). In the author’s rendering, several distinct streams of protest eventually formed a tide that 
brought down one of the world’s two super powers.  Over the course of several years, over a 
massive geographic expanse, social movement networks built towards critical change. Through 
numerous expressions of discontent participants and organizers developed a base of resources 
and grievances. Beissinger identified three significant protest streams. Conservative reactionaries 
resisted the changes of Glasnost.  Nationalists hoped to push new-found local autonomy further, 
a move towards complete independence from the federal center. And miners sought economic 
sovereignty as a means to remedy wage arrears and a deteriorating quality of life.  
Restricting analytical focus to large events in Moscow and Saint Petersburg would 
completely obscure the sequence of social protest that eventually brought down the USSR. Each 
of the protest streams occupied distinct geographic zones. The economically-focused unrest, for 
example, occurred primarily in Donbass, Komi province in Northern Russia, and Northern 
Kazakhstan. Statistics gathered by Beissinger’s research team frame the context of state-society 
tension during the crucial period. Of the 5500 + protests in the Glasnost period, 1900 occurred in 
the Russian territory, and 714 of these occurred in Moscow or Saint Petersburg (around 36% of 
the total number). Individual events formed streams, which eventually formed a destabilizing tide 
as nationalism, the fight for local governance and local identity, became a dominant mobilizing 
force. Nationalist activists successfully harnessed existing social tensions related to living 
condition concerns, including miners’ grievances. The tide reached critical magnitude as 
connections between protests across time and space strengthened and multiplied (Ibid.). By 
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tracing the social movement sequence in its entirety, by gathering data on events of any size and 
any location, Beissinger generated an explanation of the USSR’s collapse. 
Other scholars have recently begun to trace the humble beginnings of mass protest. 
Research on Brazilian unrest in Sao Paulo surrounding the 2014 World Cup identified “scale 
shift.” Small groups of graduate students organized to condemn increases in public 
transportation. After a video of repressive response spread through social networks, breadth of 
protest spread in kind (Alonso and Mische 2017) . Moving to the former Soviet space, a similar 
shift occurred in Ukraine at the now famous Maidan square. Crowds capable of choking off city 
transportation, crowds reported at over 80,000 people, only appeared after police cracked down 
on a relatively small gathering, estimated at around 1,000 participants (Aytaç, Schiumerini, and 
Stokes 2017). In another former Soviet state, Sharon Wolchik chronicled social movement 
sequence in Kyrgyzstan’s color revolution. Broad-based social mobilization from Kyrgyz society 
ousted President Kurmanbek Bakiyev. Early stages of the movement, however, can be traced to 
the remote Eastern town of Naryn, where protestors voiced frustration with high oil prices and 
local corruption. Democracy activists were able to harness the economically-focused strain of 
protest to create a destabilizing mass movement (2012).  
The examples above demonstrate that smaller protests can be considered “dress 
rehearsals” that incrementally contribute to future mass mobilization (Wolchik 2012). As 
Beissinger’s study suggests, the cleavages present in dress rehearsals can reappear in the main 
event. My project is methodologically inspired by recent work that eschews monolithic treatment 
of social unrest, and is particularly inspired by Beissinger’s approach. Only by defining my 
dependent variable at the disaggregated level can I trace the streams and strains characterizing 
the modern Russian environment. This approach will allow me to create an explanation of protest 
onset that appeals to audiences concerned with both small and large events.   
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Thus, I will focus my attention on acts of protest, whatever the size, wherever the 
location. I define my dependent variable as protest onset frequency at the level of federal subject. 
Subject is not the most micro geographical unit. In the Russian context, however, federal-subject 
governments feature political and financial structures required to test leading theories, while 
avoided the gross over-simplification of a broader analytic lens. Defining protest onset sub-
nationally separates my project from much contemporary work. Tomila Lankina and Alisa 
Voznaya argue that “the spatial dimension of protest has remained marginal to the literature” 
(2015: 22). This means that a hypothetical study would focus on Russian or Brazilian protest, 
rather than protest in Moscow or Novosibirsk, San Paulo or Brasilia. Any accompanying 
explanation of onset would rely on national-level independent variables. This practice is puzzling. 
States that have provided case material for recent studies of protest onset—Argentina, Mexico, 
Russia, Ukraine—exhibit significant spatial variation in protest frequency and socio-political 
conditions (Buhaug, Cederman, and Gleditsch 2014). Failure to consider the actual location of 
events is an astounding, common flaw in much contentious politics work. I will thoroughly address 
the puzzling neglect of the local level more fully in Chapter 3.  
The Puzzling Empirical Realm 
This section begins with a discussion of the Russian Federation, a polity consisting of 
numerous types of federal subject. With the federal structure established, I will then introduce 
variation in protest onset. Since 2007, Russia has experienced over 4,500 discrete protest 
events. In the last decade two groups of scholars have begun studying the phenomenon. 
Nevertheless the academic terrain remains virtually unexplored, populated by descriptive work 
(Robertson 2013; Lankina 2015; Lankina and Voznaya, 2015).   
The modern Russian Federation consists of eighty three federal subjects, as outlined in 
the Russian Constitution of 1993. (Two recent additions, Crimea and Sevastopol, are not 
internationally recognized as part of the Russian Federation).  Subjects hold numerous 
designations: oblasts, comparable to provinces or states; republics, named after indigenous non-
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Russian majority ethnic groups; krais, originally established as lower-order political units; and 
autonomous oblasts and autonomous okrugs, which emerged as small ethnic groups won 
autonomy from surrounding oblasts or krais. Finally, Moscow and Saint Petersburg hold the 
designation of federal city, which entails full subject-hood. Subject designations appeared during 
the Bolshevik years, and the formative years of the Russian Soviet Federative Social Republic 
(RSFSR), the core member of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). With the collapse 
of the USSR, a constituent assembly met to reform relations between the federation and subjects. 
Members hoped to phase out hierarchal political status of the subjects, in favor or an equal 
system based on the German Lander (Sheehy 1993). After a contentious bargaining process—
one that may have threated the survival of the federation (Treisman 2001) —the 1993 
Constitution did indeed reduce disparities between designations. However, individual regions 
continued to press the center for conciliations, a process which produced numerous bilateral 
agreements.  James Hughes and other scholars label the resulting structure “asymmetrical 
federalism” (2001). Each type of federal subject has equal representation in chief executive 
elections, and in the Federation Council, the upper house of the federal legislature. Each type of 
subject features a local executive, parliament, judicial body, and budget. However, under the 
Russian system of asymmetrical federalism, each subject enjoys differing degrees of financial 
and policy-making autonomy from the center.  And this autonomy is fluid and extra-legal, as bi-
lateral agreements can contradict federal or regional constitutions or go entirely ignored. For this 
reason, Alfred Stephan (2000) describes federal-center relations as difficult to represent in 
concrete terms. Indeed, a degree of vagueness was built into the post-Soviet constitution: Article 
66 of the 1993 constitution leaves unclear conflict-adjudication between the center and its 
subjects. Hughes argues that this provision was included to allow bi-lateral center-subject 
negotiations as ad-hoc ameliorative measures (2001).  
Because of the murky nature of this political arrangement, scholars of Russian 
asymmetrical federalism infer relations from outcomes rather than legal designation. Scholarly 
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work on center-subject budget transfers serves as a useful example. Scholars often assert that 
certain regions, republics and the “autonomous” subjects, are privileged in comparison with their 
counterparts (Triesman 2001). Vladimir Popov conducted a study in order to quantify this 
privilege. After determining that subjects had similar budgets by law, Popov decided to explore 
federal relations by looking at outcome indicators such as tax revenues, spending, and federal 
transfers. Popov concluded that, more than subject type, financial privilege stemmed from 
political performance. Specifically, net fiscal transfers varied in step with votes for pro-central 
government parties (2004). Following this example, I do not expect subject designation to 
influence protest onset frequency. Below, Figure 1 displays the current federal boundaries. The 
two federal cities are not displayed. 
Figure 1: Russian Federal Subject Boundaries 
 
In recent years, Russia has experienced thousands of protest events, occurring unevenly 
throughout federal subjects. Since 2007, a team of Russian sociologists have maintained a virtual 
chronicle of protest—housed on the website namarsh.ru. The team gathers dispatches from 
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regional print and web journalists. Dispatches cover protest events triggered by any type of 
grievance, from environmental degradation, to wage conditions, to political corruption. The 
website is funded by opposition politician and chess grandmaster Gary Kasparov. Tomila Lankina 
and Alisa Voznaya created a dataset from namarsh.ru reports, hand-coding the timing and 
location of protests. I build on the existing data, coding an additional year of event reports and 
creating a dependent variable dataset that covers the time period 2007-2013. Data availability 
dictates the starting year.  However, 2004-2005 marked a critical juncture in Russia’s political 
history, when a Duma decision abolished popular election of regional governors (Robertson, 
2013). Even if data for 2005 and earlier years were available it would be reasonable to analyze 
the two periods separately.  
An initial look at protest onset data reveals concentration in the two federal cities. Over 
1400 protests occurred in Moscow, and over 500 in Saint Petersburg. Despite such high 
frequencies, the data further show that the majority of Russia’s more than 4,500 protests occur 
outside the two major cities (more than 70% of the total figure). Frequency varies widely across 
the eighty three federal subjects. The histogram displayed in Figure 2 below offers a quick look at 
variation. Nearly twenty regions experienced over fifty events from 2007-2012. Fifteen regions 
experienced between twenty five and fifty events. Seventeen regions experienced from ten to 
twenty five. And twenty six regions experienced ten events or less. For a full list of regions by 
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Figure 2: Protest Onset Histogram 2007-2013 
 
Leading theories of social protest onset offer an initial cut at explaining this variance. The 
prevailing set of theoretical tools consists of three approaches to understanding conditions 
shaping protest onset—political opportunity structure theory, resource mobilization theory and 
grievance theory. Each of these three approaches offers tools for a structural explanation. As 
Chapter 3 demonstrates, elements of the triad are often applied as explanations in isolation. Only 
one explicit application to the Russian case exists: Lankina’s exploratory exercise based on 
political opportunity structure. Neither this, nor an alternative based on the other traditions 
provides a comprehensive explanation. 
First, political opportunity structure predicts covariance between onset frequency and 
local government openness. The initial, and perhaps the most well-known, strain of social 
movement theory is political opportunity structure. Writing in the midst of the civil rights struggle 
and the Vietnam War, Peter Eisinger (1973) produced a foundational expression of the position in 
his study of protest onset in 43 American cities. In the late 1960’s and early 1970’s political 
scientists were concerned with exploring the relationship between so-called “political 
environment” variables and political outcomes of interest. Eisinger attempted to theorize the 
context as a structure of political opportunity facing a particular community, which served to 























Source: Updated Lankina and Voznaya Protest Data (Appendix i) 
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whether a city is under a mayor or city manager; an at large or ward-alderman voting system; 
partisan or non-partisan voting system. Employing the instrumental rationality assumption, 
Eisinger argued that individuals would choose to protest when there exists little opportunity to 
exercise influence through delegates or representative bodies. In other words, “protest is a device 
by which actors making demands in the political system attempt to maximize the impact of their 
meager resources…at the same time they strive to minimize the costs which they might incur by 
such demand making”(1973: 13).  Eisinger posited two hypotheses linking political opportunity 
structure and protest onset. A linear relationship would see people frustrated as opportunity 
structures were “closed,” or non-representative and non-responsive. A second, curvilinear model, 
predicts protest as opportunity structure begin to open. The expected benefit of protest actions in 
either very closed or very open structures is similarly low. When government is not at all 
responsive or representative, would-be dissidents expect to fail. When government is very 
responsive, directing resources from the system is a more likely route towards success. In the 
middle range previously excluded groups acquire enough influence to hope to change the 
system. In the structural tradition, then, Eisinger’s theory—and modern versions—explain protest 
events through contextual factors. However, the context is limited to the political realm. This strain 
of thought has thrived since its introduction. Indeed, the position is so often amended as to 
“become a sponge that soaks up every aspect of the social movement environment” (Gamson 
and Meyer, 1996). Some scholars even use the term in a loose, ad hoc manner, to describe any 
protest driver. In the following, I refer to the more focused, political formulation—as discussed in 
Chapter 2.  
In order to evaluate this first argument, scholars must gather data pertaining to sub-
national political structure.  Recent work by Lankina (2015), an international relations specialist at 
the London School of Economics, followed this approach. The author created measures of 
regional political opportunity structure openness. Instead of utilizing Eisinger’s objective local 
political indicators, Lankina uses a subjective index of regional democracy: an index compiled by 
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the Moscow Carnegie Center and the Independent Institute of Social Policy, covering the years 
2000–2005. The index is based on expert opinions. Respondents were asked to indicate the 
degree to which they considered each federal subject, "a political system, one of the 
characteristics of which is the quality of being completely or almost completely responsive to all 
its citizens," meaning that citizens must be able "to formulate" and "signify" their preferences and 
have them "weighed equally in the conduct of the government” (Moscow Carnegie Center). 
Lankina employed the results to argue that regions exhibiting comparatively open regional 
political systems are among the leaders in protest activism. She claimed that several members of 
the top ten protesting regions are also those that have in the past received high democracy 
ratings. It is true that, Sverdlovsk, Samara, Perm, and St. Petersburg have been among 
“democracy” leaders according to the subjective index. And further, it is true that these regions 
are among the leaders in protest activism. Upon further inspection, however, Lankina’s argument 
is not compelling. 
This evidence amounts to selecting several regions which exhibit the expected 
relationship between political opportunity structure and social protest onset. John Stuart Mill’s 
System of Logic quickly reveals the incomplete nature of Lankina’s claimed relationship. For Mill, 
a necessary condition must always be present if the effect is present. Any properties which are 
absent when the effect is present cannot be necessary conditions for the effect. Comparing other 
regions’ political opportunity scores and onset frequency reveals that a relatively open political 
opportunity structure is not a necessary condition of high protest frequency. Some regions score 
highly on protests frequency but low on openness: Penza; Primorsky; Voronzeh; Krasnodar; 
Kirov; Ulyanovsk. Moving beyond Lankina’s narrow examples renders the political opportunity 
structure explanation inadequate; something else appears to drive protest onset. At best an open 
political opportunity structure—at least under this operationalization—explains part of the 
phenomenon of protest onset in Russia.  
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The second set of theoretical tools, resource mobilization theory, captures part of the 
environment that has not been “soaked into” political opportunity structure. Resource 
mobilization, given name and initial formulation by McCarthy and Zald (1977), places explanatory 
power in contextual factors that empower would-be dissidents. The authors focus on resources 
available to collective actors in advanced industrial societies. Increased personal resources, 
professionalization and financial support allow citizens to create professional movement 
associations. Following this approach, protest drivers include the population of potential 
protestors, the presence of potential sponsors and organizational capacity among activists. But in 
addition to human and financial resources, cognitive and motivational factors facilitate 
mobilization. Educational attainment, for instance, has long been identified as a driver of 
traditional and non-traditional political participation (Almond and Verba, 1963; Chenoweth and 
Ulfelder, 2015a). Resource mobilization theory shares assumptions with Eisinger’s political 
opportunity structure theory. McCarthy and Zald’s framework rests on the rationalist assumption: 
that would-be protestors act when perceived costs exceed perceived benefits. A further similarity, 
both strains of thought assume that grievances are ubiquitous. Indeed, according to McCarthy 
and Zald, “the definition of grievances will expand to meet the funds and support personnel 
available” (1973: 103).  
As an exploratory exercise, I will again evaluate perhaps the simplest operationalization 
of this theoretical position. Willing participants are the fundamental protest resource.  For this 
reason, scholars hypothesize that higher population numbers correspond with higher resource 
mobilization, and thus higher likelihood of protest onset (McCarthy and Zald 1977a; Chenoweth 
and Ulfelder 2015a). The position would predict regional population size and onset frequency to 
closely covary. This logic explains the high frequency of protests taking place in the two largest 
Russian cities, Moscow and St Petersburg (Robertson 2011, 2013). However, a simple 
comparison of regions indicates that this operationalization of resource mobilization, like political 
openness, does not represent a necessary condition for high protest frequency. For example, the 
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city of Kaliningrad has a population of nearly one million and accounts for a rough 2% of the 
country’s protests—comparable to the 3% of protests experienced by Northern and East Siberian 
divisions, which hold populations 5 and ten times larger than that of Kaliningrad. Other high 
population areas experience low protest frequencies, including the North Caucasus (17.7 million) 
and West Siberian divisions (14.6 million). Simple correlational statistics further weaken the 
resource mobilization position. For all 81 regions outside of the federal cities, the r-squared 
correlational statistic between population and protest onset is barely over .5. Under a simple 
understanding of the statistic, population size explains roughly half of the variation in protest 
onset in Russia. 
The third and final theoretical position focusses the analytical lens firmly on grievances. 
Again, the foundational statement appeared during the height of protest activities in America, in 
Ted Robert Gurr’s Why Do Men Rebel? The study includes cross-sectional analysis of 
contentious political events from 1961 to 1965 and assigns explanatory power to socio-economic 
factors inspiring participation. Grievance inducing factors could include economic discrimination, 
political discrimination, religious cleavages, or perceived financial injustice. At the heart of Gurr’s 
theory lies the frustration-aggression thesis. Gurr posited frustration as the principal psychological 
root of human rebellion. This frustration can arise out of relative deprivation, the “perceived 
discrepancy between value expectations and value capabilities” (1970, 37), or simply put, the 
difference between how things are and how things should be. At first glance this third theoretical 
tradition might appear incompatible with structural analysis. Explanatory power is placed in the 
minds of men and women. For this reason grievance theory has been labeled psychological 
(Goldstone, 2001). However, the level of analysis is not the agent, but rather the political 
environment which are likely to engender grievances. This approach can be considered a 
structural theory, because the assumed driver of protest is a “fundamental social dislocation,” 
represented by broad socio-political context. 
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A grievance-based explanation for protest onset is again incomplete at best. From 2007 
to 2013 federal subjects that score relatively highly on common indicators of grievance do not 
score similarly highly on protest frequency. In fact, the most deprived regions—those with highest 
levels of unemployment and with lowest levels of regional wealth measured in GDP per capita—
are those exhibiting some of the lowest levels of protest activism. Lankina and Voznaya 
highlighted the absence of North Caucasus republics among protest leaders. As the authors point 
out, this absence is particularly damaging for the grievance position considering the highly 
publicized socioeconomic problems in the region. For instance, the republics of Karachay-
Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria recorded only six and five protests respectively for the entire 
period under investigation, while Adygea recorded three protests. Again, a simple correlation 
further weakens the explanation. The r-squared statistic for average protest and average 
unemployment across sub-regions is a weak .20. Recently Robertson (2013) joined Lankina and 
Voznaya in highlighting the weakness of the grievance position in the study of Russian protest 
onset.  
Each one of these leading theories offers an explanation for some regions and not for 
others; each strain offers a sufficient but unnecessary element of protest onset. The three leading 
theories, any one taken alone, offer only partial explanation of variation. For instance, none of the 
three leading theories explain low levels of protest onset in the North Caucasus region or the Far 
East region, together the home of 17 federal subjects. Both feature high rates of unemployment, 
and particularly puzzling, the Far East also features high urbanization rates, and open political 
opportunity structures. The region should produce relatively high onset rates, according to the 
three theoretical positions. This is not the case. Not surprisingly, given the preceding 
demonstration, something is missing; something is omitted. An explanatory model based on any 
single element of the triad would suffer from omitted variable bias. But even an integrated model, 
featuring all three, would suffer from omitted variable bias.  
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The omitted variable is state capacity. Most commonly, a state’s capacity is considered 
high when would-be activists are deterred through force or the threat of force (McAdam, 1982). 
Coercion is only one aspect of the state, however. Softer and more abstract forms of power are 
just as effective as boots and truncheons. States coopt their populations through measures aimed 
to ameliorate suffering, such as social spending programs and access to social services. States 
can also develop cooperative power that engenders feelings of loyalty.  Fjelde and de Soysa’s 
(2009) tri-part taxonomy nicely captures the dimensions of capacity that shape variations in 
protest onset. A theory of state capacity expects high levels of protest where state capacity is 
weak along dimensions of coercion, cooptation, and cooperation. As discussed in detail in 
Chapter 3, the only element captured in Social Movement Studies is coercive capacity, often 
crudely rolled into political opportunity structure.  
Looking at the two most puzzling regions, this state capacity lens produces clarity not 
offered by the three proceeding positions. Quiescence in the North Caucasus appears to be the 
product of coercive capacity and cooperational capacity. A snapshot of Grozny, capital of 
Chechnya and the most recognizable city in the region, encapsulates a set of structural 
conditions not conducive to protest: heavily armed police patrol a pristine downtown, one marked 
with modern commercial buildings, colorful light displays, and a massive, modern mosque. Less 
than a decade ago the city was a scene of utter destruction, razed city blocks and burned-out 
cars.  The local Idea of the State takes the form of an iron fist legitimately buffering the population 
from the horrors of instability. Quantitative operationalizations validate this interpretation—as 
further discussed in Chapter 3. The area features very low levels of crime, a measure of coercive 
capacity, and very high vote shares for the dominant United Russia party, a measure of 
cooperational capacity. The key to understanding low protest rates in the Far East lies with the 
third dimension: cooptational capacity. Local governments spend very generously on social 
programs in the area. As well-known example, oligarch Roman Abramovich served as governor 
of the federal subject Chukotka. Abramovich is today known as a secretive billionaire owner of 
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the Chelsea football team, rumored to exchange financial support for protection from Putin. As 
governor, the oligarch lavished financial assistance on residents of Chukotka, in a push to raise 
the local standard of living. With his goal accomplished, he departed for more lavish surroundings 
in London. Again turning to quantitative indicators, each of the 9 federal subjects in the Far East 
feature rates significantly higher than average on per capita social spending. Here the Idea of the 
State takes the form of a provider, buying off would-be dissidents even under conditions 
otherwise conducive to protest.  
A Model Of Russian Protest 
I expand on existing work to develop and operationalize an integrated model of protest 
onset, titled the Idea of the State, over the next three chapters. Members of the Putin regime, the 
United States military and diplomatic communities, liberal civil society organizations, and 
investors would all benefit from understanding the conditions precipitating and militating against 
protest events in Russia; members of this diverse audience would deem important an explanation 
of when and where protests are more and less likely to occur. Political scientists, economists and 
international relations experts strive to provide the analytical tools needed to produce such an 
explanation. Or put another way, King, Keohane and Verba (1998) claim that “social science 
constitutes an attempt to make sense of social situations that we perceive as more or less 
complex.” In order to make sense of phenomena, social scientists must first select an analytical 
strategy. With the complexity of reality reduced and ordered, scholars can move on to address 
causal forces. My approach is, thus, to simplify the reality of Russian protest, in a fashion that will 
create a useful understanding of cause. I take inspiration from a noted historian. 
There are innumerable ways to describe the onset, or the occurrence, of an event. As the 
historian E.H. Carr argues there are, in fact, infinite pathways to identifying “cause.” In his book 
What Is History? Carr (1961) provides a description of this concept. In history, every event is the 
product of innumerable contingent forces occurring simultaneously.  The historian’s job is to sift 
through the mass of effects and create a useful account of say, the origin of World War II, the fall 
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of the Roman Empire, the Arab Spring, or protests in Russia. For Carr the quality of good history 
is utility, not truth. Numerous versions of an event can be deemed true, but only a useful account 
will allow consumers to learn from historical analysis, in order to shape future situations. In a 
memorable example, the author presents a hypothetical scenario: one rainy night, a drunken 
party-goer decides to drive home against the wishes of his hosts. Elsewhere, a man, suddenly 
realizing he is out of cigarettes, dons a raincoat and heads to the corner store on foot. Minutes 
later with the smoking-man lying dead in the road, the contemporary historian, the social analyst, 
is tasked with creating an explanation of the account. Equally valid arguments would deem 
weather conditions, a lack of cigarettes, or an intoxicated driver as the main cause of the 
accident. However, any account that did not lay primary blame with the driver would do little to 
prevent similar future accidents. Social scientists face a similar conundrum when crafting 
accounts of causation. 
My integrated model places explanatory power with structural conditions in Russian 
federal subjects. An event can be considered the cause of underlying structural conditions, or a 
short-term catalyst. The goal of the first analytical strategy, the structural approach, is the 
identification of “stable conditions that systematically determine” where an event is likely to occur. 
James Fearon and David Laitin’s 2003 American Political Science Review article epitomizes this 
position. The article employed statistical techniques to create measures of civil war risk.  Fearon 
and Laitin argued that civil wars have structural roots, represented by fragmented control of state 
territory. The contrasting position holds that structural positions are incidental to contentious 
politics onset, because the drivers are short-term triggers. This perspective holds that structural 
conditions do not cause events to emerge. Instead cause resides with a triggering event, or a 
concerted activist campaign as described in agency-based approaches. As one example, 
Klandermans and Staggenborg (2002) argue that contentious politics onset should be understood 
as caused by individual protest entrepreneurs. He argues that “movements consist of individuals,” 
and thus too should the analytical frame. Fearon and Laitin’s work includes policy 
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recommendations that nicely demonstrate the difference between the two strategies. A structural 
approach finds that all sets of belligerent agents emerge in similar conditions of weak state 
control—be they communists in Southeast Asia and Latin America, Islamic fundamentalists in 
Afghanistan, Algeria or Kashmir, or reactionary militants in Nicaragua. If this is true, any short-
term trigger or ideology doctrine is incidental to cause. The attendant policy recommendation 
becomes strengthening state capacity, not a focus on individuals.  My model describes variation 
in protest onset likelihood probability as driven by variation in similar underlying structural factors.  
The Idea of the State framework hypothesizes that protest onset varies systematically 
with particular structural conditions. Conditions include the triad of theories from Social Movement 
Studies along with state capacity, as four sufficient but unnecessary causal drivers. It expects 
high levels of protest in conditions of high social mobilization capacity, or high levels of grievance, 
or open political opportunity structure, or weak state capacity; the framework expects low levels of 
protest under inverted conditions. This project follows the tradition laid out by Fearon and Laitin, 
attempting to explain protest onset variation through stable conditions. The relatively 
undeveloped nature of Russian protest studies allows me to provide the first test of this general 
analytical wager. Scholars have not yet determined whether or not a structural approach will bear 
fruit at all. A test of the structural methodological position versus the agency alternative is itself a 
novel academic contribution. Do there exist “stable conditions that systematically determine” 
where and when Russian protest events occur? Findings—presented in Chapter 5—offer an 
affirmative answer.  
According to statistical results, structural factors do, in fact, systematically explain 
variation in Russian protest from 2007-2013. A time series negative binomial regression model 
reports that protests are most likely in federal subjects featuring highly urbanized populations, 
high unemployment, and low social spending. These structural factors provide a probabilistic 
explanation of Russian protest variation over the time horizon. The finding regarding state 
capacity to coopt is particularly interesting. Ceteris paribus, a one thousand ruble increase in 
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social cultural spending per capita results in a 3% decrease in expected onset potential. Such a 
magnitude is not seen with the other significant independent variables. A one thousand ruble 
increase is relatively small, less than 3% of most Russian federal subjects’ current spending 
levels. Moreover, the finding is interesting because state capacity is generally omitted from 
protest models. When it does appear, it is restricted to coercive capacity. Findings regarding 
cooptational capacity underscore the importance of a dimensional approach. Not all of the 
hypotheses generated by the Idea of the State framework were accepted, however. Neither 
political opportunity structure, nor coercive capacity, nor cooperational capacity were significantly 
linked to protest onset frequency. These elements seem to hold little explanatory power, at least 
in the Russian context, over the time period 2007-2013. A case study exercise in Chapter 6 
further evaluates the statistical results and offers suggestions for model improvement.  
These findings throw a broad challenge to agent-based positions, such as so-called New 
Social Movement Theory (NSM). The school of thought encompasses several strains of 
academic work first appearing in the 1980’s and 1990’s. New social movement theorists describe 
their work as ‘new’ in reference to classical Marxism, eschewing the monolithic theory’s economic 
reductionism and class-based understanding of identity. The school is loosely connected 
(Buechler, 1995), held together by a focus on temporary and fluid catalyzing factors.  Scholars 
emphasize the ephemeral nature of networks undergirding social action (Melucci 1989)–in direct 
opposition to structural applications of the resource mobilization approach. Others sketch a 
similar story of socially-constructed grievances and ideology, amorphous and unmoored to 
objective conditions (Laraña, Johnston, and Gusfield 1994). The hallmark methodological 
standpoint cuts against the structuralist analytical gamble. Contributors study ethnicity, gender, 
and sexuality. All are united by an approach that places explanation with quickly-changing context 
specific factors. My explanation will be based on macro, structural, factors that shape the relative 
likelihood of Russian protest.  
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In a sense, this project features two competitions: the first, between structural and agent-
based explanations, and the second, within the structural methodological realm, a tournament of 
variables, a search for the most compelling explanation offered by Social Movement Studies. 
Based on statistical results, underscored by case study analysis, structural factors do offer a 
systematic explanation. Protest onset patterns vary in step with urbanization, state capacity to 
coopt the populace through public spending, and grievances associated with unemployment. 
Moving Forward 
In one of his earliest speeches, in 1999, Vladimir Putin claimed that “Russia needs strong 
state power and must have it” (Taylor, 2011). Over the course of the remaining chapters I will 
attempt to reveal the contours of the state that produce strength vis-à-vis social unrest. The Idea 
of the State framework offers a set of hypothesized conditions that shape relative protest onset 
frequency across federal subjects. Findings generate a novel understanding of this important 
phenomenon.  
A foundation of theory and data facilitates the knowledge-building exercise. I build the 
datasets needed to evaluate Lankina’s political opportunity structure explanation, along with other 
theoretical positions, and my integrated Idea of the State framework. In so doing, I conduct the 
first ever robust exploration of Russian protest onset frequency. The next chapter leverages a 
literature review to reveal major theoretical blind spots, in particular inadequate treatment of the 
state. Over the last several decades social movement theorists and state capacity theorists have 
covered similar conceptual and empirical ground without much communication. By merging the 
traditions, I will craft a comprehensive structural framework that generates falsifiable hypotheses 
regarding the likelihood of protest onset. The third chapter discusses independent variable 
conceptualization and operationalization from the two areas of study. Moving to the dependent 
variable, the fourth chapter introduces my hand-coding approach to Russian protest data. In the 
fifth chapter I subject the integrated Idea of the State framework to statistical testing, using a 
variety of models. Any observed patterns merely suggest causal mechanisms at play. The sixth 
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chapter, thus, offers a process tracing exercise, evaluating protests in the case of Novosibirsk 
and neighboring Krasnoyarsk Krai, regions similar in all respects other than state capacity profile 
and onset potential.  
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II - Theories of Protest and State Power 
Introduction 
Social science, the practice of crafting explanations for social phenomena, is a collective 
enterprise. Even if political scientists, economists, and sociologists do not stand on the shoulders 
of their predecessors, they explicitly and implicitly connect to extant work. Over the course of a 
research project, scholars make choices that situate articles or books within a broad academic 
narrative. Citation choice directly forms a conversation with previous work. And research design 
shapes the conversation by defining the realm of testable hypotheses, and subsequently, the 
realm of viable critique. In a memorable quote, Dietrich Reuschemeyer observed that “there are 
many crossroads where social scientists meet, move, halt, or collide”(2003, 22).  
In this chapter I place my study of Russian protest onset within a tradition of scholarly 
work. I begin with a discussion of major contributions from political scientists and sociologists, a 
body of work today known as Social Movement Studies. Since the 1960s scholars have 
developed theoretical resources intended to facilitate the understanding of social movements and 
protest events. The following literature review exercise identifies possible structural conditions 
linked to protest onset potential—this is its primary purpose.  
I further leverage the review to argue that the state of the art features two problems. 
Today, a consensus view of the field identifies three potential drivers of protest: grievance, 





 Very few structural studies, however, evaluate more than two of the concepts. Whether 
the triad is complimentary or competing, omitting any one element is unjustified. As a second 
problem, the theoretical triad grossly under-theorizes the role of the state. Indeed, compared with 
a parallel research strain, civil war and conflict studies, Social Movement Studies’ formulation 
takes on the appearance of a caricature or straw man. To address both problems, I leverage 
resources produced by structural civil war studies and statist theories associated with the 
Copenhagen School of international relations. Only by synthesizing insights from these traditions 
will I be able to effectively test the structuralist analytical gamble: that there do indeed exist 
“stable conditions that systematically determine” where a protest event is likely to occur. What I 
title the Idea of the State theory of protest shifts focus to the state’s ability to mitigate driving 
factors. My framework thus contributes to several academic traditions. In the following sections I 
will explore the meeting points—and collision points—between my work and work on protest, civil 
wars, and state capacity.  
A chronological literature reveals the triad’s enduring nature. A timeless truth, scholars 
have discovered and rediscovered the driving factors. Reiteration across time demonstrates the 
importance of all three; any understanding of protest onset must include a representation of each. 
But this is not enough. A comprehensive understanding of protest must include a fourth element: 
state capacity.  
Scholarly work on protest and state capacity has evolved alongside the course of human 
history. The state of the world, current political, military or sociological events, shapes the 
academic realm. As they attempt to generate useful knowledge, scholars frequently take 
inspiration from the headlines. Robert Keohane notes that big research questions often appear “in 
the wake of disaster” (2008). Whole sub-fields emerged after major events in the 20th century: 
international relations after World War I (Carr 1939; Morgenthau 1948); security studies during  
the Cold War (Schelling 1960); modern political economy after the economic malaise of the 
1970’s (Gilpin 1975); terrorism studies after September 11
th





chapter indicated, recent protests in Russia brought international and scholarly attention to the 
phenomenon. Russian scholars have recently attempted to identify structural determinants of 
protest onset in the country (Robertson 2007; Lankina and Voznaya 2015). And the Arab Spring 
conflict has heightened attention to protest across authoritarian or mixed regimes (Wolchik 2012; 
Koesel and Bunce 2012). Since the 1950s, protest and conflict theorists similarly reacted to 
contemporary events. In the post-war decades, scholars faced a wave of protest, as people took 
to the streets in support of civil rights, anti-poverty, and anti-war movements—a tumult, or 
“American reckoning” (Appy 2015), that shaped national identity.  
As I argue below, the current state of the field provides a useful but incomplete set of 
tools for the structuralist. To improve my position, I turn to the state-centered study of civil wars. 
In the wake of the Cold War, a new set of disasters shifted the academic community’s attention. 
Ethnic conflicts and wars of secession represented a disaster that shifted scholarly attention 
towards civil wars (Kaldor 2007). Scholars studying intra-state conflicts greatly expanded on 
political opportunity structure theorists’ concept of state capacity. Below I describe the history of 
scholarly work in these areas, proceeding roughly in chronological order. A synthesis of the two 
traditions produces a complete, but large, set of structural drivers. In order to provide an orderly 
theoretical framework for the study of Russian protest onset, I introduce Buzan’s concept of state 
capacity before concluding. 
Social Protest Theory Over Time 
The following literature review serves to identify potential protest drivers. Through a 
historical walkthrough of Social Movement Studies, I argue that a structural theoretical framework 
of protest onset must include political opportunity structure, grievance, and social mobilization 
capacity. The three major strains of Social Movement Studies emerge time and again, and make 
up the current state of the field. Failure to include any element is inexcusable. Even such a robust 
framework would be incomplete, however.  I further argue that social movement theorists missed 





 set of protest drivers. Sophisticated statist elements first appear in Social Movement Studies in 
the 1970’s. After that point—as reviews of the current state of the field make clear—insights were 
inadequately brought into theoretical canon. A search for structural protest drivers must extend 
beyond narrow disciplinary boundaries, to leverage contentious politics work. 
My search must begin with the turbulent post World War II decades. Throughout the 
1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, protests erupted across America—The New York Times reported 
thousands of protest events in the country during this time period (McCarthy, McPhail, and Smith 
1996). Study of protest emerged under a concurrent trend within academia. The behavioral 
revolution, perhaps best described as a “mood towards developing systematic theories and 
empirical testing” (Dahl 1961, 765), brought grand theoretical frameworks and big quantitative 
datasets to prominence. Dahl titled his own framework pluralism, which described political 
influence as the product of resources such as social standing or wealth. Referred to later by 
statist theorists as the “cash-register” theory of government, the pluralist state simply tallied up 
resources and preferences to produce appropriate policy (Evans, Reuschemeyer, and Skocpol 
1985). Working under this framework, the study of protest became the study of “relatively 
powerless groups” (Adrian 1960); because protestors lacked the resources held by mainstream 
political groups, they had only a minor effect on politics under pluralism. Thus, the pluralist 
established a place for protest studies while simultaneously deeming the phenomenon marginal.  
Refinement of the grand framework generated useful theoretical tools. Beginning with the 
work of Michael Lipsky, protest scholars began to carve out an independent area of study.  
Lipsky’s American Political Science Review article “Protest as Political Resource” established a 
conceptual baseline for protest studies (1968). The article’s title reveals that the author is clearly 
working under Dahl’s pluralist influence. Lipsky, indeed, embraced the behavioralist reliance on 
theoretical frameworks as organizational devices. In his work the author bemoans the widespread 
use of the single-case case study, disconnected from broader theoretical discourses (e.g., Walker 
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However, Lipsky rejected the substantive content of pluralism as applicable to protest 
study: protestors were not relatively powerless groups, as measured by pluralist resources. 
Instead, protestors created their own resources in a way distinct from other political actors.  
Against the cash-register theory of the state, Lipsky posited that under certain conditions 
protestors could generate resources necessary to impact policy. This position corresponded with 
James Q. Wilson’s (1961) contemporary argument that protestors can, and do, increase their 
bargaining ability without acquiring Dahl’s resources of influence. Lipsky’s work strongly argued 
that protest ought to be studied as an independent subject, and simultaneously offered the first 
potential structural drivers of social protest onset.  
The major streams of modern Social Movement Studies are first visible in “Protest as 
Political Resource.”  Lipsky established four dimensions of “protest as political resource.” Each 
dimension conditioned the likelihood that a social movement would successfully influence policy. 
First is personnel recruitment, uniting individuals under a common cause.  Recruitment covaried 
with fears, real or perceived, facing members of society—in other words covaried with perceived 
grievances. Second is the informational environment in which protests are embedded. Lipsky 
theorized that cohesive movements maximized exposure through communication media; media 
coverage, in newspapers and on television, raised awareness of protests. Exposure benefitted 
protestors by increasing recruits and winning allies—by increasing social mobilization capacity. 
The third resource dimension is interaction with third parties. In their struggle, successful 
protestors win support from third-party allies and combat third-party enemies—enemies to include 
repressive state agents. Allies can include civil society groups and other protest movements, 
while enemies can include repressive arms of the state. Finally, the fourth dimension is support 
from targeted groups, which include institutionalized political actors.  Lipsky saw effective protest 
movements receiving support from elected officials, through conventional political channels such 
as petitioning and voting—through openings in the political opportunity structure.  
 
 
  54   
    
Lipsky’s resource model, already present in the late 1960’s, suggests that grievances, 
social mobilization capacity, political opportunity structure, and a measure of state capacity all 
shape protest conditions. The model intended to “assist in ordering data and indicating the 
salience for research of a number of aspects of protest” (1968: 1157). Dahl’s pluralism 
established a common vocabulary and set of concepts to order the study of all politics. Lipsky’s 
resource dimensions accomplished the same goal for the circumscribed area of protest studies. 
At the same time, the dimensions offered theoretical tools for structural researchers. Lipsky’s 
model was not designed as a theory of protest onset per se. The author attempted to explain the 
conditions under which protest movements could affect political decisions. His conceptual tools 
nevertheless offer plausible causal drivers of onset. In fact, his four categories foreshadow the 
major theoretical positions introduced over the next half century in Social Movement Studies. 
Today structural studies of protest onset evaluate the triad of grievance, political opportunity 
structure, and social mobilization capacity, each of which resembles a posited dimension. 
Lipsky’s resource dimensions theory set the stage for over half a century of work in protest 
studies. 
The first attempts to identify structural determinants of protest events, appearing during 
the 1960’s, were atheoretical, offering no guidance to the modern scholar. Protest scholars, like 
political scientists more generally during this period, explored observable patterns between so-
called political environment variables and outcomes. Political environment studies exemplified the 
behavioralist commitment towards empirical testing (Russet et al. 1968). The goal was to employ 
quantitative methods to identify the effect of political environment elements across numerous 
dependent variables. Several examples from protest studies illustrate such work. In an early 
piece, Lieberson and Silverman (1965) found evidence that race riots occurred more frequently 
under at-large electoral systems than in small district ward systems. Other studies produced 
conflicting accounts of the predictive power of “environmental” variables.  Palley and Palley 
(1969) found that objective indicators of social and economic deprivation were unreliable 
 
 
  55   
    
predictors of urban strife. This contradicted Downes’ (1968) finding that that the incidence of riots 
and protest fluctuated systematically with economic prospects and educational attainment of 
black adults. These contributions, and many others, constituted the first generation of quantitative 
protest studies. However, the findings often conflicted, a problem exacerbated by the lack of 
explicit theorizing. As Peter Eisinger (1973) noted, the connection between environmental 
variables and protest patterns was “seldom made explicit theoretically” (1973: 11). Absent a 
theoretical framework, scholars were unable to carry on productive debate and refine studies to 
account for disparate results. 
Peter Eisinger’s work brought clarity to early structural studies of protest onset and 
created one of the three major strains of Social Movement Studies; he provided a pathway 
beyond atheoretical work in the political environment tradition. Eisinger restricted the definition of 
political environment, merging the empirical goals of Lieberson and Silverman, the Palleys and 
Downes, with Lipsky’s dedication to explicit theory crafting. Eisinger theorized that each American 
city held a particular structure of political opportunities, which shaped protest behavior. This 
original formulation included specific institutional factors: for example, whether the chief executive 
is an elected mayor, or a manager hired by the city council, and whether elections are ward 
aldermanic or partisan. Such formal arrangements defined the political opportunity structure for 
each city. Protest is here not primarily the product of resources, even resources generated by 
protestors. Protest is instead primarily a function of “openings, weak spots, barriers” (1973: 20).   
Political opportunity structure, under Eisinger’s theory, conditioned the likelihood of 
protest through mechanisms of frustration and rationalist cost-benefit calculation. Protest erupted 
as a reaction to frustrated groups’ inability to gain access to political processes, an inability to 
influence political outcomes through conventional means. However, rational protestors would 
choose not to protest under hopeless conditions, conditions in which neither conventional nor 
unconventional actions have an effect on policy. The joint theory generated two rival hypotheses. 
First is a linear relationship between political opportunity structure openness and protest 
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prevalence. As groups are increasingly blocked from policy creation, frustration sends them to the 
streets. Second is a non-linear, U-shaped relationship between the two variables. This hypothesis 
holds that very open systems prevent the rise of frustration, and very closed systems prevent the 
rise of hope. In both cases protest onset will be limited. In middle ranges, however, a combination 
of frustration and expectation spur onset.  To test the hypotheses, Eisinger constructed a dataset 
from newspaper reports in forty three American cities. His statistical tests support the U-shaped 
hypothesis, and refute the linear hypothesis. The 1973 article is still widely cited in modern 
work—according to GoogleScholar, the article has been cited over 1500 times. The study is a 
landmark in the exploration of structural causes of protest onset. Thus, it directly provides 
guidance for an exploration of protest onset in Russia, or any other context.  
Eisinger’s work set a precedent by connecting to work outside of protest studies—a 
precedent that is unfortunately ignored in modern Social Movement Studies. Specifically, the 
author engaged with work in the tradition of rebellion studies. At first glance, this interdisciplinary 
move appears surprising. In his work, Eisinger advocates for the study of protest as a standalone 
phenomenon. In the 1960s scholars studied protest alongside related violent events, particularly 
race riots. Eisinger contends that protest events and their violent counterpart were two forms of 
collective action that should be “distinguished conceptually and empirically” (1968: 44). The 
foundational article introduces the tense relationship between protest and other forms of political 
conflict in academia; the article demonstrates how scholars can fruitfully draw tools from parallel 
fields without jeopardizing the independence of protest as a phenomenon.  
Interdisciplinary linkage connected political opportunity theory with Ted Robert Gurr, one 
of the founders of rebellion studies. Gurr’s (1970) Why Men Rebel is a comprehensive 
investigation into the causes of collective violence. As reviewers were quick to point out, the 
boundaries of the collective violence category were fuzzy (Tilly 1971; Black 1972). The study’s 
dependent variable sprawls to include revolutions, civil wars, strikes, and street demonstrations. 
The dependent variable of protest studies thus falls under the broad umbrella category.  For each 
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form, the author theorizes the potential for collective violence as a function of relative deprivation, 
or the disparity between “justifiable expectations and perceived value capabilities” (1970:43). Gurr 
wagers that the processes underlying various forms of contentious expression are similar enough 
to warrant aggregated treatment. Despite Eisinger’s clear rejection of the aggregate position, he 
entertains Gurr’s hypotheses. Even though Eisinger strongly argues that protest should not be 
studied alongside violent rioting, or the numerous phenomena that make up collective violence, 
Gurr’s work provides a potentially useful theoretical tool, or resource. A search for structural 
causes of protest onset must similarly consider the arguments put forth in rebellion studies.  
By citing Gurr’s work, Eisinger brought the second strain of modern Social Movement 
Studies, grievance, into the mainstream. Theories from revolution studies informed Eisinger’s 
foundational political opportunity structure work in two ways. First, Gurr’s relative deprivation 
hypothesis offers a theory for statistical testing. In his article, as mentioned above, Eisinger finds 
support for an inverted-U relationship between political opportunity structures and protest, rather 
than the linear relationship associated with relative deprivation theory. However, elements from 
revolution studies inform a broader articulation of political opportunity theory. In a closing note 
Eisinger brings elements of grievance into his model. Political opportunity structure is narrowly 
constructed from formal institutional attributes. However, the author posits that opportunity is also 
related to “social considerations which breed deviance” (1973: 17). Even under the original 
formulation of political opportunity theory, Eisinger outlined a broader definition that included 
societal elements of grievance. Even while introducing a single, parsimonious explanation, the 
author recognizes the importance of a broader theoretical model. Political opportunity structure 
expanded even more through contributions from sociology and collective behavior studies.  
The full triad emerges for a second time in a move to expand upon political opportunity 
structure. Charles Tilly built on Eisinger's work to offer the beginnings of a more dynamic theory 
of social movements. In From Mobilization to Revolution Tilly (1978), echoing Eisinger,  
contended that the frequency of protest and other collective behavior charts a curvilinear 
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relationship with political openness. When the state offers individuals and groups access to 
conventional politics, few will select more costly, unconventional alternatives. When the state 
offers absolutely no access to politics, even unconventional politics may fail to achieve results. 
Again, protest occurs in the middle ground, where ample obstruction breeds motive, and ample 
openness breeds hope. Tilly’s formulation of tri-part opportunity structure, however, expands well 
beyond formal political features.  First, the interest dimension represents potential gains from 
participation. Second, Tilly defines organization as the cohesion of community networks. And 
third is opportunity, defined as the likelihood of repression, and the vulnerability of the state.  Two 
of these dimensions roughly correspond to Eisinger’s broader theoretical position. Interest 
resembles grievance, and opportunity serves as a much broader take on Eisinger’s political 
opportunity measures. The third dimension, organization, reestablishes Lipsky’s resources as a 
central feature of social movement theory. Tilly’s opportunity structure theory thus recast the 
preceding theoretical strains of grievance, political opportunity structure, and movement 
resources. 
In broadening the concept of political opportunity structure, Tilly also introduced a novel 
statist element to protest studies. Lipsky’s state was capable of repression. Eisinger’s state 
comprised of formal institutional elements. Now, in the alternative formulation, the state became a 
complex actor as well as a set of political institutions. In fact, Tilly (1976) conceptualizes collective 
action of all kinds as a push and pull between the state and its constituents. The author takes a 
historical view to describe the rise of the modern nation-state as a narrative of political conflict. 
For Tilly, “reactive forms” of action, such as revolution or civil wars declined when the modern 
state won a battle for resources and control. With a monopoly of force established, early states in 
Middle-Ages Europe no longer feared existential challenges from rival groups. Any potential 
challenges had, by that time, lost the organizational power to mobilize territory, arms or popular 
allegiance. However, the tension between state and constituents did not disappear with reactive 
forms of collective action. Proactive forms of dissent, protest and strikes, continued to occur in 
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modern states. Indeed, according to Tilly, the "social movement" as understood in the U.S. and 
Western Europe co-evolved with relatively stable popular democracies (1976). In such contexts, 
organization and interest often align to produce collective action. And at the same time, such 
opportunity in advanced democracies is open enough to prevent repression. Tilly’s three 
elements configure to produce a continued push and pull in which the state is an active 
participant; protest is the manifestation of an ongoing struggle to establish the boundaries of 
control between ruler and ruled.  
Like Eisinger, Tilly’s work clearly identifies potential structural determinants of protest 
events. An exploration of protest onset in Russia, or in any geographical context, would benefit 
from the author’s theoretical work. Efforts to operationalize the rich framework outlined in From 
Mobilization to Revolution would need to include elements of interest, organization, and 
opportunity, as well as proactive state capacity. It is clear the theoretical position is much broader 
than Eisinger’s. Unfortunately, subsequent authors have reduced the three elements to a shallow 
version of Eisinger’s theory. For example, in their widely cited paper on civil war onset, Fearon 
and Laitin join the two authors in parenthetical citation (2003). They write that “rebellion is better 
explained by “opportunity” than by grievance (cf. Eisinger 1973 and Tilly 1978).” In casting the 
two studies as counter to grievance this interpretation loses much of the richness inherent in both 
Eisinger and Tilly’s work. Instead, political opportunity structure appears as a stand-in for any 
explanation obscuring contentious actors themselves.  
The final piece of the modern theoretical triad appeared as focus shifted back to actors.  
In the late 1970s Lipsky’s resources approach made a comeback under the title of resource 
mobilization theory. The shift started with Mancur Olson’s (1965) application of marginal utility 
theory to socio-political contexts. This work produced the collective action problem, a situation in 
which a group would benefit from cooperation, but the rational outcome of cost-benefit analysis 
leads any one person to refrain from acting. In the classic prisoner’s dilemma, communication 
restrictions prevent former accomplices from achieving their optimal outcome. In the game, the 
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two individuals face a simple payoff matrix. If both cooperate with the police both receive a 
moderate sentence. If only one cooperates, the silent partner receives a very harsh sentence. 
However, if both remain silent, the authorities will lack evidence to convict either one. In order to 
avoid the harsh punishment, with no method of assuring cooperation, the rational outcome is an 
undesirable equilibrium; rational individuals will not bear the cost of working towards a collective 
good.  Would-be protestors, rebels, and revolutionaries face variants of this game. Collective 
action events only emerge when the “rebel’s dilemma” (Lichbach 1994) is solved. According to 
this position, analytical frames must focus attention on mobilization challenges and group 
dynamics. Focusing on other factors, like political opportunity structures, or individual grievances, 
is misguided.  
Working in the area of protest studies, John McCarthy and Mayer Zald produced a 
theoretical solution to the collective action problem—and in so doing provided an enduring tool for 
structural applications.  In a journal article McCarthy and Zald (1977a) published the touchstone 
piece, and provided the title, for resource mobilization theory. The two authors focus analysis on 
resources available to collective actors in advanced industrial societies. Only armed with 
sufficient resources could individuals solve the collective action problem and engage in protest or 
other group action. Under this framework personal wealth and free time, professional training and 
external financial support, allow passionate citizens to create professional movement 
associations. These movement entrepreneurs create associations to alter potential recruits’ cost-
benefit processes. A resource base and mass communication networks allow participants to 
avoid costs associated with mobilization, and increase the chances that others will join the cause. 
Here the entrepreneur does not necessarily suffer from grievances, and might even have 
deliberately created the appearance of grievance. Here the entrepreneur’s resources hold 
analytical priority over any political opportunity structure. 
McCarthy and Zald’s framework operates in opposition to political opportunity and 
grievance theories. Social mobilization was a self-conscious departure from the erstwhile “main 
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tradition in social movement analysis” (1977: 1213). According to the authors, grievances are 
ubiquitous. Formation of social movement associations, and by extension likelihood of protest 
events, are a function of the absolute amount of resources available; as funds are available for 
entrepreneurs, as communication networks facilitate recruitment and organization, these groups 
will form (1977). The authors explicitly aim their attack at work in the grievance tradition.  
McCarthy and Zald’s critique would apply as well to political opportunity structure positions, 
however. This analytical lens obscures the political structure facing a group as well as 
grievances. Resource mobilization sees emergence result from the tasks of transforming the 
population into adherents and adherents into constitutents. In other words, McCarthy and Zald 
argue that resources are the sine qua non for social movements: “only if survival is guaranteed 
can other goals be pursued” (1977: 45). Like preceding work in Social Movement Theory, 
McCarthy and Zald’s work offers suggestion for identifying contextual protest onset. A structuralist 
working with resource mobilization theory would focus on elements of social movement 
organizations (SMOs), resource streams, and informational connections between constituents.  
Returning to a recurring theme, McCarthy and Zald include a broader version of their 
position; returning to a recurring theme, even the broader articulation ignores Tilly’s insights vis-à-
vis state capacity. The foundational resource mobilization articulation includes reference to statist 
elements. McCarthy and Zald mention that social movements’ ability to mobilize is contingent on 
state responses. Any organization’s potential for mobilization “is also affected by authorities and 
the delegated agents of social control” (1977: 56). This is to say, mobilization is contingent upon 
actions of police or government surveillance organizations. The authors describe repressive 
measures dampening population motivation through the demonstration effect. As the state as 
actor punishes protestors, cost-benefit calculations change, despite the best efforts of movement 
entrepreneurs. Thus, much like political opportunity theory, and grievance theory, resource 
mobilization indicates the importance of a confluence of factors.  And, most importantly, like the 
previous two frameworks, it fails to account for the state as more than repressive force. 
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More recent work on protest has explicitly established the three strains of theory as 
parallel explanations, as the core of comprehensive empirical work. Here the triad appears for the 
third time. One strain of literature published since the early 1980s falls into what is referred to as 
the “political process model.”  Douglas McAdams introduced this label in his Political Process and 
the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970 (1982). The author lauded the progressive, but 
in his view incomplete, turn towards resource mobilization. His attempt to offer a more satisfying 
theoretical account joined the major streams of Social Movement Studies. For McAdam, 
“movements develop in response to an ongoing process of interaction between movement groups 
and the large socio-political environment” (1982: 40). McAdam elucidated his theory with the case 
of African American civil rights activism. Civil rights movements only emerged when external 
circumstances provided sufficient openness to allow mobilization. Favorable changes in policy 
and the political environment, including the collapse of the cotton economy in the South, African 
American migration to Northern cities, and a decline in the number of lynchings, for example, 
lowered the costs and dangers of organizing for African Americans and increased their political 
value as an electoral constituency. Secondly, the movement thrived with increases in indigenous 
organizational strength, increases in communication networks and financial and human 
resources. Here political opportunity structure and resource mobilization appear in tandem.  
McAdam rounded out his account of mobilization with a third insufficient but necessary 
element: insurgent consciousness. This element, novel in Social Movement Studies, updated the 
concept of grievance. Insurgent consciousness activated through the process of “cognitive 
liberation,” the belief that a set of circumstances are “unjust and subject to change through group 
action” (1982: 51). In the case of the American civil rights movement, visible events led to 
liberation. For example, the landmark case, Brown v. Board of Education, which declared de jure 
racial segregation in public schools unconstitutional, brought widespread attention to the issue. 
The court decision triggered subjective grievance, while simultaneously triggered collective 
attribution, the recognition that one’s grievance is widely held. McAdam’s description of insurgent 
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consciousness connected to constructivist theories of framing. Constructivists emphasized the 
indeterminacy of material conditions because individuals "often misunderstand or experience 
considerable doubt or confusion about what it is that is going on and why" (Snow and Bedford 
1988, 212). Scholars used frames to describe the processes through which people define and 
experience material conditions. Under this theory re-framing social movement context could 
influence protest onset potential as much, or more than, shifts in material conditions. While 
McCarthy and Zald were correct to establish the insufficiency of objective grievances, McAdam 
argued that this subjective variant deserved consideration, alongside the other theoretical 
elements.  
The political process model represents the culmination of major preceding work. 
McAdam’s work united the three main contemporary streams of Social Movement Studies. 
Similar to Tilly’s conceptualization, McAdam brought together political opportunities and 
organizational strength. Also following Tilly, McAdam’s concept of opportunity expanded well 
beyond Eisinger’s formal politics. McAdam’s opportunity includes statist elements of repression. 
The third element, subjective grievance formation, reintroduced Gurr’s concept in a new light.  
This complex, position moves away from competing independent variables, towards a 
multi-dimensional understanding of structural conditions leading to protest or other contentious 
political events. Despite its considerable lack of parsimony, the complex model has endured. 
McAdam’s synthesis places in the foreground the conjuncture mentioned as an aside in earlier 
work. Eisinger, in his political opportunity theorizing, and McCarthy and Zald, in their resource 
mobilization theorizing, briefly mention the importance of a complex, or conjunctural, 
understanding of protest drivers. As I shall discuss below, the complex position has become the 
core of social movement theory.  
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State of the Field 
The political process model is recognized as the modern state of the field in Social 
Movement Studies. As such, it offers an exhaustive set of theoretical tools for structural work—
exhaustive within narrow disciplinary guidelines. This set is, unfortunately, incomplete. Tilly’s 
innovative statist approach, comprising of reactive and proactive elements, appears in a very 
weak articulation. As I will argue in the following section, Gurr’s willingness to reach across 
disciplinary boundaries offers a clear solution.  
Today the political process model holds pride of place in social movement studies. The 
privileged position of McAdam’s synthetic framework is clear from comprehensive summaries of 
the field, and from critiques. For example, the Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology, edited by 
Neal Caren, includes a section on social movements. The section’s author, George Ritzer, labels 
political process theory the “standard explanation” for social movement formation and protest 
onset (2012: 3). Ritzer describes political process as incorporating three foundational elements: 
opportunities, resource mobilization, and framing (of grievances). David Meyer (2004) came to a 
similar conclusion in his field review for the Annual Review of Sociology. Meyer writes that work 
that explores the interaction of a social movement with its context has accumulated within the 
"political process" tradition (2004: 125). McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (1996) tried to unite the 
main strands with their collection Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements. The book is 
divided into four sections, one section each for the triad of opportunities, mobilization resources, 
and subjective framing, and a fourth section arguing for synthesis. State capacity is conspicuous 
in its absence.  
Analysts of the field agree on the three core theories—see social movement reviews in 
recent handbooks of political science (Ishiyama and Breuning 2010) and comparative politics 
(Boix and Stokes 2009) . However, some analysts reject the move towards synthesis. In a recent 
book-length review of Social Movement Studies, Karl-Dieter Opp (2009) prefers positing a 
competition between political opportunity structure and grievance and resource mobilization 
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theories. So where do structural scholars stand today, given the current state of the field? How do 
scholars leverage the resources provided by major theoretical contributions to social movement 
studies?  
Theoretical tools identified in the above literature review offer clear guidelines for 
structural work. Scholars often attempt to create observable indicators of the three leading 
theories: political opportunity structure, resource mobilization, and grievance. Equipped with 
variables they proceed to test hypotheses using statistical analysis. Scholars have continued 
Eisinger’s attempt to test political opportunity theory. Protest scholars studying formal political 
opportunity structure variables established a connection between protest onset and partisan party 
structure (Arce and Mangonnet 2013), voting patterns (MiKyoung Kim Park 1997; Machado, 
Scartascini, and Tommasi 2011), and level of electoral competitiveness (Lankina and Voznaya 
2015). A third group of scholars has explored the connection between the active and institutional 
state. They argue that sham elections serve as a political opportunity opening, increasing the 
likelihood of protest (Tucker 2007; Robertson 2010; Bunce and Wolchik 2011). In the grievance 
tradition, Walton and Ragin (1990) established a link between austerity measures and political 
protest in 65 countries. Other structural work in the tradition explores the economic inequality and 
political conflict nexus. Protest and political conflict scholars who cast grievance as within-country 
report mixed results (Lichbach 1994). Moving away from simple measures of inequality, however, 
others have established a connection between “horizontal inequalities,” the overlap of inequalities 
and other group characteristics, and violent and nonviolent political conflict (Goldstone et al. 
2010; Buhaug, Cederman, and Gleditsch 2014). Moving to the third element, scholars have 
evaluated hypotheses linked to resource mobilization theory. Studies have explored the link 
between political unrest and demographic growth and urbanization (Urdal 2006; Wallace and 
Weiss 2013), and the spread of information communication technology (Meier, 2007). Work on 
diffusion also falls under the mobilization tradition, as scholars have traced regional and 
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international spread of protest (Beissinger, 2002) and violent political conflict (Gleditsch and 
Ward, 2006). 
Thus, over half a century of theoretical work has provided structuralist scholars with 
ample theories to test the methodological position. Numerous studies have evaluated the core 
structuralist wager, that contextual factors can systematically shape protest onset potential. 
Through their work, scholars have made progress towards defining the contours of the 
relationship. Concepts pioneered by Eisinger, Tilly, McCarthy and Zald, and McAdams today 
appear in quantitative form, as independent variables in statistical studies. Scholars have realized 
Lipsky’s hope that protest would be studied systematically, under the organizational guidance of 
theory. Unfortunately, the theoretical resources provide only incomplete guidance to structuralist 
explorations of protest onset.    
Not In Circumstances They Choose 
The current state of affairs in protest studies suffers from two problems, one procedural 
and one theoretical. First structural scholars have failed to adequately test the political process 
model, the leading strain of social movement theory. And secondly, the leading theory is itself 
flawed. Recent consensus on the elements of political process has failed to adequately represent 
the statist position, originated by Tilly, that the state as an actor shapes protest potential.  
For these two reasons structural studies fail to adequately analyze social movements and 
contexts in which they are embedded. Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte claimed dictatorial rule of 
France through a coup in 1851. Karl Marx was appalled to see a man he deemed a “grotesque 
mediocrity” play the role of national hero. Members of society, from the landed to the indentured, 
united to support military rule, in contradiction with their class interests. According to Marx, fear of 
bloodshed lay at the root of this puzzling turn of events, puzzling from the perspective of Marxian 
revolutionary theory. Events from this 18
th
 Brumaire of Louis Napoleon have become a common 
allegory for the agent-structure dilemma in political science (Katzenstein 1977; Ruggie 1998). 
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Modern-day scholars often make use of the famous observation that, “men make their own 
history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected 
circumstances, but under circumstances existing already” (1869: 10).  A take on this quote opens 
David Meyer’s assessment of the political process model. Meyer’s coyly writes: “social protest 
movements make history, one might paraphrase an earlier analyst, albeit not in circumstances 
they choose“ (2004: 125). What structuralist scholars of protest onset must do, then, is sketch the 
contours of these circumstances. Only by expanding hypothesis testing, and expanding the 
theoretical base can scholars accurately capture effects of structure.  
Structuralist studies have failed to adequately test the political process model. As recent 
overviews of Social Movement Studies demonstrate, as mentioned above, the consensus view of 
the field includes political opportunity structure, resource mobilization, and subjective grievances. 
Scholars do not agree on whether the triad operates as three necessary but insufficient causal 
factors, or three competing explanations. From either stand point, however, it is unjustifiable to 
restrict testing to one or two elements of the accepted wisdom. A fair test of structural conditions 
of protest onset, a test that adequately leverages the extant stock of theoretical tools, must 
evaluate all three. Of all structural studies of protest, which tend to employ quantitative methods, 
only two studies evaluate the complete triad. Kurt Schock (1996) produced a test of a “conjectural 
model” of protest and political violence onset. Schock explored the interaction effects between 
political opportunity, operationalized as state repressive tendencies, grievances, operationalized 
as economic inequality, and mobilization capacity, operationalized as ethnic community ties. The 
author reported that inequality increases the likelihood of conflict, especially in open political 
structures. And more recently, Erica Chenoweth and Jay Ulfelder (2015a) evaluate all three 
elements, arranging them as competing explanations. Chenoweth and Ulfelder determine that 
none of the factors effectively predicts the onset of maximalist non-violent protest movements. 
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A second, more serious problem is that the current state of the field has incompletely 
incorporated Tilly’s statist elements. This problem is more difficult to overcome because it 
fundamentally restricts the shape of scholarly inquiry. Or in other words, the set of theoretical 
tools available to the structuralist and the “context” are not co-terminus. Academic research is the 
product of a chain of steps. Scholars form theoretical models of the phenomenon of interest. 
Scholars operationalize their models as concepts turn to observable data points. Then scholars 
test theories. In the final step scholars turn back and amend their theories on the basis of 
findings. A flaw in the early part of the chain will negatively affect all future work. Existing statist 
elements appear under the political opportunity structure heading. The field has moved towards a 
consensus definition in response to critiques that “political opportunity threatens to become an all-
encompassing fudge factor for all conditions and circumstances that form the context for 
collective action” (Gamson and Meyer 1996, 281), or that “opportunity is seldom defined” 
(Koopmans 1999, 96). Scholars often rely on dimensionality to order complex concepts. In his 
overview, McAdam identified the constituent elements of political opportunity structure, across 
numerous articulations. McAdam identified a list of four dimensions. First is relative openness of 
formal political institutions. Second is the stability of elite alignments within a polity. Third is the 
presence of allies, among elected officials and among civil society groups. And fourth and finally, 
state capacity and propensity for repression. The problem is that only the fourth dimension 
describes the state as actor. 
Since Tilly’s (1976,1978) path-breaking work the state as actor has done more than 
repress. After the formation of modern nation states in Europe the process of state-making did 
not end. Recall, under Tilly’s theory, reactive forms of political expression like protest are actions 
that determine the boundaries of state control. And the state is an active participant in reactive 
political expression, through repressive action or ameliorative responses to protestor demands. 
Ameliorative responses would capture changes across political, economic, educational or health 
policy realms. Tilly’s fellow statist theorists Charles Bright and Susan Harding eloquently 
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summarized the position: “statemaking does not end once stately institutions emerge, but is 
continuous…contentious politics both define the state vis-à-vis other social and economic 
institutions and continually remake the state itself” (1984, 12). Repression is a single part of the 
state’s repertoire.  Repression is a single facet of the ongoing exchange between ruler and ruled 
that continuously constitutes the state. Responses from the state condition the likelihood of future 
contentious political events. 
Thus, the consensus view of political opportunity structure described by McAdam (1996), 
that the state-as-actor only acts through repression, is incomplete. Structuralist scholars hoping to 
evaluate the ways in which the state conditions protest onset cannot rely on the tools provided by 
Social Movement Studies. Instead, they need to operationalize the full range of state responses; 
they must place the full range of responses within a clearly organized framework. Lipsky valued 
theoretical frameworks as means to “assist in ordering data” in the 1960s. Theoretical frameworks 
are just as important today. A need for order and clarity is especially clear for such a sprawling 
conceptual domain as state action.  
Three of the major social movement theorists offer a possible way forward. In their 2001 
book Dynamics of Contention, Douglas McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly introduced the 
umbrella category of contentious politics to highlight similarities between distinct phenomena 
including revolutions, protests, strikes, and ethnic and non-ethnic civil wars. The authors hoped to 
pool theoretical resources across the boundaries of sub-fields. The authors called for a focus on 
recurring mechanisms—such as social mobilization, identity shifts, and accreditation/de-
accreditation of political entrepreneurs—across the various forms of contention. The vision of 
academic work outlined in the book concerns the dynamic unfolding and outcomes of contention. 
However, as Eisinger demonstrated by connecting to Gurr and revolutionary studies, theoretical 
cross-pollination is equally effective for structural studies of event onset.  Following McAdam, 
Tarrow, and Tilly, following Eisinger’s older example, I will reach outside of Social Movement 
Studies for theoretical resources. I will turn to civil war studies and the Copenhagen School of 
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international relations to craft a comprehensive structural theory of protest onset. These two 
areas of study features a concept of state capacity that is much more robust than the variant 
featured in the modern political process model. 
State Capacity Theory 
Compared with other disciplines, Social Movement Studies’ treatment of state capacity 
appears thin, simplistic even. The concept of state capacity entered international relations and 
comparative politics through two related sub-disciplines. In the decades following the Cold War, 
international relations scholars were forced to focus on a “new” type of conflict: civil war. Since 
the 1950s and 1960s the accumulation of protracted wars and the eruption of additional conflicts 
greatly increased the total number of active civil wars (Fearon and Laitin 2003). According to one 
widespread designation, post-Cold War civil wars were qualitatively “new.” They were criminal 
rather than military, ethnic and religious rather than secular (Kaldor 2007). As the threat of 
interstate war and nuclear annihilation appeared to fade, pundits predicted a “coming anarchy” 
(Kaplan 1994). In the anarchic scenario collapsing states gave rise to international security 
threats. Poor countries in Africa and elsewhere no longer represented a site of superpower 
competition. Angola, Cambodia, Mozambique, Uganda, and other countries now represented 
areas of concern in their own right, as breeding grounds for military and epidemiological threats. 
As the international community began to intervene in intra-state conflicts scholars initiated the 
discipline of peace-building and state-building studies. Both groups of scholars, those exploring 
the onset of conflict, and those studying the reconciliation phase, place state capacity at the 
center of their theoretical models.  
State capacity and the study of civil wars entered the discipline of international relations 
simultaneously. And much like protest studies in the tumultuous post-war decades, the shift 
followed historical developments. Since Kenneth Waltz’s 1952 The Man the State and War, 
international relations theorists had organized their discipline around the study of war. In the mid-
1990s Kalevi Holsti led a reassessment of the field. Holsti hoped to maintain focus on war, which 
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would remain, for him, the “central problem of international relations” (1996, 19). However, he 
argued that changes in the frequency of conflict forced analysis to the domestic level. Since 1945 
over three quarters of wars broke out internally (Ibid.). Theories of international relations, to the 
extent that they were applicable to domestic events, could only place the causes of civil war at 
the international level. Holsti acknowledged that international phenomena of superpower 
competition, the flow of arms and the flow finances, shaped domestic conflict. The author argued 
that domestic institutional strength, domestic state-society relations, held causal primacy, 
however. So international-level theories such as realism and neo-realism should be 
supplemented with theories of the state.  
Holsti produced just such a theory. In The State, War and the State of War, he introduced 
a robust theory of state capacity. State capacity is often conceptualized in material terms, such as 
military power or repressive power featured in Social Movement Studies. Holsti, alternative, 
defined state capacity in ideational terms.  As he writes, “the critical dimension of state strength 
is legitimacy, which is an idea or feeling” (1996: 33). Legitimacy arises when constituent members 
of the state recognize the rightful nature of officials, and obey state commands not only out of 
fear, but also out of moral authority. Thus, state capacity becomes a measure of citizens' 
attitudes towards authority, whether they withhold or grant the 'right to rule' to those who act in 
the name of the state. This framework clearly goes well beyond the state as repressive force. 
Repression is not absent from Holsti’s state capacity. Instead, it is one part of the complex set of 
state-society relations that establish legitimacy.  
Holsti imported a nuanced understanding developed by statist theorists working in 
comparative politics. Through his work, Joel Migdal revitalized the theoretical treatment of the 
state in comparative politics. Working in the post-Cold War context, characterized by civil war and 
failed states, Migdal addressed the question: “why have so many third world countries been so 
ineffective in accomplishing what their leaders and others have expected of them?” (1988, 9). 
According to the author, the contemporary set of theoretical resources vis-à-vis the state 
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precluded effective exploration of the question. In short, as states themselves had deteriorated, 
so too deteriorated the utility of the ideal-typical state. Scholars could no longer effectively turn to 
the Weberian ideal of the state as holding a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Since the 
end of World War II, the collection of 200 formal states produced such a range of outcomes that 
terms like failed, fragile, or collapsed state arose. As a replacement for the outdated ideal, Migdal 
provided a tri-part definition of the state. The first element is the familiar concept of repression 
appearing in the political process model: the state as a field of power marked by the use and 
threat of violence. The second element brings in Tilly’s concept of a continuously redefied state, 
shaped by recurring transactions between ruler and ruled. Migdal’s second element is 
transactional loyalty, achieved through contentious and conventional politics. The first two 
elements lead naturally to the third: the actual practices of state representatives and 
organizations. This is a dynamic framework that captures the state as actor and institution—thus 
incorporating insights of Reuschemeyer, Stevens and Skocpol (1985) and Tilly’s application in 
social movement theory. The framework was created intentionally to be as broadly applicable as 
possible. Analysts could describe and compare the capacity of advanced industrial states or so-
called failed states using a single conceptual vocabulary. 
Structural scholars studying civil war onset have applied this robust theory of state 
capacity, offering a way forward for Social Movement Studies. Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) model 
of insurgency—mentioned above—serves as the touchstone example.  The authors famously 
claimed that “not cultural differences and ethnic grievances, but rather the conditions that favor 
insurgency” (2003: 17) determine the onset of civil war. The authors conceptualized the structural 
conditions as the state’s ability to patrol and control territory, and the state’s ability to discourage 
recruitment. Since Fearon and Latin’s foundational piece, numerous studies have posited more 
accurate measures of state capacity; numerous scholars have attempted to improve upon Fearon 
and Laitin’s application of state capacity, producing variants that resemble Holsti and Migdal’s 
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framework more closely. I will discuss the operationalization techniques in depth in the following 
chapter. Here however, it is important to note the theoretical underpinnings.  
The numerous, diverse approaches to state capacity developed since Fearon and Laitin’s 
work can be organized neatly, multi-dimensionally. Fjelde and de Soysa (2009) introduced a 
typology that places various elements of state capacity within the dimensions of coercion, co-
optation, and cooperation. These three dimensions nicely represent Holsti and Migdal’s theories 
of state capacity. Coercive state capacity signifies, as usual, military and financial resources, and 
the state’s ability to extend official presence throughout territory. The second dimension, 
cooptation, consists of the state’s ability to strategically placate segments of the population 
through public expenditure. The author’s final dimension, cooperation, represents the level of 
trust between the state and the populace. Civil war scholars have treated the state as a rich actor 
as well as a set of institutions. 
Protest and the Idea of the State 
Lipsky began the study of protest with a call to organize data in a broad, clear theoretical 
framework. Generations of scholars, working over decades, have followed his directive. The 
amount of data required to test the comprehensive framework is daunting, however. An effective 
structural study must operationalize all three components of the political process theory.  
Even that is not enough. An effective study must operationalize all three state capacity 
components to create an integrated model. The actions of the state, which according to Tilly 
shape the likelihood of onset, appear in truncated form under the political protest model. An 
effective structural study of protest must, following Holsti and Migdal’s’ lead, reflect a rich 
understanding of state capacity—moving beyond repressive capacity. The triad of coercive, 
cooptational, and cooperative power is an essential part of any comprehensive theoretical 
framework of protest onset. 
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State capacity may even hold more explanatory power than rival explanations. 
Grievances build a reservoir of discontent that may drive people to the streets. Social mobilization 
capacity catalyzes discontent, while at the same time offering a channel through which 
movements gain momentum. Open political opportunity structures offer the space for protest 
movements to originate and grow. Each theoretical driver increases the likelihood that protests 
will occur. State capacity should dampen protest potential and interrupt causal chains. Local 
governments’ coercive, cooptational, and cooperative capacity should, theoretically, snuff out 
protests before they begin. Grievances lose their catalytic aspect when states effectively 
ameliorate feelings of injustice; where social services address sources of anger, impetus for 
congregation fades; where citizens are cowed or satisfied, open political opportunity structures 
will remain devoid of dissident action.  
Barry Buzan articulated this position, distinguishing weak states by “their high level of 
concern with domestically generated threats to the security of the government; in other words, 
weak states either do not have, or have failed to create, a domestic political and societal 
consensus” (1983: 64). Rather than the ability to win an external war, state capacity here 
coincides with socio-political cohesion. As state capacity strengthens, protest frequency falls—
according to the theoretical position. Buzan argued that a complex idea of the state determined 
strength. I will utilize this formulation as an umbrella theoretical framework for protest onset. In 
the remaining chapters, Idea of the State signifies a broad framework including political 
opportunity structure, grievance, social mobilization capacity, and multi-dimensional capacity. 
Each polity holds a unique Idea of the State, where underlying elements produce frequent 
protests, the Idea is weak. 
A synthesis of Social Movement Studies and state capacity work will allow me to explore 
what some describe as the unfathomable enigma of Russia (Zekulin 2009). In the next three 
chapters I will operationalize the idea of the modern Russian state in an attempt to establish a 
structural understanding of protest onset. The complexity inherent in the position will allow me to 
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contribute to several academic traditions. My work will encounter—and collide with— theories 
proposed in Social Movement Studies and state capacity studies. Perhaps most significantly, my 
work will suggest whether or not scholars of protest onset can unravel enigmas working from an 
abstract, structural level of analysis.  
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III - Operationalizing Core Concepts 
Introduction 
Good social science research requires both abstract concepts and precise observable 
variables. Without abstract concepts, researchers cannot formulate theories and testable 
hypotheses, cannot form general understandings of how the social world works.  A social science 
discipline without concepts would lack cohesion. John Gerring, in a recent treatise on 
methodology, argued that political science, economics or sociology without abstract concepts 
“would be a series of disconnected facts and micro-theories” (2001, 38).  
In order to proceed from theorizing to testing, researchers must bring their concepts from 
the realm of the abstract to the realm of the concrete. Noumenal and phenomenal, mental and 
sensual, ideal and empiric, each pair defines the two realms. Scholars use operational definitions 
to cross the boundary. An operationalization clearly defines an observed quantity and guides 
measurement. Theories and variables are thus co-constituted. Indeed, Gerring eloquently wrote 
that “large-order concepts comprise the scaffolding on which we hang observables” (Ibid. 38). 
The choice of how to make a concept operational, useable, is fraught with potential difficulty. 
Should conflict scholars move beyond military and economic capability to include measures of 
inter-subjective meaning and control (Barnett and Duvall 2005)? Should state capacity scholars 




  77   
    
Across areas of study, the manner in which concepts are operationalized shapes 
findings. Critics have called attention to the tenuous link between concept and variable in 
integration in international relations (Hughes, 1971); the democratic peace (Gartzke 1998); 
democratization (Teorell 2010); revolutions (Goldstone 2001).  When observable variables do not 
adequately reflect the conceptual scaffolding, even the most rigorous study will produce specious 
results and conclusions. This raises the concern of construct validity: “the degree to which 
inferences can legitimately be made from the operationalizations in a study to the theoretical 
constructs on which those operationalizations were based” (Trochim and Donnelly 2008, 137). 
This concern is not unique to social scientists.  Biologists’ common practice of animal testing 
represents a potentially catastrophic problem of construct validity. Hypotheses derived from 
human beings are commonly tested using the decidedly non-analogous subjects of mice, rats or 
ferrets. 
Commonly as well, natural science journals feature assessments of construct validity in 
the animal model (Cronbach and Meehl 1955; Willner 1984; Ellenbroek, Geyer, and Cools 1995; 
Nestler and Hyman 2010). Across disciplines, poor operationalization can lead to misleading 
findings. This chapter argues that protest scholars, and contentious politics scholars more 
broadly, fail to achieve construct validity.  Decades of scholarly work features flawed 
operationalizations of major theoretical drivers: grievance, political opportunity structure, social 
mobilization, and state capacity each take underspecified forms, jeopardizing conclusions, 
blunting the impact of academic work. I will expose threats to construct validity before compiling 
superior alternative operationalizations. 
Two canonical examples of construct validity—the cautionary tales encountered in 
research methods seminars—underscore the importance of operationalization. As Fordist 
production practices took hold in the United States, scholars turned their attention to productivity.  
Elton Mayo hypothesized that workers’ productivity, output per hour, depended on context rather 
than innate ability.  Mayo selected lighting in order to operationalize the concept of working 
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conditions. He then proceeded to organize an experiment at an electricity factory in Hawthorn, a 
suburb of Chicago.  A conditioned group worked under improved lighting, while a control group 
worked under usual lighting conditions. Mayo and his colleagues reported a positive correlation 
between illuminated environment and productivity. Encouraged by the results, Mayo and his 
colleagues repeated the experiment with changed working hours and rest breaks. Each time 
productivity increased vis-à-vis the control group.  Upon completing the study, working conditions 
for all workers returned to pre-experiment levels. Surprisingly, the experiment group continued 
their productivity increases. It appeared that the physical changes were only indirectly responsible 
for increased production. Instead, the fact that “someone was actually concerned about the 
workplace” (Adair 1984, 337), motivated workers. Decades later, the Hawthorne effect has been 
immortalized, though perhaps not in the manner in which the authors of the 1925 study would 
have anticipated. The effect today signifies that workers who are aware of being observed worked 
harder, regardless of external environment, regardless of inherent ability.  
Renowned biologist  Stephen Jay Gould revealed a similar problem in his 1981 book The 
Mismeasure of Man, a discussion of early attempts to operationalize the concept of intelligence. 
Psychologists working in the early 20
th
 century developed survey instruments, which included 
questions on current events. One question asked, “in which city do the Dodgers play.” Many 
Americans living in the 1920s would have correctly identified the city as Brooklyn. This was not 
the case for recent immigrants.  Survey respondents included many Eastern Europeans, recently 
arrived in the country, lacking an understanding of local sports. Predictably, psychologists inferred 
that Eastern Europeans had lower intelligence. The intelligence survey creators, like Mayo, failed 
to capture their core concept in practice. Mayo’s attempt to evaluate physical work environment 
captured instead attention to environment. Gould’s surveyors only measured how long one had 
lived in the USA and become acculturated to a popular pastime. These errors in 
operationalization precluded effective testing of hypotheses; in both cases, scientists failed to 
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navigate the tenuous link between concept and observable variable, leading to faulty inference 
and specious conclusions.  
Continuing from the preceding discussion, this chapter will operationalize core concepts 
relevant to protest onset in Russia.  Scholars working in contentious politics have, fortunately, 
begun the work of operationalization. Progress in the field could not occur otherwise. Though 
useful, these studies also exhibit ample room for improvement in operationalization. Scholars 
have routinely failed to account for two threats to construct validity. First, contentious politics 
scholars have often underspecified the dimension captured in variables—for example, GDP per 
capita as a representation of state capacity in general (Hendrix 2010). And secondly, scholars 
studying structural causes of protest and violent conflict routinely place their state capacity 
measurement at the incorrect geographical level (Buhaug 2010). I will use extant quantitative 
work as a starting point in my attempt to traverse the “perilous span” (Hughes, 1971) connecting 
concepts and variables.  
The Importance of the State 
While operationalization is a building block in my study, forming new measures of state 
capacity is a stand-alone scholarly contribution. State capacity appears across a diverse range of 
work in political science. Since Evans and her colleagues famously “brought the state back in” to 
comparative politics and international relations in the 1980s, scholars have treated the concept as 
both independent and dependent variable. Because it is central to so much work, flaws in 
construct validity are similarly widespread. This section will motivate the search for new, better 
measures. 
The state is central to political science by definition. Scholars working across the porous 
disciplinary boundaries connecting American political science, comparative politics, and 
international relations study the concept.   Although politics is difficult to define (Magstadt 2015), 
two well-known authors provided useful attempts. Max Weber defined politics as the struggle for 
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power. In Politics as Vocation, he writes that politics is “the pursuit for a portion of power or for 
influencing the division of power whether it is between states, or between groups of people which 
the state encompasses.” The state enters this first definition as a holder of power—indeed as the 
sole holder of the legitimate use of violence—and a context in which the struggle occurs. Harold 
Lasswell alternatively defined politics as involving the state as distribution mechanism. For 
Lasswell politics was “who gets what, when and how” (1950). Working from either definition, 
political scientists of any sort cannot help but study the state.  In the influential volume, Bringing 
the State Back In, Evans, Reuschemeyer, and Skocpol (1985) attempted to reshape the manner 
in which scholars approach the state. The authors argued that foregoing work failed to sufficiently 
account for the state as actor. They argued that, despite its central role in political science, the 
state appeared in studies as a passive set of institutions. 
Whether or not Evans and her colleagues’ critique of the field was accurate (Burnstein 
1987), the Bringing the State Back In moment serves a useful organizational function. Evans, 
Reuschemeyer, and Skocpol highlighted the centrality of the state across substantive issue 
areas. And they exhorted scholars of all sorts to add sophistication to the core concept. Their 
contribution demonstrates the widespread importance of state capacity as a concept. 
Furthermore, it implies that problems of construct validity would negatively affect a wide range of 
studies.  
Scholars employing state capacity as a dependent variable clearly rely on effective 
operationalization of the core concept. Across sub-fields of state-building and post-conflict 
reconciliation, scholars attempt to elucidate processes through which state capacity develops. For 
example, some scholars study historical formation of early states, or rebuilding of modern less-
developed countries. Charles Tilly (1975) describes the origin of the modern state in the pithy 
line, “the state made war and war made the state.”  Tilly and other contributors to this bellicist 
tradition of state-building study the development of state capacity to extract taxes, military 
service, and loyalty through the war making process (Herbst 1989, 1990; Thies 2004). Another 
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set of scholars, neo-institutionalists, trace the relationship between economic change and state 
capacity.  Focus shifts to the role of the state as an institutional solution to transactional and 
informational hurdles (North 1982). Others explore the stilted development of state capacity 
where neither war-making, nor efficiency incentives work to produce a strong state, in 
environments characterized by informal control structures (Migdal 1998; Reno 2000). Still another 
strain of work focuses on the sociological drivers of state capacity, to include identify-formation 
and myth creation (Anderson 1974; Geertz 1981; Ruggie 1993). 
 A second body of literature explores forward linkages of state capacity, treating state 
capacity as an independent variable. As I will discuss in detail below, civil war studies, protest 
studies, and other components of contentious politics commonly explore the effects of state 
capacity. This strain of work traces the relationship between fluctuations in state capacity and 
corresponding fluctuations in the onset of conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Fearon and Laitin 
2003; Hendrix 2010), the duration of conflict (Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom 2004; Buhaug, 
Gates, and Lujala 2009), the intensity of conflict (Benson and Kugler 1998; Lacina 2006) and the 
outcome of conflict (Rouen and Sobek 2004; Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009).  
Others trace the connections between state capacity and economic development (Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinson 2001; Rodrik 2003, 2009), a debate with fraught policy implications in the 
wake of the international debt crisis (Blyth 2015). 
Across a vast swath of academic work scholars rely on the concept of state capacity. 
They must all traverse the perilous span between concepts and variables; they must 
operationalize conceptual elements of state capacity. Improving the construct validity of state 
capacity measures would, thus, mark progress for diverse research traditions.  
Leveraging the experiences of others, their struggles and their successes, I build tangible 
representations of each element present in the Idea of the State framework. As discussed below, 
early attempts to move from concept to measurement generated threats to construct validity.  
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Scholars studying protest and contentious politics more broadly occasionally worked with overly 
general, observationally equivalent measures. Problems associated with GDP per capita serve as 
a warning: studies in which it appeared produced specious findings, faulty policy 
recommendations.  My measures are more refined. As mentioned in Chapter 2, state capacity 
itself consists of three dimensions. I operationalize coercive capacity as crime rates. I use 
government spending directed towards social projects to operationalize cooptational capacity. 
And for the third dimension, cooperational capacity, I use electoral support for the ruling United 
Russia party.  
My choices are not perfect. Data were unavailable for desired measures of coercion and 
cooperation. An ideal measure of coercive capacity would evaluate law enforcement’s ability to 
achieve express goals. Crime rates reflect the general physical security environment, and capture 
the state’s monopoly on the application of violence.  Rates do not, however, control for official 
indifference. High crime would prevail in areas where law enforcement possesses capacity to 
coerce, but not the will. Furthermore, the crime rates measure poses a possible endogeneity 
problem: if authorities register protests as crimes, the measure would simultaneously capture 
both independent and dependent variables, jeopardizing causal inference. Fortunately, protests 
are not considered crimes in the Russian case (Rossstat, 2018). My measure of cooperational 
state capacity is similarly second best. Social survey data would represent an ideal, direct 
assessment of regime loyalty. Russian elections get at the phenomenon indirectly. They are 
notoriously corrupt. Still, I argue that vote fixing primarily exaggerates existing tendencies. High 
vote shares will appear where the populace supports Putin, even if figures are artificially 
increased. Take Chechnya for example. The region features an improbably high United Russia 
vote share, over 95% in 2007 and 2011. Despite the dubious figures, support for the ruling regime 
has been strong since Putin brutally put down an Islamic insurgency (Seddon 2018). Despite 
concerns, my choices do not suffer from major threats to construct validity—they are not ideal, 
but good enough given data restrictions. 
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I follow best practices in the field to operationalize the remaining three elements of the 
Idea of the State theoretical framework. Social mobilization capacity becomes concrete measures 
of total population and urban population percentage, as well as a measure of educational 
attainment. I use unemployment as a somewhat crude, but common, representation of grievance. 
And I rely on the Carnegie Institute’s Openness Index to capture political opportunity structure, 
following Lankina and Voznaya’s lead.  
Though imperfect, chosen independent variables avoid what I consider the biggest threat 
to construct validity. Each operationalization avoids the all-too-common problem of geographical 
over-aggregation, or methodological nationalism, discussed in detail below; each is measured at 
the correct, subnational level.  A close look at existing work, at the choices of scholars studying 
civil wars and protests, reveals the problem’s scope and magnitude.  Geographical abstraction, 
measurement at the incorrect level, produces a significant threat to construct validity, and thus, to 
causal inference. In order to preserve the value of academic inquiry, the field must carefully move 
from concepts to measurement.    
And, as early studies of productivity and intelligence demonstrate, operational 
improvement is a critical component of knowledge generation.  This overview should convey the 
room for cross-fertilization between my study of protest onset in Russia and a wide range of other 
studies. In the following two sections I shall demonstrate common problems in operationalization 
afflicting contentious politics work. 
The Tenuous Link 
To generate useful knowledge, scholars must construct observable variables that 
effectively capture their conceptual and theoretical frameworks. Studies situated within protest 
studies, contentious politics, state-building, and peace-building all require an operationalization of 
state capacity that meets construct validity standards. Otherwise, the inferences drawn from any 
of these studies will be faulty, the hypotheses will remain untested, and any conclusions will be 
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incorrect at best, misleading at worst.   Over the preceding decades contentious politics scholars 
have encountered several threats to construct validity.  Some threats have been identified and 
addressed; others have not been taken seriously enough. I will here discuss operationalization 
challenges appearing in structural contentious politics work. The study of Russian protest events 
fits directly into this research tradition. Critiques and measures of state capacity discussed below 
apply directly to contentious politics work. Contentious politics scholars have identified related 
problems of observational equivalence and over-aggregation.  A third problem, however, 
inappropriate geographical specification, remains a major problem in the field. This discussion 
pertains to any work incorporating state capacity concepts, on either side of the regression 
equation. 
In structural contentious politics studies early operationalizations of state capacity failed 
to adequately reflect the core concept. These studies have become touchstones in the field, 
despite their flaws.  Civil war studies in the early 2000’s established state capacity as a driver of 
conflict. These same studies established poor operationalization, variables failing basic construct 
validity tests, as a central feature of quantitative work. Structural scholars defined the so-called 
greed versus grievance debate. Funded by the World Bank, Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2004) 
found that economic contexts—including overall level of development, GDP per capita—
outperformed measures of grievances in large-n statistical studies of civil war onset. Collier and 
Hoeffler employed the theory of instrumental rationality to explain the correlation. For them, as 
economic development increased the benefits associated with non-rebellious activity increased. 
Individuals would, all else equal, earn a living and even obtain wealth legally, rather than risking 
punishment for taking part in violence. The catchy greed-grievance dichotomy drew other 
contributions. Writing shortly thereafter Fearon and Laitin (2003) argued that state context, state 
capacity, conditioned the likelihood of civil war onset, not economic context.  Fearon and Laitin 
argued that GDP per capita is negatively related to the probability of civil war onset because it 
serves as a useful proxy for a state’s capacity to project coercive force. States with greater levels 
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of material resources, they argue, can leverage military force to deter would-be insurgents, and to 
crush existing insurgents. A quick look at citation records underscores the influence of Fearon 
and Laitin’s article. According to GoogleScholar, as of March 2017, the article has been cited over 
6,200 times. This figure approaches the gold standard in social science citation.  Seymour Martin 
Lipset’s “Some Social Requisites of Democracy,” published in the American Political Science 
Review in 1959, holds the distinction of most cited journal article. Lipset’s place-holding article 
totals over 6700 citations. In their widely-cited contribution, Fearon and Laitin captured the 
concept of state capacity with the observable variable of GDP per capita. GDP is, of course, an 
estimate of the total value of goods and services produced by an economy. It seems a perilous 
span indeed that connects the concept of state capacity and the population weighted sum of 
private consumption, gross investment, government investment, government spending, and net 
trade balance.  
The weakness of the GDP operationalization was visible from the beginning. It featured 
two related threats to construct validity: observational equivalence and over-aggregation. First, 
the operationalization facilitated multiple interpretations.  Fearon and Laitin’s central finding was 
not novel. Collier and Hoeffler had already published the negative correlation between overall 
economic development and civil war onset.  Fearon and Laitin’s interpretation of the finding was 
novel. Troublingly, the two disparate interpretations, the two causal stories, emerge from an 
identical evidence base. The theory of economic opportunity and the crude version of state 
capacity theory generate the same observable implication: as overall economic development 
rises, civil war rates declines. The argument that GDP per capita captures coercive capacities 
and the argument that GDP per capita captures economic capacity to compete for the labor of 
rebel recruits are equally plausible at first glance; the correlation could represent state success in 
coercing compliance just as easily as it could represent state success in purchasing compliance. 
The empirical evidence cannot serve to distinguish between two rival explanations, precluding 
productive debate.  
 
 
  86   
    
The problem of observational equivalence can even lead to weak or misguided policy 
recommendations. Government and international organization groups attempting to reduce the 
onset of civil war have limited resources. These groups will have to carefully select an actionable 
strategy. Collier and Hoeffler’s explanation implies a focus on job opportunities. Fearon and 
Laitin’s would divert resources to government military command and control structures. But, 
again, the policy recommendations derive from an identical evidence base. Policy makers lack 
the confidence that either causal story is correct, and thus lack confidence that either policy will 
work. Worse still, the problem of observational equivalence can even jeopardize the integrity of 
social science. Evidence cannot distinguish between policy recommendations, and evidence 
cannot definitively rebut counter explanations. Operating in a vacuum of objectivity, policy makers 
or scholars are free to let ideological and political biases guide their conclusions.  Mark Blyth 
levies such a claim at scholars who advocate for pro-austerity economic policies (2015).   
Indeterminacy brought on by observational equivalence is the product of over-
aggregation, the problematic practice of subsuming disparate elements into a whole. GDP per 
capita captures supporting evidence for disparate theoretical positions. Even a scholar restricting 
analysis to the state capacity explanation would find evidence for multiple competing 
explanations. The operationalization captured a crude, aggregated concept of state capacity. 
Employing GDP per capita transforms state capacity into an undifferentiated monolith. As 
discussed earlier, theorists recognize numerous interrelated but distinct dimensions or elements 
of state capacity. They have responded to Margaret Levi’s call to disaggregate the state. She 
argued that “good analysis requires differentiating among the features of the state in order to 
assess their relative importance; the state becomes less than the sum of its parts” (2002: 34). My 
Idea of the State framework employs Fjelde and de Soysa’s (2009) tri-part break down of 
coercion, cooptation and cooperation. Several other scholars, however, produce alternative 
dimensional categories. Hillel Soifer (2008) adapted Michael Mann’s (1984) infrastructural power 
to develop dimensions of central state capabilities, the territorial reach of the state, and the 
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effects of the state on society. Cullen Hendrix (2010) presented dimensions of military capacity, 
bureaucratic administrative capacity, and the quality and coherence of political institutions. 
Hanson and Sigman (2013) preferred extractive capacity, coercive capacity, and administrative 
capacity.   Despite their differing organizational categories, all of these authors agree that state 
capacity is best conceptualized as featuring dimensionality. That is to say, state capacity consists 
of sub-components that do not consistently covary, and that operate through distinct causal 
mechanisms. An increase in, say, coercive capacity does not imply a corresponding increase in 
cooptation or cooperation. And as their labels indicate, the three dimensions condition social 
cohesion through unique processes. 
Fearon and Laitin’s initial article, along with other studies, demonstrate the perils of 
eliding dimensionality in state capacity. The GDP per capita variable precluded the observation of 
differing mechanisms. Returning to the problem of observational equivalence, the 
operationalization blocked attempts to adjudicate between the options. For example, Cameron 
Thies demonstrated that either extractive capacity and military capacity, or a combination of the 
two, could explain the original findings of the greed-grievance literature. He argued that individual 
dimensions or combinations of dimensions could lie concealed within the crude indicators of GDP 
per capita (2010).  A disaggregated operationalization of state capacity is the only way to expose 
the causal mechanism at play. The problem of over-aggregation appears likewise in the related 
strain of work that explores the link between regime type and conflict. The “murder in the middle” 
hypothesis (Fein 1995) posited that regimes falling in between the poles of autocracy and 
democracy experience highest rates of violence.  Echoing the political opportunity structure 
theory in Social Movement Studies (Eisinger, 1973), the hypothesis sees conflict emerge from 
inadequate capacity for repression with insufficient ability to accommodate opposition through 
institutionalized channels. Scholars have operationalized the theory using regime type, reporting 
that semi-democratic regimes correlate with the highest risk of conflict (e.g., Mueller and Weede 
1990; Reynal-Querol, 2014). Again, this over-aggregated operationalization obscures multiple 
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causal processes. Only equipped with more nuanced variables can scholars determine whether 
repressive capacity, representation, or another aspect of regime type drives the relationship 
(Hegre 2014).   
Suffering from observational equivalence and over-aggregation, the original 
operationalization of state capacity was clearly problematic. GDP per capita has, nevertheless, 
become a mainstay in structural studies of state capacity since the early 2000’s. As recently as 
2014 Camber Warren could opine that the “operationalizations of state strength utilized in the 
quantitative literature on civil war have generally relied on measures of economic advancement, 
such as gross domestic product per capita, as proxies for state effectiveness” (2014, 115). 
Since Fearon and Latin’s foundational piece, numerous studies have posited more 
accurate measures of state capacity. The crude, problematic operationalization created an 
opening for future contributions. Dozens of alternatives offer tools for scholars hoping to 
overcome the problems of construct validity. Measures of state capacity include: anocratic regime 
type  (Goldstone et al. 2010); extractive capacity, measured in terms of taxation rates, and the 
size of government, in terms of total spending, and type of spending (Bethke and Bussman 
2011); tax/GDP ratio (instrumented by geographical features to control for endogeneity or reverse 
causality) (Hendrix 2011); total revenue/GDP ratio (Thies 2010); relative political capacity, or 
RPC, the ratio of actual tax revenue to expected tax revenue, estimated as a linear function of the 
structure, size, and social spending in the national economy (Buhaug 2006); strong revenue 
mobilization capacity coupled with low levels of corruption (Hughes et al. 2014) ;the share of 
money held in savings deposits and legal paper, rather than currency, as a measure of trust in 
institutions as credible guarantor of property rights and contracts (Fjelde and de Soysa 2009); 
economic freedom (de Soysa and Fjelde 2010); frequency of irregular leadership transition 
(Gleditsch and Ruggeri 2010); total welfare spending, and welfare spending as a percentage of 
GDP (Taydas and Peksen 2012); positive credit rating, and global liquidity (DiGiuseppe, Barry, 
and Frank 2012; Shea 2014); “soft” state capacity, or the presence of  economies of scale in the 
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market place of ideas, measured by mass media penetration (Warren 2014); military capacity, 
measured through military personnel, military expenditures, and military expenditures per soldier, 
and administrative capacity, measured through a bureaucratic quality index  (Hendrix and Young 
2014); lack of economic autonomy, measured by the presence of IMF conditionality (Abouharb 
and Cingranelli 2007); exposure to the international economy (Flaten and de Soysa 2012). This 
lengthy, though far from exhaustive, list demonstrates that improving measures of state capacity 
has become a growth industry in political science. The popularity of state capacity variable 
development indicates that the field recognizes problems of observational equivalence and over-
aggregation. The studies mentioned here span the breadth of contentious political studies. 
Scholars interested in civil wars, ethnic conflicts, and protest have all attempted to better translate 
state capacity from concept to observable variable. A separate threat to construct validity, and 
thus to causal inference, has received far less attention.  Contributions to the field routinely ignore 
sub-national dynamics of contentious politics onset. 
Methodological Nationalism 
The second threat to construct validity in studies of state capacity is geographical. 
Contentious politics scholars routinely operationalize the concept of state capacity at the level of 
the nation-state. As others have pointed out, this wide-spread, seemingly innocuous aggregation 
technique can negatively affect the quality of causal inference. Andreas Wimmer and Nina 
Schiller identified problems associated with nation-state level data in the discipline of 
anthropology, and the narrow field of migration studies (2003). The authors use the term 
methodological nationalism to signify the assumption that the nation-state is the natural social 
and political form of the modern world. Working from this assumption, scholars would naturally 
construct their variables at the nation-state level, creating a corresponding “reduction of the 
analytical focus to the boundaries of the nation-state.” As migration scholars, Wimmer and 
Schiller were concerned with the loss of trans-border connections. The truncated analytical focus 
elides the trans-national. Or more importantly from the contentious politics perspective, elides the 
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sub-national. As studies have established, state capacity along these dimensions varies widely 
within countries (Buhaug, Cederman, and Gleditsch 2014).  Theories of civil war, political violence 
or protest onset connect structural conditions of coercion, cooptation, and cooperation to onset 
potential at the sub-national level—to the region in which the event actually occurs, not the 
abstract aggregate level of the state. To the chagrin of anyone looking for progress in the 
“scientific study of civil wars” (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006), the problem was identified in several 
high-impact studies, and then largely ignored. 
Methodological nationalism represents a serious threat to state capacity variables’ 
construct validity by way of ecological fallacy.  The practice severely undermines the ability of 
observable variables to reflect corresponding concepts, and thus undermines inference, 
conclusions, and policy recommendations
2
.  
Quantitative contentious politics scholars’ inappropriate employment of a type of 
methodological nationalism creates an opening for more scholarly work. The mismatch between 
theory and methodology erodes the strength of inferences and conclusions drawn in this area of 
study. By explaining sub-national events with national-level indicators, scholars have, at best, 
poorly captured hypothesized explanatory mechanisms, and at worst, generated decades worth 
of specious findings. Positive findings in the field may provide the basis for misguided policy 
recommendations. Negative findings may prove to be incorrect. Indeed major findings have been. 
In the civil wars literature, one of the most robust positive statistical findings is a correlation 
between national levels of economic development and conflict. The World Bank spends aid 
money in accordance with Paul Collier’s ‘economics of civil war’ approach, which promotes 
                                                          
2
 An ecological fallacy occurs when conclusions about individuals or component parts derive from aggregate 
data (Trochim and Donnelly 2008). Imagine, that a particular high-school class reported the highest state-
wide math scores. An observer, running into one of the high-schoolers on the street, would be mistaken to 
congratulate the student on his or her performance. The individual could be a dunce in a class full of math 
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economic growth as the cure for preventing civil wars (Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2009). 
However, because the scholars ignore the sub-national level, it is possible that an omitted 
variable accounts for the relationship between overall development (GDP per capita) and 
domestic peace—say stronger local governments or stronger local employment prospects. 
Devoting resources to a national project would be a mistake if a third factor drives the statistical 
relationship; a rise in per capita GDP that obscures regional inequalities could, in fact, exacerbate 
grievances associated with relative deprivation. Another often-cited finding in quantitative civil war 
studies is that geographic features such as mountainous terrain facilitate conflict. What, though, if 
the conflicts do not occur near mountainous regions? By locating both independent and 
dependent variables at the national level, large-n, quantitative work on contentious politics has 
failed to adequately confront these scale problems. As discussed in depth below, one of the most 
robust negative findings in the civil wars literature has been debunked. Throughout the 2000’s the 
greed-grievance dichotomy purported to prove the irrelevance of grievance on conflict, as 
measured by latent ethnic strife or vertical inequality. Numerous studies have reversed these 
findings, studies which shift focus away from the national level.  
The remainder of this section will further outline the scale problem in structural studies of 
contentious politics. I will first discuss the problem in civil war studies. This strain of contentious 
politics is an unlikely site for a problem linked to variable operationalization. A long sequence of 
contributions has been rigorously self-reflective at the methodological level—even explicitly 
striving to create a “scientific field” of research (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006). By thoroughly 
tracing the prevalence of methodological nationalism in this high-profile area, I hope to 
underscore the threat to contentious politics of any sort. The persistence of methodological 
nationalism in civil war studies is particularly puzzling given the work of Halvard Buhaug and 
others, who identified the problem in the mid-2000’s. The authors’ most recent contribution 
demonstrates that the sub-national movement has not gone far enough, that leading scholarly 
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work is still operating under the assumption of methodological nationalism. In closing the 
discussion I identify the problem in the narrower field of protest studies. 
At first glance, the quantitative study of civil wars is an impressive strain of political 
science research, approaching the orderly accumulation of knowledge demonstrated by the 
natural sciences. A chain of inquiry stretching back over four decades has produced knowledge, 
which has been challenged and refined as new contributions directly engage the old. Scholars 
employ cutting-edge statistical analysis tools. Conclusions have driven policy, as evidenced by 
the World Bank’s connection to Collier’s work. And the discourse has taken place across the 
pages of high impact journals including American Political Science Review, International 
Organization, International Studies Quarterly, Journal of Conflict Resolution, and the Journal of 
Peace Research among others. For these reasons, scholars refer to “decades of scientific 
debate” (Buhaug, Cederman, and Gleditsch 2014) on the topic. Unfortunately a missed 
opportunity to adequately address the scale problem associated with methodological nationalism 
has marred the sub-field with weak inference and logical failings. 
The counter-intuitive finding that grievances are irrelevant to the onset of civil war was 
derived from national-level statistics. As discussed in Chapter 2, Gurr introduced his relative 
deprivation theory in the 1970 Why Do Men Rebel? According to the theory, individuals become 
aggrieved when value expectations do not match value realities—a rethinking of Davie’s (1962) J-
curve hypothesis. Expectations are driven by visible experiences of other individuals, groups, 
countries, or past personal experiences. Quantitative support for relative deprivation includes 
findings based on inequality of income (Muller and Seligson 1987), or more recently immobile 
assets like land (Boix 2008); and based on socio-political access measures derived from the 
Minorities at Risk Project (Gurr and Moore 1997). However, since early literature on revolutions, 
mobilization capacity theorists (Tilly, 1978) and statist theorists (Skocpol, 1979) complained that 
aggrieved populations were ubiquitous, too common to hold explanatory purchase. Explaining 
conflict through individual or group grievances was to mimic the methodologist who, having 
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achieved a hangover with a water and whiskey and water and vodka started taking her drinks 
neat (Aya, 1979). In the early 2000’s two landmark studies purportedly provided strong evidence 
for this over-prediction critique, winning the day for greed (or perhaps the similar state capacity 
position) against grievance.   
Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler’s (2004) Greed Grievance and Civil War gave the debate 
its enduring label. The authors found that proxies for grievance—inequality and political 
repression (captured by the Polity Index)—did not increase the likelihood of conflict in their 
sample. Ethnic diversity as a measure of latent identity-based grievance even reduced the 
likelihood of conflict, except in situations of “ethnic dominance,” in which one group comprised a 
large majority of society. Greed indicators on the other hand—overall economic development, 
growth rates, education levels, oil exports—explained significant variation in civil war onset. 
Fearon and Laitin (2003) offered additional support for the opportunity structure position, further 
bolstering the greed-grievance dichotomy. The authors demonstrated the statistical power of their 
state-capacity model in which police and counter-insurgency weakness is proxied by GDP per 
capita, and insurgent strength is proxied by mountainous terrain and large populations. A rival 
grievance-based model again failed to show a significant relationship between latent ethnic 
tension and inequality and civil war onset.   Koubi and Böhmelt’s recent Journal of Peace Studies 
article exemplifies the way in which the field has interpreted these two studies: “scholars interpret 
the non-finding as a confirmation that grievances are largely irrelevant for explaining civil war 
(Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004)” (2014: 21). However this conventional 
wisdom rested on weak inference. Other weaknesses in proxy variables aside, both groups of 
scholars ignored the potential scale problem underlying their work.  
Scholars in the field attempted to bolster their findings against critique of inferential 
weakness, and in the process hoped to solidify their scientific credentials. In 2006 Harvard Hegre 
and Nicholas Sambanis conducted a sensitivity analysis of the correlates of civil war onset. A 
quote from Ed Leamer, UCLA economist and frequent critic of social sciences statistical work, 
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opens the piece: “a fragile inference is not worth taking seriously.” Results surviving Hegre and 
Sambanis’ testing would form a baseline of the conventional, accepted knowledge in the field.  
The ensuing set of correlates included large population, low per capita income, recent political 
instability, rough terrain and anocratic regime types—closely resembling the drivers identified by 
Fearon and Laitin and Collier and Hoeffler. The authors conclude with a sense of renewed 
confidence: “some of the empirical results in the civil war literature are fragile, but others are not, 
and they are worth taking seriously” (2006: 531). Unfortunately, this confidence was misplaced. 
The rigorous attempt to establish a “scientific field” should not have given warrant for findings to 
be taken seriously. An inference is a conclusion reached on the basis of evidence and reasoning. 
The statistical analysis did nothing to improve faulty reasoning and poor evidence. The 
dependent variables were country-year format, based on 1,000 or twenty five battle deaths. Of 
the more than eighty independent variable operationalizations, not one evaluated sub-regional 
effects. 
The enduring weakness of Hegre and Sambanis’ findings emerged alongside challenges 
to the conventional wisdom. It is telling that these challenges emerged from scholars employing 
sub-national logic, logic that rejected methodological nationalism. In the late 2000’s and early 
2010’s, studies overturned the purported irrelevance of both commonly-captured grievance 
factors: inequality and ethnic strife. In the process these studies brought the broader scale 
problem to the attention of the field.   
In 2011 four researchers from the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) laid down the 
framework for the modern study of civil conflict.  Siri Rustad, Halvard Buhaug, Ashild Falch, and 
Scott Gates argued that “all conflict is local.” The authors argued that contributors to civil war 
studies, “traditionally apply a rigid country-level approach whereby aggregate country data are 
used and any resulting conflict is assumed to affect the entire country” (2011: 20). A number of 
peripheral conflicts in the contemporary world illustrate the limit of such an assumption—conflicts 
located on isolated Philippine islands or in Nepali mountain valleys. Using Southeast Asia as 
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exemplar, the authors demonstrated that the estimated probability of observing intrastate armed 
conflict varies substantially not only between states, but within most states. In order to abandon 
methodological nationalism, the authors were forced to abandon national-level indicators. Thus, 
Rustad and her colleagues used provincial-level data on population, GDP (gross provincial 
product) per capita, infant mortality, and HDI scores from national Human Development Reports. 
Moving beyond crude national-level measures of ethnic population composition, the scholars 
used ArcGIS data to identify the dominant ethnic group in each sub-national region under study 
and calculated the share of the population in the region belonging to the largest ethnic group. 
With independent and dependent variables operationalized sub-nationally, results showed a 
political risk map that varied significantly within Nepal, the Philippines, and other Southeast Asian 
states. In addition to clearly stating the critical position, Rustad, Buhaug, Falch and Gates provide 
a ready-made plausibility probe for my study: the theoretical drivers of domestic conflict do vary 
dramatically below the national level. 
Roughly contemporaneous work further challenged weak inference associated with the 
methodological nationalist position. Gudrun Østby’s work has provided large-n statistical support 
for Frances Stewart’s theory of horizontal inequality. Stewart (2002) argued that inequalities 
between culturally-formed groups can activate ethnic group boundaries, drawing evidence from 
case studies of Mexico’s Chiapas region, Fiji, Uganda, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland, 
South Africa, Brazil, and the United States. Adding an identity-based element to Gurr’s logic, 
Stewart argued that unequal access to political, economic or social resources by cultural groups 
can engender frustration because individual self-esteem is “bound up with the progress of the 
group.” Østby generated a measure of polarization that captured this effect, for thirty six 
countries. She argued that a society that is split into two well-defined groups with substantial 
intragroup homogeneity and intergroup heterogeneity in resource ownership is particularly likely 
to experience social unrest—such a society would be marked by both strong group identification 
and sharp divisions between the groups. Her data include economic inequality measured by 
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asset ownership, and social inequality measured by educational attainment and by ethnic group. 
Although this initial study does not explicitly consider sub-national geography, the creation of 
horizontal inequality indicators moves away from methodological nationalism. Østby argues that 
ethnic cleavages that coincide with systematic socio-economic inequalities may enhance both 
collective grievances and group cohesion among the relatively deprived, among a specific group. 
Shifting analysis to the group level entails a move away from the national-level, away from a 
model of the state as a unified actor or billiard ball.  
The sub-national turn gave scholars the tools to continue effectively challenging the 
prevailing wisdom vis-à-vis ethnic grievance and conflict. Working with Ragnhild Nordas and Jan 
Rød in 2009, Østby made the disaggregated nature of horizontal inequality work explicit. The 
authors now positioned their theory as a challenge to national-level measures of inequality such 
as Gini coefficient: “neglecting or failing to measure the spatial variations and group aspect of 
inequalities may produce tests that do not capture the essential group dynamics of civil conflicts” 
(2009: 309). Exploring sub-national regions in 22 Sub-Saharan African Countries, the authors 
leveraged Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data to reveal risk factors. Conflict onset was 
more likely in regions characterized by absolute educational inequality, and horizontal inequality 
in household assets. By applying sub-national analysis to horizontal inequality theory, Østby and 
her colleagues’ work resembled S. Mansoob Murshed and Scott Gates’ 2005 work on the Maoist 
insurgency in Nepal. Murshed and Gates’ single country, large-n statistical study found that 
fatalities were highest in regions in which life expectancy, educational attainment, road density, 
and rates of land ownership diverged from national averages. Contradictory new findings 
accumulated as scholars realized that “all analysis thus far had been conducted at the country 
level whereas the causal mechanisms are located at the substate level” (Buhaug, Cederman, 
Rød 2008: 540).  
Sub-national work challenged the irrelevance of the second form of grievance as well: 
socio-economic inequality. In 2009 the Journal of Conflict Resolution published a special issue 
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titled Disaggregating Civil War. The issue was a clear call to move beyond methodological 
nationalism. In their contribution, Hegre, Østby, and Clionadh Raleigh (2009) created sub-national 
models of the Liberian civil war. Drawing on a single year’s worth of data from DHS the authors 
created a wealth index, comprised of durable goods ownership and educational attainment, 
measured by GIS grid squares. To disaggregate the dependent variable, the authors used conflict 
data from the ACLED event database, which includes precise geographic location information. In 
a complete reversal of Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) findings, the 
authors reveal a positive relationship between development and conflict: in the context of Liberia 
in 1986, conflict events are more frequent in locations that were absolutely and relatively well off. 
This finding is consistent with an interpretation of wealth representing target value, or the 
presence of a strong support base. Hegre and his colleagues then leveraged case study and 
ethnographic work to expose the causal mechanism at play. This qualitative analysis provided 
support for the target value interpretation. That a sub-national level study could reverse the so-
called conventional wisdom exposes the serious weakness in Hegre and Sambanis’ (2006) 
attempt to create inferences that deserved to be taken seriously.   
In two articles, Buhaug worked with co-authors to broaden the attack on methodological 
nationalism in the civil wars literature. Moving beyond the greed-grievance debate, the scholars 
provided large-n tests of all sub-regional drivers of civil wars. In a 2006 article Buhaug and Rød 
attempted to move beyond the flaws associated with the “statistical study of civil war that uses 
country-level approximations of local phenomena” (2006: 320). Looking at African civil wars from 
1970 through 2001, the authors find sub-regional correlates of conflict, which vary by conflict 
type. Specifically, territorial conflict was more likely in sparsely-populated regions near the state 
border, at a distance from the capital, featuring sparse road density, and lacking significant rough 
terrain. Conflict over state governance was more likely in regions that are densely populated, 
feature dense road networks, near diamond fields, and near the capital city. Later, in a 2011 
article published in the Journal of Conflict Resolution, “It’s the Local Economy Stupid,” Buhaug et 
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al. expanded the sub-national quantitative study of conflict to all countries captured in the PRIO 
Armed Conflict Dataset. The primary independent variable in the study is “gross cell product 
(GCP),” calculated by GIS, relying on economic production data tied to geographical coordinates.  
Whereas GDP per capita income provides a population-averaged per capita measure for the 
whole country, the GCP per capita values for individual local cells reflects spatial variation in 
income within a country. Unlike Hegre et al. (2009) who focused on Liberia only, Buhaug et al. 
(2011) found that conflict events were more likely to occur in absolutely and relatively less 
developed sub-national areas. 
In their piece Buhaug and his colleagues provide a hint of what the field would look like if 
scholars took the problem of methodological nationalism seriously. Conducting sensitivity 
analysis of their model, they explicitly compare the predictive power associated with gross cell 
product per capita and gross domestic product per capita. The authors find that minimum GCP (a 
measures of a state’s poorest sub-region) provides a better predictor for whether states will see 
conflict than GDP per capita. This is exactly the type of sub-nationally sensitivity test that Hegre 
and Sambanis failed to consider in their attempt to create scientific consensus in the field.  
Sub-national quantitative work on civil war clearly shows the weakness of the “state of 
the field” as described by Koubi and Böhmelt in 2014. It appears that it is, in fact, the local 
economy and other local factors that drive the onset of conflict. Indeed, the results of Buhaug et 
al.’s sub-national sensitivity analysis demonstrates that local drivers of civil war hold more 
explanatory power than national-level analogues—a finding that is only surprising in light of years 
of weak inference produced before the article. The push to align theory with methodology in the 
study of intra-state conflict exposed the weakness of the field’s current state of knowledge 
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Recent work by Buhaug, Cederman and Gleditsch suggests that the sub-national push 
has not gone far enough. Echoing their earlier work, the authors accuse quantitative civil wars 
scholars with “pushing square pegs through round holes,” (2014:420) by failing to adequately 
operationalize both the independent and dependent variables in the grievance-conflict nexus. 
Buhaug and his recent set of collaborators attempt to remedy these failings by employing group-
level indicators associated with horizontal inequality. However, the authors now deem 
problematic the limited geographical scope of previous horizontal inequality work. They tout their 
work as “the first to propose global country-level measures of both economic and political 
horizontal inequality” (2014: 422).  The work of Stewart, Østby, and others developed horizontal 
inequality measures as a corrective to national-level measures of grievances like the 
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Index and Gini coefficient. These scholars obtained valid 
operationalization of grievances while losing the generalizability associated with ubiquitous 
national-level data. Østby‘s 2009 article is the broadest early work on horizontal inequalities, 
spanning 22 countries. So, by expanding the reach of the data, Buhaug, Cederman, and 
Gleditsch are broadening the reach of the more accurate operationalization; they are reducing the 
generalizability cost of turning to more accurate quantitative measures.  
However, a closer look at the study suggests that the move back to the national, 
generalizable level occurred too soon. The improvements to inference that have occurred for 
grievance have not occurred for other potential drivers of civil war. For example, in Buhaug, 
Cederman, and Gleditsch’s recent article, the opportunity structure or state capacity position is 
represented by crude national-level indicators: level of democracy, GDP per capita, and total 
population. Only one of the potential drivers of civil war is captured at the sub-national level. 
Related concerns of generalizability and data availability explain the enduring mismatch between 
sub-national theoretical mechanisms and national-level variable operationalization. The authors 
betray the importance of data availability, a decidedly non-theoretical problem, with a strange 
caveat. Discussing statistical and forecasting models, they claim that “available input data on core 
 
 
  100   
    
features such as economic development, democratization, and demographic changes almost 
exclusively pertain to countries” (2014: 423). Economic development and demographics clearly 
vary sub-nationally, as does level of democracy in anocratic countries, including Russia (Lankina 
and Voznaya 2015). So, such input data do not exclusively pertain to countries. What may pertain 
exclusively to countries exclusively is available input data. It appears that even the pioneers of 
the sub-national turn in civil wars are still pushing square pegs through round holes. Despite the 
sub-national turn in the 2000’s, the problem of methodological nationalism still mars the 
quantitative sub-field. And in fact, this is a problem that much quantitative work in the broader 
contentious politics field shares. 
The preceding discussion introduced the problem of methodological nationalism with 
examples from civil war studies, the most voluminous, most widely cited branch of contentious 
politics. The problem similarly afflicts quantitative studies that focus exclusively on protest onset. 
Eisinger launched the quantitative study of protest. Since his foundational work in the 1970’s, 
however, such studies have been relatively rare, until the turn of the century. Patrick Meier (2007) 
explored the relationship between information communication technology (ICT) and protest onset, 
defining independent and dependent variables at the national level. Patrick Regan and Daniel 
Norton (2004) compared the conditions leading to three types of contentious politics onset, 
protest, rebellion, and civil war, with aggregated predictors drawn from grievance and social 
mobilization theories. In the same year, Benjamin Smith (2004) conducted a large-n, national-
level study evaluating the relationship between oil wealth and protest events. Smith concluded 
that oil bust periods correlate with relatively high protest frequencies. Taehyun Nam (2007) 
worked at a more refined geographical level to study the relationship between political opportunity 
structure and protest onset.  Nam focused on Western Europe, rather than the entire globe, but 
still operationalized variables at the national level. T.V. Maher and Lindsay Peterson (2008), and 
a year later Sabine Carey (2009), theorized political opportunity structure as repressive regime 
tendencies. Both studies employ methodological nationalism as they trace statistical relationships 
 
 
  101   
    
between repression and protest onset. Felix Bethke and Margit Bussman (2011) consider 
government financial effects in a similar study of repression and protest. The authors restrict 
analysis exclusively to the national level. Finally, recent work defines grievance as food price 
spikes and then explore the forward linkages to social unrest. Cullen Hendrix and Haggard (2013) 
find significant relationships between price increases and increased frequencies of protests and 
riots. The study operationalize most, but not all, variables at the national level. 
The problem of methodological nationalist is wide-spread. It erodes the construct validity 
of any study. And it must be corrected. By developing sub-national measures of state capacity for 
Russia, I shall make a contribution to structural studies of protest onset, and contentious politics 
more generally. The few quantitative studies of protest onset that do operate at the sub-national 
level do not comprehensively test structural drivers. Wilkinson (2004) evaluated the forward 
effects of politically motivated transfer rates, ethnic composition of police and federal 
administration, as well as corruption. He does not find a significant relationship between onset 
and any of his measures.  Bohlken and Sergenti (2010) conducted a more recent study of social 
unrest in Indian federal states. The authors mimic the initial, invalid operationalization of GDP and 
report negative results. Gillezeau (2014) analyzed the relationship of federal spending at the state 
level and both the onset and severity of racially motivated protests in the United States. Recently, 
Arce and Mangonnet (2013) conducted a sub-national study of political opportunity structure and 
protest onset in Argentina. The state of the field, then, sees many quantitative scholars of protest 
onset either operating at an inappropriate level of analysis, or applying an incomplete set of 
theoretical drivers. 
Organizing Operationalizations 
The fraught history of quantitative contentious politics studies offers valuable lessons for 
scholars hoping to traverse the tenuous link between the concept of state capacity and 
operational variables. Effective work must avoid the short-comings of Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) 
initial contribution. Operationalizations must take the dimensional characteristics of state capacity 
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seriously. Effective work must avoid the alarming problem of methodological nationalism rife in 
the field. Operationalizations must appear at the appropriate level—the sub-national level. For my 
exploration into the drivers of protest events, dimensionality is especially important. I will first 
outline the state of the art in terms of operationalization. After identifying the most prominent 
operationalizations and requisite data, I produce commensurate measures for the Russian case.  
Following the Idea of the State theory outlined in Chapter 2, state capacity consists of 3 
dimensions: cooptation, coercion, and cooperation.  
The first dimension of state capacity is coercion. State capacity to coerce increases as 
citizens fear government retaliation, as citizens are deterred from breaking laws. States with high 
coercive capacity are able to monitor, deter, and suppress dissent effectively. The Hobbesian 
concept of the Leviathan represents this first dimension. Here legitimacy is attained through the 
social contract of myth: individuals forgo some portion of their freedom in order to establish a 
power to overwhelm them all. The power then ensures peace and security. It is the coercive 
Leviathan that Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue deters rebel organizations, precluding the 
appearance of dual sovereignty (Tilly 1978). It is the Leviathan that increases the opportunity cost 
of joining dissident groups according to Collier and Hoeffler (1998).  These conceptualizations 
recall Alexis de Tocqueville’s famous claim that, the “sovereign should punish immediately any 
fault that he discovers, but he cannot flatter himself into supposing that he sees all the faults he 
should punish.”  
Scholars have operationalized coercive capacity along military and economic lines. The 
first, problematic, attempts to capture coercive capacity took the form of general levels of 
economic development, GDP per capita. Two groups of scholars used distinct approaches to 
refine the measure. The first group attempted to create more direct measures of military strength. 
For example, Herbst (1989) and Lacina (2006) compiled military expenditures and military 
personnel figures in their work. The second group turned to extractive capacity as an alternative. 
The government’s capacity to extract resources from society is a less ambiguous proxy for 
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institutional reach and, in turn, the capacity of the state to credibly threaten and coerce: 
“governments rely on revenue to invest in the military, police, and bureaucratic apparatus, which 
in turn allow them to accumulate power for further penetration and extension of state rule” (Levi, 
1988). For this reason Hendrix (2010) described tax capacity as the “sine qua non of state 
capacity.” The simplest formation of extractive capacity is tax take, measured in absolute or 
relative terms. As a more complex alternative, over three decades ago, in 1980, A.F. Organski 
and Jacek Kugler introduced relative political capacity. Organski and Kugler’s measure compares 
the actual level of tax revenue extraction to an expected level of extraction, given the state’s 
economic and natural endowments. This formulation controls for advantageous or 
disadvantageous circumstances. For example, a state rich in oil, or endowed with a wealthy 
population, would be expected to extract more taxes than a relatively poor counterpart. My sub-
national focus precludes the use of military spending. Police competence, on the other hand, 
varies across federal subjects. I collect data on local crime rates as a proxy for state coercive 
capacity. As an alternative operationalization, I follow Organski and Kugler and compute a 
measure of extractive capacity for each Russian subject region. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, a comprehensive statistical model must include 
the three major strains of Social Movement Studies. The first strain, social mobilization theory, 
offers a counterbalance to coercive capacity. Armed with resources and propitious environments, 
activist populations will resist the iron fist of law and order.  Across quantitative contentious 
politics work, scholars have employed a variety of operationalizations. A long—though not 
exhaustive—list would include: presence of professional movement organizations (McCarthy and 
Zald 1977b); emancipatory values (Welzel 2013); membership in network-building associations 
(Norris 2002; McClurg 2006; Kaplan, 2013); educational attainment and transportation 
infrastructure (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Inglehart and Catterberg 2002);  access to 
information communication technology (ICT) (Meier 2007; Earl 2013), especially in light of the 
Arab Spring revolutions (Chung and Cho 2013; Jansen 2010); urbanization rates and a 
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demographic “youth bulge” (Goldstone, 2001b);  existing protest networks, as measured by 
history of protests or strikes (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2015b); demonstration effects, measured 
by high levels of contentious politics onset in neighboring regions (Gleditsch and Ward 2006). 
Data availability dictates my selection of social mobilization capacity measures. Of the 
operationalizations produced across contentious politics studies, I was able to compile sub-
national data on population characteristics, educational attainment, and transportation 
infrastructure. I employ total population, urban population, and tertiary attainment as primary 
operationalizations.  I compiled a measure of annual bus transit volume, to capture transportation 
infrastructure available to would-be protestors and protest organizers.  As alternative 
operationalizations, I further compiled a measure of population age to capture Goldstone’s 
demographic variant.  
The second dimension of state capacity is cooptation. A state that is strong in cooptation 
maintains civil peace not merely through the Leviathan’s threat of violence. Cooptation is 
precisely, “the process by which a group subsumes or assimilates a smaller or weaker group with 
similar interests” (Selznik 1984). Through this mechanism the state is able to appeal to the 
interests of would-be dissidents. Dissident groups’ relative socio-economic condition and 
demands shape the concessions required to subsume or assimilate. In the words of Levi (2006: 
9), one of the central challenges of creating capable governments is to “offer constituents enough 
in the way of benefits to retain their loyalty.” Citizens consent to fall in line, conditional on the 
government’s provision of political goods in return. The Hobbesian social contract, and underlying 
feelings of fairness, rest on exchanging freedom for security. The move to cooptation instead 
involves a broader exchange. The state provides goods, quality of life, in exchange for a feeling 
of fairness that keeps protestors and rebels off the streets. Recent actions in Saudi Arabia offer a 
touchstone example. In Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, and Libya unemployed masses played a significant 
role in social unrest (Goldstone, 2014). In response, Egyptian leaders began paying a generous 
monthly subsidy to job seekers.  
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Scholars have produced a wide range of operationalizations of cooptational capacity.  
This second dimension of state capacity often includes government spending and measures of 
effective governance. Total spending levels on public goods signal to the population that short-
term citizen well-being is a government priority.  A relative measure is more common, however, 
such as a ratio of government expenditure to total GDP or a per capita calculation (Fjelde and de 
Soysa, 2009). Other studies disaggregate spending by destination. For example, Thyne (2006) 
suggests that spending specifically on education creates an indirect link to civil peace, working 
via channels of economic growth, greater social mobility, and lower inequality.  I employ data 
from RossStat from 2007 to 2013 to generate two measures of sub-national capacity to coopt. I 
follow Fjelde and de Soysa and capture the state’s inclination to ‘give back’ as total government 
spending per capita. I also follow the disaggregated approach by computing a per capita measure 
of government spending directed towards socio-cultural projects, which include pensions, 
subsidized health care, housing assistance, unemployment assistance, and green space 
construction projects.  
The grievance position from Social Movement Studies offers an inversion of cooptational 
capacity logic. Undesirable living conditions catalyze manifestations of social unrest.  In the 
decades since foundational contributions of Davies and Gurr, contentious politics scholars have 
developed numerous measures of grievance.  The historical list would here include:  income 
inequality and ethno-linguistic fractionalization (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 
2004); power balance between politically excluded ethnic groups and dominant actors in terms of 
group sizes and access to political, economic, and social resources (Buhaug et al. 2011); 
polarization and horizontal inequality as a measure of ownership of consumer durables and 
educational attainment (Østby, Nordås, and Rød 2009); retrenchment in government budgets 
associated with austerity policies (Ponticelli and Voth 2011; Ban 2012); the erosion of elite 
economic interests (Robertson, 2007); corruption (Neudorfer and Theuerkauf 2014). Explicitly 
sub-national work on grievance operationalization is scarce, but includes several significant 
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operational definitions: the risk of conflict onset in a location may increase with larger income 
deviations from the national average (Buhaug et al., 2011);  or may increase with relative 
electricity shortages (Juan and Bank 2015). I develop several sub-national measures that capture 
grievance across Russian federal subjects. I use unemployment rates by subject as the primary 
measure of grievance. I generate two alternative operationalizations: percentage of local 
populations living in poverty, and annual reported morbidity, as a measure of living conditions.  
The third dimension of state capacity is the most abstract. Cooperation signifies the 
extent to which the state and the populace are integrated. Securing compliance is easier where 
effective governance allows the populace to trust leadership, as compared to countries where 
compliance depends on coercion or cooptation (Levi 2006). Fjelde and de Soysa alternatively 
describe the dimension as “integrative capacity,” which increases as citizens begin to trusts the 
state to be an impartial enforcer of the societal contract, to uphold property rights, and generally, 
to exercise public authority in a way that is not biased towards particular segments of society 
(2009). I consider cooperation the degree to which citizens identify with government and trust 
government officials to remedy social ills. The abstract dimension of capacity has received less 
attention than the previous two. Scholars have operationalized the dimension in a few ways: a 
measure of Contract Intensive Money (CIM) in society, as a measure of financial trust (Clague et 
al. 1999); corruption (Fjelde and de Soysa 2009); and vote shares won by the ruling party 
(Lankina and Voznaya, 2015). I gathered data on voting patterns to calculate the share won by 
United Russia in parliamentary and presidential elections, for all federal subjects.  
The third major strain of Social Movements Studies similarly concerns political interaction 
between state and society.  Social scientists have been operationalizing political opportunity 
structure for decades. Eisinger theorized that each American city held a particular structure of 
political opportunities, which shaped protest behavior. Protest is here a function of “openings, 
weak spots, barriers” (1973: 20). More specifically, the relationship between degree of openness 
and risk of conflict should take the shape of an inverted-U, with the greatest risk of violence 
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among semi-democratic polities that combine insufficient ability to deter violence and insufficient 
political openness to induce non-violent participation (e.g., Muller and Weede 1990).  The core 
idea connecting earlier and later work is that protest frequencies vary with the relative closure of 
the formal political system. Measuring political opportunity structure in an illiberal democracy like 
Russia is particularly difficult. Lankina and Voznaya employed qualitative interviews to 
operationalize the level of political competition and electoral freedom at the regional level. The 
pair also included a measure of corruption.  Corruption fits under the political opportunity structure 
heading through the channel of responsiveness: corrupt political dealings can render even 
competitive, clean elections meaningless. Unfortunately Lankina and Voznaya’s results were only 
available for roughly a third of federal subjects. I leverage a recent study by the Carnegie Center 
in Moscow to significantly improve on this operationalization.  The center published a list of 
openness indicators, regarding democratic elections, political pluralism, independent media, 
economic liberalism, civil society, political society, elite cohesion, corruption, and regional 
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Table 1: Independent Variable Operationalization 
Theoretical Driver Operationalization 
Coercion Crime Rates 
Social Mobilization Capacity Population Figures; Transportation Data; 
Educational System Data  
Cooptation Total Government Spending; 
Government Spending on Socio-Cultural 
Projects 
Grievance Unemployment; Poverty; Morbidity  
Cooperation 
Political Opportunity Structure 
Electoral Support  
Openness Index 
Moving Forward 
Structural contentious politics studies have often failed to effectively cross the perilous 
span between concept and measurement. Facing twin threats of misspecification and 
methodological nationalism, contentious politics scholars must operationalize state capacity 
carefully in order to form meaningful inferences, conclusions, and policy recommendations. As I 
shall discuss in the following chapter, protest scholars studying countries characterized by illiberal 
press face an additional challenge: official reports of events may be inaccurate.  Scholars often 
rely on newspaper records to identify protest events and to build datasets. They provide a 
relatively accessible source of data. They are often, in fact, the only available source of data.  
Several studies have demonstrated that newspapers are not a transparent conduit of protest 
information, and that systematic reporting biases can affect the types of events appearing on the 
printed, or digital, page (Barranco and Wisler 1999; Koopmans 1999; Mueller 1997a, 1997b; 
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 Only after identifying and addressing problems associated with protest event data can 
this study effectively explore the relationship between state capacity and protest onset in Russia.  
Only then can this study begin to illustrate the shape and strength of the Russian social contract. 
As Turgenev wrote, “Russia cannot be measured with an ordinary yardstick” (Zekulin 2009). 
Scholars should interpret the author’s warning as a challenge to develop innovative tools, not as 
cause for despair.  
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IV - Data Politics 
Introduction 
In March of 2017, almost six years since the Bolotnaya square events, a tide of mass 
protest actions spread across Russia. Thousands of people, in dozens of cities, participated in a 
march against corruption. The Anti-Corruption Fund played a catalyzing role. Fund leader 
Aleksey Navalny published an explosive piece of investigative journalism, directed towards 
exposing the staggering personal wealth of former president, current Prime Minister Dmitry 
Medvedev. Touring Tuscan vineyards, luxury condominiums, and a person yacht, the film tells a 
tale of state funds funneled into a personal empire. Navalny urges viewers to remember, “He Is 
Not Dimon To You, or Don’t Call Him Dimon (Он вам не Димон),” a play on Medvedev’s 
personal, playful nickname. The subsequent surge in protest activity comes in the wake of years 
of calm at the national level. Duma elections held in September witnessed a record low in turn-
out. Observers wondered if dissident movements had run out of steam (Shevtsova 2012). Large 
crowds from Moscow, to Yekaterinburg, to Novosibirsk, to Vladivostok in the Far East, highlight 
the presence of lingering tension between state and society. Official actions in response to 
Navalny’s campaign, created a counter narrative, a false image of tranquility that starkly opposed 
reality.   
Russian government reaction lays bare an information suppression campaign. The 
compromising film was immediately banned from all Russian television outlets. In the neutral 
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 Despite mass interest, officials refused to even entertain questions, dismissing the Anti-
Corruption Fund as the work of a known criminal, a reference to Navalny’s questionable charge 
for corrupt business dealings. Once protestors hit the streets, officials continued their dampening 
strategy. Riga-based Meduza News compiled a profile of all major Russian news agency 
coverage during the mass actions. Russia Channel 1, the most-watched channel in the country, 
completely ignored the turmoil, with one exception. Over the course of forty eight hours, talk show 
host Vladimir Solovyov spent 6 minutes denouncing the action in vague terms, avoiding 
Navalny’s name, avoiding the word protest. No other mention appeared. State-aligned television-, 
radio-, and web-outlet RIA Novost completely ignored the thousands of people marching across 
the country.Websites Life, Isvestia, Forbes Russia, TASS, and Interfax were likewise 
meaningfully silent throughout the day. The only sites featuring significant coverage are 
considered oppositional or at least independent, foremost TVRain (Дождь) (Meduza 2017c). 
Even a keen observer of current events in Russia would likely consider the wave of protests a 
minor expression of social unrest.   
This chapter argues that traditional media are inadequate sources of Russian protest 
data. So-called event data projects, based on traditional media, are similarly inadequate. 
Newspaper accounts in Russia ignore most dissident action, as predicted by news worthiness 
theory from media studies. Even a single data point is the product of numerous decisions, and 
each decision is potentially objectionable, fraught with value judgments. Only careful decision 
making will produce useful data on Russian protest onset. The previous chapter built a 
connection between independent variable concepts and operationalization. Here the task 
becomes traversing a second perilous span (Hughes 1971), this time with the dependent 
variable. 
My dependent variable definition—one that includes even micro events–renders 
traditional news media entirely unreliable. Thanks to the mass scale of events, and thanks to the 
efforts of dedicated media outlets like TVRain, official suppression did not entirely obscure 
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Navalny’s 2017 marches. Smaller events do not share the scale advantage. Demonstration 
effects mobilized an anti-corruption march in Krasnodarsk, in a rural area outside Sochi. A film 
crew from the firmly anti-regime Radio Freedom struck out to cover the event. Before reaching 
their destination, the group was beaten and robbed of cameras, cell-phones and notebooks by a 
group of masked men (Meduza 2017a). From the position of social science research, the push 
and pull around reporting becomes a battle for data creation or data suppression. Recent events 
surrounding “Don’t Call Him Dimon” highlight the political nature of data in social science in 
general, and contentious politics in particular. Individuals like the battered crew, operating despite 
official restriction, provide an alternative source of protest data. 
Below, I argue for activist-generated data as a viable alternative. Facing censorship, 
scholars are often unable to study contentious politics in illiberal regimes (Barsalou 2012). The 
charged, political process of data gathering thus makes allies of dissidents and academics. 
Without a record of events, dissidents cannot spread their message, to potential sympathizers, to 
targets within the ruling circle. Without a record of events, academics cannot even begin to 
answer questions of state-society relations. The Russian coalition Collective Action 
(коллективное действие), a group of liberal activists, journalists, and professors, appreciate 
the political power of data gathering. The group claims: “we are dedicated to participating in the 
formation of the Russian future; our weapons are critical thought, information and collective 
action.” Successful scholars rely on the very same arsenal. 
With a source identified, this chapter then argues against mainstream collection 
methodology: automation is an inappropriate method of data collection. The discussion below 
introduces event data coding, a common method of quantifying protest. Over the last fifty years 
contentious politics scholars have interfaced with print and web media to build event databases. 
Striving for efficiency, they leverage automated coding algorithms to dramatically outstrip hand 
coding speed. As I will argue, however, what is an acceptable error rate for massive datasets is 
 
 
  113   
    
unacceptable for Russian protest from 2007 to 2013. For this reason, I hand-coded hundreds of 
articles to compile the updated Lankina and Voznaya dataset.  
This study foregrounds the political nature of gathering data, especially protest data. If 
participants are unaware of sympathetic actors across the country, coordination failure will stymy 
nascent movements. For example, in the former U.S.S.R. and in Russia today broad anti-regime 
sentiment has been, and remains, an insufficient condition for mass mobilization. Only when an 
informational connection appears will sympathizers recognize each other and act. The connection 
in East Germany and other former Soviet republics took the form of leaked videos depicting 
resistance and police abuse (Kuran 1991). In Russia today, the connection takes the form of 
independent news and eyewitness accounts. Putin’s social project thus requires censorship, to 
sever the informational link. If a string of anti-corruption protests breaks out in Novosibirsk or 
Irkutsk, but censors block national media coverage, Moscow-based organizers may miss the 
signal of support. A choice to study modern protest, then, is a choice to directly affect the 
prevailing protest environment.  
From Concept to Measurement, Again 
My arguments concerning source data and methodology naturally follow a dependent 
variable definition that includes micro events. This first section presents this definition in detail. 
International relations scholars have long argued that definitional choices shape research. 
Choices restrict the questions scholars can ask and the conclusions they draw (Holsti 1964; 
Buzan 1991; Holsti 1996; M. N. Barnett and Duvall 2005). My choices are driven by the research 
question: why have certain Russian regions experienced higher or lower levels of protest than 
others? The answer requires an understanding of when, where, and why protests occur, as a 
means to sketch the contours of the modern social contract in Russia. 
Recent studies offer inadequate definitional resources. Erica Chenoweth’s work on 
protest often employs a “maximalist” variant (2010, 2014; 2015a). Non-violent protest campaigns, 
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under Chenoweth’s definition, hold explicit goals related to removing incumbent governments, 
and involve more than one recorded event, in which at least 1,000 people participate. As the 
language suggests, this variant is too macro for my purposes. Campaigns capture protest in a 
general sense while ignoring individual protest events. Graeme Robertson’s definitions, on 
display in his work on Russian protest, are similarly inadequate. His early work defines protest as 
contentious political events involving labor organizations (2007). His recent work expands scope 
beyond labor but fails to provide definitional clarity. Especially troubling, Robertson fails to define 
a scope of protestor identity (2013). It is not clear if pro-government assemblies fall under his 
definition, a particularly important consideration in the Russian context (Lankina and Voznaya 
2015).  
In order to construct an appropriate dependent variable definition, I merge contributions 
from two studies. A classic study in the social movement literature provides an ideal foundation—
as I mentioned in the introductory chapter. Douglas McAdam provided a broad conceptual 
definition of social protest in his 1982 “Political Process and the Development of Black 
Insurgency, 1930–1970.” Protests are, “organized efforts to promote or resist changes in the 
structure of society [or polity] that involve recourse to non-institutional forms of political 
participation” (1982: 25). McAdam’s definition is sufficiently micro to capture individual events. 
This form of contentious politics can include demonstrations, marches, picketing, sit-ins, with one 
thousand, one hundred or ten participants. Moreover, his focus on change highlights negotiation 
and renegotiation of state-society relations. To this definition, I follow Lankina and Voznaya’s 
recent practice and add an explicit proscription of pro-regime activities. I define protest as anti-
regime group action only. Youth marches or counter-rallies organized by the ruling United Russia 
party would not qualify.  
Appropriate temporal and geographic parameters round out the definition. Dependent 
variable data must include refined geographical information in order to support sub-national 
inquiry. And moreover, dependent and independent variable specifications must coincide. As I 
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have argued—in Chapter 3—the Idea of the State theory can only be effectively tested at the sub-
national level. The body of social movement studies, developed over the last five decades, posits 
associations between structural factors and the onset of protest events. Causal mechanisms tied 
to grievance, state capacity or social mobilization capacity work to increase or decrease onset 
potential in the immediate area. I thus select Russian province as the appropriate geographical 
unit. Choosing a temporal unit of analysis is a practical question, rather than a theoretical one. 
Following tradition in the social sciences, I select yearly increments. My dependent variable 
dataset organizes protest events, events corresponding with McAdam’s definition, into province-
year categories. 
With a working definition in hand, the next step is dependent variable data gathering. 
Common data gathering methods in contentious politics studies include participant interviews, 
archival research, quasi-experiments, and media event coding (Koopmans and Rucht 2002). The 
last method is widely used to build protest databases.  
Effective, Efficient Accumulation 
Event data coding has become a viable methodology in political science. Previously the 
work of human hands, it has increasingly become the purview of machines (Schrodt and Brackle 
2013). This transition has advantages and disadvantages. Efficiency, objectivity, and replicability 
are counterbalanced by inaccuracy and a lack of transparency. Modern data projects carefully 
process newspaper data to produce reliable data. News agencies and activist reporting networks 
instantly transmit protest events over even expansive geographic territories, from the west coast 
of the United States back to Washington D.C., from the center of Siberia or the eastern steppes 
to Moscow and Saint Petersburg. Event data sources leverage such informational flows to further 
social science research.  
Event data thus represents a logical choice to build my dependent variable database. 
Despite advantages discussed below, however, it is inadequate for the case at hand. In order to 
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conduct effective studies of Russian protest onset, scholars must break with tradition and seek 
alternative sources. 
Event data, derived from media accounts, has recently achieved a place in the 
methodological canon. As recently as the 1980s, event datasets were rarely used in mainstream 
journals (Earl 2004) despite the fact that methodological development began much earlier 
(McClelland et al. 1971). Today they are a ubiquitous sight in methods sections. Any 
retrospective of collective action studies would be incomplete without mention of media data and 
its development over time. Jennifer Earl and her co-authors describe the event data research 
tradition as arising to seize “numerous theoretical and methodological opportunities”(2004 65). 
Scholars could not test leading contentious politics theories without newspaper accounts of 
protest events. Research questions addressing the internal dynamics of social movements or the 
calculus of participation often do not require event data. On the other hand, questions addressing 
onset (Meier 2008; Chenoweth 2003), repertoires of contention (Tilly, 1979; 1995) tactical 
innovation and diffusion (McAdam 1983) all require newspaper data. There is simply no other 
suitable source of event data (Franzosi 1987), an insight as true today as it was 30 years ago—at 
least for those reluctant to embrace recent attempts to crawl and code social media posts 
(Valkanas and Gunopolus 2013). Only methodological innovation in data gathering allowed 
scholars to begin to answer many research questions. 
Efficiency is the first advantage of event data. Over the last several decades, scholars 
have attempted to achieve efficiency in data gathering. Large-scale projects gathered contentious 
political event occurrences in Europe (e.g., Koopmans and Rucht 2005), in the United States 
(e.g., McAdam and Su 2002), and internationally (e.g., Bond et al. 1997; Jenkins and Bond 2001). 
Beginning with early projects, scholars exploited newspaper staff labor to increase the volume 
and speed of accumulation (Taylor and Jodice 1986). A single newspaper issue represents the 
aggregation of hundreds of observations, filtered through reporters and editors. Editorial staff 
identify sources, and filter out unreliable stories. Event data pioneers added another layer to this 
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parsing structure. They took available issues of major newspapers and coded events of interest. 
Cooperation between academics and journalists later turned explicit. Indexing was an early 
attempt to improve coding efficiency, a process by which newspapers would prepare brief 
descriptions of article content. Critical research, however, quickly revealed flaws. Indexing 
generated data collections that captured neither the total population of events, nor the total 
population of relevant articles (Earl 2004). Researchers reverted to the previous method of “daily 
newspaper scans” (Ibid.). Even a rapid look through daily issues of a single newspaper, say the 
New York Times, is labor intensive. As an alternative, scholars moved to sampling techniques, 
replacing daily papers with Monday editions or weekend editions (Kriesi 1995).  
As a second advantage, event data achieves the objectivity and replicability desired by 
positivist social scientists. Milton Friedman provided the touchstone defense of positivism for a 
generation of scholars (1966). Social science research of the highest quality, according to 
Friedman, mimicked the natural sciences. Sociologists, like chemists, like physicists, strove to 
identify general laws that could explain empirical phenomenon. Only by rigorously testing and re-
testing hypotheses could researchers begin to make claims about the presence of laws, or lack 
thereof. Only by reproducing major findings could social scientists take their results seriously. 
Event datasets derived from newspaper data corresponded with the doctrine nicely. Newspaper 
articles are static, freely available sources. Critics can replicate scholarship. Collaborators can 
expand methods and theories beyond original contexts. Data derived from newspapers thus 
facilitate comparisons between contentious political patterns across geography and time 
(Koopmans and Rucht 2002). Innovators in data time-space compression have recently 
attempted to further the positivist dream. Today, two projects begun in the late 1960’s, the Cross-
National Time Series Data Archive (CNTS) and the World Handbook of Political and Social 
Indicators, employ automated parsers rather than research assistants (Taylor and Jodice 1986). 
Modern event data developments enhance objectivity and replicability. Modern event 
databases are populated by automated content-analysis software. Programmers construct 
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dictionaries of terms, connected by nested algorithms. Logic chains parse text blocks into data 
fields, regarding the location, timing, and characteristics of contentious political events. By 
creating links to aggregated newswire feeds, programmers can even create real-time updates to 
underlying databases.  Several high-profile projects have recently emerged as social scientists 
attempt to bring the tools of the internet and computer programming to bear on scholarly work—
with varying degrees of success. The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) 
and the Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD) feature in mainstream political science and 
international relations journals such as the American Political Science Review, Journal of Peace 
Research, and the Journal of Conflict Resolution.  
Potential disadvantages are visible in the shift towards increased automation. The fate of 
a high-profile project, GDELT, has become something of a cautionary tale in the discipline. Its 
creators overstated its utility and perhaps even committed fraud in the process of gathering data 
(Spath 2014). Analysts identified twin concerns of accuracy and transparency. Creators defined 
the data as recording contentious political event onset. Publicized definitions changed after 
scholars identified puzzling discrepancies between GDELT and other sources. The dataset, as it 
turned out, recorded reporting about events, rather than onset (Ulfelder 2015).  
Currently, leading projects acknowledge these problems. Modern event data projects rest 
on a tension between breadth and efficiency, on the one hand, and context specificity and 
accuracy on the other. Developers of the Social, Political and Economic Event Database 
(SPEED) attempt to harness the advantages of automation, while mitigating the disadvantages. 
Housed at the University of Illinois’ Cline Center for Democracy, SPEED features a combination 
of machine coding and strategically placed human oversight. Scholars at the Cline Center 
strikingly frame the efficiency gains offered by machine coding. Peter Nardulli and Matthew 
Hayes estimated that classifying 5.9 million New York Times articles on the basis of civil unrest 
content would have taken a single human analyst working 24 hours a day and 365 days a year 
over two decades to complete. Once SPEED’s classifier model was fine-tuned, the task was 
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completed in a matter of hours. This discrepancy is breathtaking. It is no surprise, then, that 
social scientists have hoped to develop event databases—and similarly unsurprising that such 
projects continue to receive significant funding from the likes of the government Minerva Initiative 
(Shellman, Hatfield, and Mills 2010) and private foundations(Nardulli, Althaus, and Hayes 2015). 
The cost of incredible efficiency is accuracy. For instance, unlike computers, humans usually 
have little trouble determining which of several named persons any given “she” refers to, or 
whether a date refers to the day of a protest or the day of the news report covering a protest. The 
SPEED project provides the most satisfying solution to this tension. Nardulli and Hayes describe 
their methodology as a “supervised learning system.” In this system, human coders are presented 
with input data that have been pre-processed by classification software. Then, humans perform 
only the most difficult coding decisions, leaving the simpler work to automated processes.  
Methodological innovations have indeed seized an opportunity to spur knowledge 
generation in contentious politics; it represents a viable methodological option. Protest event 
data, from hand coding, to indexing, to machine coding, and back to the hybrid approach, has 
facilitated a number of landmark studies, on European contention (Tilly 1995), California farm 
workers (Jenkins and Perrow 1977), the U.S. civil rights movement (McAdam 1982), protest 
cycles in Italy (Tarrow 1994), new social movements in Western Europe (Kriesi 1995), and 
nationalist protest in the former Soviet republics (Beissinger 2002). The study of protest in Putin-
era Russia could fit into this tradition.  
As the following section will argue, however, reliance on newspaper data renders any 
event data source inappropriate; the study of modern Russian protest cannot rely on traditional 
media accounts. Even the most sophisticated, reflexive projects like SPEED produce data of 
unacceptably poor quality.  
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Event Data Flaws 
There are many reasons to doubt the adequacy of SPEED or any other large-scale, 
machine-coding project. Event data innovators have constructed more and more complex parsing 
systems. Each attempt to improve efficient data accumulation introduces error. Newspaper staff 
and research assistants built the first generation of event data projects. Both parties represented 
a potential source of error. Clumsy reporters or overworked graduate students threated accuracy 
of the final product. Automated systems added faulty algorithms to the list. Sociologist Roberto 
Franzosi conducted a social history of media-based data in the social sciences. He elaborated 
threats associated with data and discussed scholars’ subsequent reactions. The results are 
worrying. Franzosi concludes that “social scientists involved in quantitative empirical research 
generally are relatively unconcerned with problems of measurement” (1987, 7). Jay Ulfelder, 
similarly accused the current cohort of contentious politics scholars of expecting their data to 
stream onto virtual desktops free of errors, “like manna raining down from digital heaven” (2015).  
Only by outlining and explicitly considering each threat to data viability can scholars avoid 
blindly using flawed datasets. Because they rely on newspaper data, older critiques of newspaper 
data apply to projects like SPEED. An older literature thus provides a useful set of tools. Scholars 
working in the field of media studies developed a theory of “news worthiness” that organizes 
potential sources of bias (Lipmann1922; Galtung and Ruge 1965). The distortion effect 
jeopardizes the objectivity of any newspaper, journal or website, even those covering high-profile 
events like American presidential elections or international military conflicts. Selection bias 
threatens to push small-scale events out of papers due to lack of interest. When the subject of 
coverage is Russian protest, however, an additional danger arises: lack of translation can prevent 
stories from making the move to international news wires. In this section I restrict discussion to 
automated event data construction in general. In the following section I move on to challenges 
associated with the Russian environment. 
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Every news story includes a point of view. Even the most detached rendering of events 
includes tone. Even the most bare-bones account is the product of deliberate choices. In a 
reflective moment, the Guardian conducted a study on media’s treatment of natural disasters 
versus armed conflict. Respondents reported that, as fundraising campaigns reflect, victims of 
floods and earthquakes appear more sympathetic than victims of civil war (The Guardian 2014). 
Media studies scholars dub this the distortion effect. Between occurrence and reporting all events 
pass through a filter. The filter distorts events by attaching elements of style and association. The 
degree of distortion is an empirical question, varying on a case by case basis. Contentious 
politics scholars must be cognizant of distortion effects. Jennifer Earl, Andrew Martin, and their 
colleagues published an overview of media studies work on distortion bias. The scholars 
concluded: “newspaper reports are generally accurate in their portrayal of the ‘hard facts’ of the 
event” (2004, 67). This optimistic conclusion features an important caveat, however. Even the 
hard facts—the who, when and where—are less reliable when news stories implicate authorities. 
Worse still, such events, including anti-regime protests, may go unreported (Ibid.).  
The second major threat to media data is selection bias
3
. Event data managers similarly 
strive to minimize selection bias. Walter Lippmann (1922), regarded as the founder of the news 
worthiness theory (Earl et al. 2004), counts mainly the characteristics ‘proximity’, ‘surprise’, 
‘prominence’ and ‘conflict’ amongst the influencing factors. The theory expects nearby, surprising, 
large-scale, violent events to make the news  (Galtung and Ruge 1965; Barranco and Wisler 
1999).  
                                                          
3
 Influential individuals, or so the scene goes, begin each morning with a stack of newspapers and a cup of 
coffee. According to CNBC Warren Buffett begins his day with a thick stack: the Wall Street Journal, the 
Financial Times, The New York Times, USA Today, and even the Omaha World-Herald. Barack Obama 
drinks his coffee over The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post, and the Atlantic 
(Crippen 2007). Even the most reputable sources are incomplete. Editorial boards determine the type of 
stories that make the cut, a decision shaped by readership and the slate of potential leads appearing on any 
given day. The selection of each paper is thus biased. Looking for a more complete picture of world events, 
Buffett and Obama expand their scope. Looking for a more complete picture of local events, the two men 
turn to sources focusing on Omaha and Washington D.C. 
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Since at least the 1970’s sociologists and political scientists have built a large body of 
literature, quantifying selection bias, testing Lippmann’s theory. Evidence supports the 
expectation that, as event participants increase, so too increases the likelihood of reporting 
(McCarthy, McPhail, and Smith 1996). Other factors militating against selection bias include 
sponsorship by an organization connected to media (Ryan 2010) and the presence of well-known 
actors (Snyder and Kelly 1977). In line with expectations, the presence of violence increases 
likelihood of reporting (Oliver and Myers 1999). Evidence has also supported the proximity 
dimension of Lippman’s theory. Over the period 1968-1969 The New York Times was thirty times 
more likely to report events occurring in New York City compared to those occurring elsewhere in 
the United States (Myers and Caniglia 2004). And in general the distance between media 
headquarters and the protest site reduces reporting frequency, as does rural location (Ibid.). 
Contentious politics scholars must acknowledge risks associated with newspaper data. 
Any event dataset built on top of newspaper feeds will reflect the distortion effect and selection 
bias. If proximate, surprising, prominent, violent events are overrepresented in the pages of the 
New York Times and other papers, such events will be overrepresented in event databases as 
well. Small-scale, non-violent protest events, occurring outside of urban centers fail Lippman’s 
news worthiness test across the board. Working under the assumptions of news worthiness 
theory, and given empirical testing from sociology and political science, it is unreasonable to 
expect newspaper data to serve as an adequate base for sub-national protest data.  
Not surprisingly, critics have repeatedly deemed media data unsuitable for contentious 
politics research. Mainstream media have failed to overcome the threats of distortion, selection 
bias, and translation. In 1996, John McCarthy, Clark McPhail, and Jackie Smith systematically 
compared newspaper accounts of protest against police accounts. McCarthy and his co-authors 
concluded that only a small portion of protests receive even cursory mention in mainstream 
media. The group further reported unstable selection bias across news sources. No major United 
States source reported more than a fraction of events, and the fraction captured in The New York 
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Times and The Washington Post differed (1996). The majority of American protests failed to 
make the news, even when the events occurred in the seat of government, in Washington D.C. 
(Mueller 1997b). Across the country, scholars identified specific correlates of bias, including race. 
American papers tend to ignore riots in cities that have higher percentages of whites in the 
population (Myers and Caniglia 2004). Underreporting held in other contexts, including in East 
Germany, where protests only began receiving coverage when the number of participants 
surpassed the 10,000 threshold (Mueller 1997a). Numerous studies have demonstrated the 
pitfalls of treating contentious politics data like “manna falling from digital heaven” (e.g., Barranco 
and Wisler 1999; Koopmans 1999; Mueller 1997a, 1997b; Maney and Oliver 2001; Koopmans 
and Rucht 2002; Myers and Caniglia 2004). American-based contentious politics scholars face an 
additional challenge. Large-scale news aggregation feeds include translated stories from 
international sources. The transition from original language to English erects another hurdle. Only 
a fraction of foreign language stories ever make the transition to English (Ortiz et al. 2005; 
Lankina and Voznaya 2015).  
A recently study exposes the problems associated with, specifically, non-English 
language source data. In 2011, Mark Herkenrath and Alex Knoll designed a test of newspaper 
protest data. They selected a small group of countries, used an alternative source to compile 
event data, and then compared the findings against LexisNexis archives, a searchable database 
of major news articles. The study focused on events in Mexico, Argentina, and Paraguay in 2006. 
The alternate data sources, Observatorio Social de America Latina, culls data from local news 
outlets, as wells as activists themselves. Large-scale, international projects draw on English-
language translations of events, overlapping with archives such as LexisNexis. The two authors 
employed logistic regression to construct a profile for omitted events. Results were striking: in the 
three Latin American countries surveyed, in 2006, roughly one twentieth of all protest events 
make it to the international news. Herkenrath and Knoll concluded that such data sources should 
be used rarely, if ever. Such dramatic results lead inevitably to the conclusion that newspaper 
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data may not meet acceptable standards for event analysis, that the data can distort findings and 
misguide theorizing (2011, 22). 
Not all critics share Herkenrath and Knoll’s dismissal of newspaper data, however. 
Scholars working with English-language sources often include an optimistic note in otherwise 
critical articles (Mueller 1997b; Barranco and Wisler 1999; Koopmans and Rucht 2002; Schrodt 
and Brackle 2013). Earl, Martin, McCarthy, and Soule’s review article, published in the Annual 
Review of Sociology in 2004, serves as a representative example. The authors spend pages and 
pages elaborating sources of media bias, and recapitulating critical empirical work. In the 
conclusion however, pragmatism seems to triumph over caution. Earl and colleagues note that, 
for many research designs, newspapers “remain the only source of data on protest” (2004: 71). 
The group falls victim to a familiar pitfall. They argue that, precisely because of the news 
worthiness effect, newspapers are unlikely to omit important protests. Failing to consider the 
political nature of problem definition, the sociologists fail to question the definition of “important.” 
Others acknowledge newspaper reporting bias, but argue that biases are constant over time. 
McCarthy et al. (1996: 496) argued that American media “provides an amazingly stable portrait of 
the churning mixture of protest forms, purposes, and contexts in Washington D.C. during1982 
and 1991”—a finding that has repeatedly come under attack (Oliver and Myers 1999; Myers and 
Caniglia, 2004). Exploring the biases of newspaper data remains a valuable academic enterprise. 
Given media studies theoretical work, and given the strength of empirical work, main-
stream media appears a poor source of protest data—in any polity. This section has presented 
critique leveraged against automated content analysis in general. The following section will focus 
on challenges related to the Russian environment in particular. Each source of bias enumerated 
in Lippman’s news worthiness theory, when applied to the Russian case, further sharpens threats 
to data collection. Furthermore, the illiberal nature of the Russian press introduces sources of 
distortion not considered in the original model. These theoretical concerns are strong enough to 
preclude newspaper data for my project. My research question and motivation simple cannot 
 
 
  125   
    
justify such problematic data. Must the inadequate become the standard because “that’s all there 
is?” This resigned approach seems to undergird the efforts of major event data projects such as 
SPEED. There exists an alternative. Like Herkenrath and Knoll, I choose to jettison mainstream 
media for alternative sources, those operating outside of government oversight, often in the 
murky realm of the internet. In the following section I shift attention to activist-based data sources. 
In the penultimate section I will use Lipmann’s theory to quantify the expected selection bias vis-
à-vis Russia protest coverage. In the Russian context, Earl and her colleagues’ conclusion that 
important events seldom fail to make the news appears baffling and misguided. Putin’s regime 
censors media precisely because events are considered important.  
The Russian Environment 
Even in environments characterized by vibrant, liberal press, newspapers are a 
problematic source for contentious politics data. As I shall discuss in detail below, the situation in 
a country like Russia is much, much bleaker.  
Classic and more recent media studies models predict high levels of bias in Russia. The 
news worthiness model expects geographical distance and event size to increase selection bias. 
The physical distance between the location of the event and news headquarters shapes the 
probability reporting (Galtung and Ruge 1965; Almeida and Lichbach 2003; Myers and Caniglia 
2004). The expansive Russian continent poses a serious challenge for comprehensive news 
coverage. Secondly, media coverage is most likely when protests are characterized by a large 
number of participants. In Russia large-scale rallies are illegal without express government 
permission (Gelman 2010). David Ortiz, Daniel Meyers, Eugene Walls, and Maria-Elena Diaz 
expanded Lippmann’s (1922) original theory. Their “media process model” describes selection 
bias as a function of audience demand and media supply (2005). When readers fail to show 
interest, events fail to appear in even local publications. It is difficult to judge the degree to which 
the Russian population demands information regarding anti-regime protests. Public opinion polls, 
conducted by the Levada research center, place interest in dissident actions at a fluctuating level 
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(Russian Times 2014, Moscow Times 2015). However, it is certain that media supply represents 
a significant source of bias. The updated model sees economic and political environments 
shaping the content that the media is willing and able to provide. For the last several years, the 
Russian economy has faced stagnation and recession. News agencies, like all businesses, would 
be forced to trim costs, leading to less coverage over the Russian continent. The political context 
represents a more significant source of bias. The Russian media has been historically unable to 
operate independent of the governing regime. 
Political leaders closely monitor and shape media supply in Russia. Vladimir Putin has 
successfully dismantled independent media. The Russian government has used mainstream 
media as a tool for decades. Literary journal and news outlet, Snob, established in 2008 by 
Vladimir Yakovleva, describes the current media censorship as a return to old practices. The 
1996 presidential election in Russia, considered the last—or alternatively the first and last—
competitive election in the country’s history, captured public attention for months. In the pre-
election days citizens found a newspaper waiting in their mailbox, despite the fact that they were 
not subscribers. The paper was printed in full color and on high quality paper, despite the fact that 
such materials were luxuries in the early days of the Russian Federation. The mysterious issue 
was a gift from the sitting president. Incumbent Boris Yeltsin faced faltering support. His response 
to a hostage situation in Chechnya failed to impress. His economic policy failed to pull the 
economy out of recession and failed to end the distribution of promissory notes in lieu of salaries. 
Communist candidate Gennady Zyuganov and his party were confident they could seize the 
presidency. Today the communists’ KPRF party is a minor member of government at best. In the 
early 1990’s however, the party retained millions of loyal supporters. A wide base, coupled with 
Yeltsin’s abysmal approval ratings, presaged change. The unexpected journalistic gift was a 
preventative measure. Titled, God Forbid!, the flashy newspaper contained “a weekly dose of 
anti-communistic propaganda”(Vasiliev 2017). Readers were treated to condemnations of 
Zyuganov’s political positions, ad hominem attacks, cartoons. The God Forbid crossword contest 
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encapsulates Yeltsin’s strategy. Clues attacked political opposition, and the winner of the 
competition received a vacation package to the Czech Republic (Ibid.). Yeltsin ended up winning 
reelection with 54% of the vote.  
In 2011 God Forbid! returned. Again, the magazine served to support an embattled 
Russian president, Yeltsin’s hand-picked successor Vladimir Putin. The second incarnation of the 
propaganda vehicle denounced the protestors taking part in the mass protests of 2011-2012. The 
impact was muted. As Snob writes, “political discussion had left print media for the internet” 
(Ibid.). In my search for appropriate dependent variable data I follow the shift, to the internet, to 
non-traditional sources of event data. 
Activist Sources 
The Russian environment is completely unconducive to traditional event data gathering. 
Is there a better alternative? Is there any alternative at all? Jack London is reputed to have said 
“life is not always a matter of holding good cards, but sometimes, playing a poor hand well” 
(Millman 2004). Fortunately, social scientists interested in studying protests and other contentious 
events do, in fact, have other cards at their disposal. Activists themselves often keep records of 
their activities, and the activities of others. Treated with a skeptical eye, activist sources can 
become a viable alternative to newspaper data.  
Activist content, appearing in print and digital media, takes a number of forms. Some 
collectives focus exclusively on journalism, providing a digital home for news stories, eye-witness 
accounts and videos. For instance, change-links.org is the digital form of a Los Angeles area 
community newsletter. Content includes stories that touch on current national and international 
events, as well as opinion pieces, and even book and film reviews. All pieces are written from the 
point of view of the progressive, non-violent activist. There are no direct calls to action or meeting 
announcements on the website.  Others use their web presence as an organizational tool, 
attracting participants, scheduling rallies, and generally building public influence. The Ruckus 
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Society, host of ruckus.org, describes itself as a “toolbox of experience, training and skills.” 
Through the website, consumers can book classroom instruction or live roleplaying scenarios 
directed towards building non-violent action competency. The site even includes a bird-dogging 
instruction manual. Pushing the boundaries between contentious and mainstream politics, bird-
doggers attend public events and pressure elected officials to change their stance on important 
issues. Other activist-based web sources combine elements of the two archetypes: their missions 
consist of both journalistic and organizational elements. As one example, elksoft.com publishes 
news content as well as calls to action. Site organizers employ the combined approach to further 
their goals, a cessation of logging in the redwood forest region of the United States. The site 
includes upcoming gathering announcements, boycott instructions, and news briefs regarding 
political and commercial action in the area. The three examples mentioned here give a glimpse 
into the set of English-language based activist media sources, a small population of at around 
twenty sources (Almeida and Lichbach 2003).  
Activist websites and newsletters correct the sources of bias identified in Lippman’s news 
worthiness model. News agencies provide information about Los Angeles area events, national 
politics, and deforestation in the United States. Members of change-links, the Ruckus Society and 
elksoft, however, refuse to accept the distortion effect and selection bias inherent in mainstream 
sources. Instead of accepting journalists’ point of view, activists create their own. Instead of 
journalists determining just what constitutes an important story, activists take selection into their 
own hands. International activist organizations even attempt to correct the translation bias. One 
particularly interesting example arose during the Egyptian Arab Spring. Launched in early 2011, 
Tahrir Documents is a collaborative effort to archive and translate activist papers from the 
Egyptian uprising and its aftermath. Volunteers collect materials from demonstrations in Cairo’s 
Tahrir Square and then publish complete English translation alongside scans of the original 
documents. The project is not affiliated with any government organization, Egyptian or otherwise. 
I sat down with founding member Elias Saba to discuss the initiative. Saba, a doctoral candidate 
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in the Near Eastern Studies department at the University of Pennsylvania, felt a responsibility to 
chronicle these contentious events. Otherwise no record would appear in local news sources in 
Arabic, much less in international sources in English. By inserting themselves into the news 
generation process, the Tahrir documents team generates data that would otherwise not exist.   
Contentious politics scholars who rely on mainstream newspaper data are indeed playing 
with a lousy hand. Even local news sources often miss the occurrence of contentious events (Earl 
et al. 2004; Ortiz et al. 2005; Chenoweth 2010). And, as scholarship has shown, as the purview of 
news organizations expands, the number of omitted cases rises. Reuters international newsfeed 
missed major contentious African events captured in two local sources: the African Research 
Bulletin and the Zimbabwe Herald (Sommer and Scarritt 1999). These findings extend to 
Palestine and Germany, where local sources are again more reliable than international news wire 
services (Gerner et al. 1994). Alternative news sources, activist-generated and otherwise, reduce 
scholars’ reliance on flawed reporting. Police agencies can supplement incomplete reporting from 
local news sources (Maney and Oliver 2001). Eye witness accounts and official state reports 
provide another option (Day, Pinckney, and Chenoweth 2015). Activist organizations, however, 
like change-links.org, elksoft.com, or Tahrir documents, offer perhaps the most comprehensive, 
easily-accessible alternative data source (Ortiz et al. 2005).  
Evidence suggests that activists can effectively produce a parallel chronicle of 
contentious events. Paul Almeida and Mark Lichbach tested the discrepancy between 
mainstream media and activist sources by focusing on a single contentious campaign, the so-
called Battle of Seattle, a series of protests held in response to negotiations in the World Trade 
Organization headquarters, spanning November and December of 1999. The primary battle saw 
tens of thousands of protesters cause the closure Seattle’s retail district, millions of dollars in 
property damage, and eventually, the failure of trade negotiations. Outside of the battleground 
dozens of parallel protests occurred through the United States, and in other countries. Almeida 
and Lichbach created a master list of news sources, from local outlets like The Seattle Times, to 
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the national New York Times, to the international aggregators Global Newsbank and LexisNexis.  
The alternative, activist-driven sources took the form of three websites, identified by the authors. 
Careful comparison led the authors to the conclusion that, “activist websites have a much lower 
threshold for reporting transnational protest events at the local, national, and international level” 
(2003: 267). And furthermore, not all activist sites are equally effective chronicles. The authors 
found that the most useful activist websites were those that focus primarily on news information 
and reporting. Patterns of omission in mainstream coverage, selection bias, support Lippman’s 
model. Large, urban events characterized by violence were most likely to appear in major 
newspapers. 
It is important to address the possible drawbacks to activist-generate news accounts. 
Perhaps the most significant drawback concerns data reliability. Data generation, data collection, 
is always a political process. Activists record contentious events in a conscious effort to effect the 
political environment in which they operate, in an effort to achieve their goals. These actors, 
naturally, have incentive to over-represent or plainly fabricate events. The only solution to validity 
issues is triangulation. Scholars argue that media coverage may provide a means to crosscheck 
activist-based reports (Franzosi 1987; Mueller 1997b; Sommer and Scarritt 1999; Oliver and 
Myers 1999). This technique can only provide limited validation.  
The second major concern regards temporal availability. Parallel chronicles of the 1999 
Battle of Seattle, the Arab Spring, or the 2013 anti-election protests in Moscow and Saint 
Petersburg all occupy space on the internet. Despite its ubiquity in modern life, the internet is a 
relatively new technology. Department of Defense technicians added TCP/IP protocol to Arpanet 
in the early 1980s. It was not until the late 1980s that civilians gained access to the 
technology(Ryan 2010). Some data sources—Tahrir Documents, for example—contain digitalized 
version of paper documents. Such sites could house primary documents with provenance dating 
from the 1980s and even earlier. However, the lack of the internet as an aggregation and 
dissemination medium in previous periods reduces the likelihood. For these reasons all of the 
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activist-based data sources that I have encountered cover events beginning in the mid-1990s or 
later.   
Concerns notwithstanding, activist data is the only promising source of contentious 
politics data in the Russian case. Traditional media would be a very poor source for my 
dependent variable.  Both Lippmann’s (1922) news worthiness model and Ortiz et al.’s media 
process model predict insurmountable obstacles for traditional event data collection. General 
restrictions to press freedom, massive geographic scale, and active informational suppression 
tactics, as seen in the recent Don’t Call Him Dimon protests, render traditional methods 
inadequate. Small-scale events are often not covered in national or international media. The 
events I wish to study are often small. Geographic distances introduce bias. Russia is the largest 
landmass on earth. And most importantly, the Putin regime has dismantled independent media 
outlets, enforced strict anti-assembly laws, and is in the process of deeming protest coverage “a 
terrorist or extremist act” (Gessen 2013). 
March of the Discontents 
In order to cross the second perilous span, between definition and operationalization, I 
choose to depart from common event-data gathering practices. Despite significant selection bias 
and underreporting, most contentious politics datasets rely on mainstream news sources 
(Herkenrath and Knoll 2011; Day, Pinckney and Chenoweth 2016). Drawing inspiration from 
Almeida and Lichbach, Ortiz and others, I turn to activist-based news sources operating in the 
fraught Russian political environment. Two promising options are available, each of which has 
received scholarly attention. Though the collective action institute and namarsh are both 
promising, the latter is a superior source of sub-national Russian protest data.  
First, namarsh.ru is a web-collective, founded in 2006, dedicated to promoting awareness 
of dissident activity across Russia. Site organizers include a social movement founded by Gary 
Kasparov, the United Civilian Front (Объединённый гражданский фронт (ОГФ)). Membership in 
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the movement is connected to the broader collective action group Another Russia (Другая 
Россия), and smaller offshoots Solidarity and Charter 31. The United Civilian Front has 
attempted to alter the course of politics, first through conventional means, supporting Kasparov’s 
presidential campaign, and thereafter through non-traditional channels, organizing numerous 
protests. The namarsh website proudly displays a banner announcement:  “the server works 
without Kremlin censorship.”  
The second source is a similar activist web presence, organized by a different group.  
The collective action institute (коллективное действие) is a group of sociologists and activists 
dedicated to progressive politics. The group’s manifesto espouses support for socio-economic 
equality, transparent elections, and labor reform. This range of causes forged a connection 
between various strands of civil society, between leftists, professional unions, ecological activists, 
and youth groups. In today’s Russia, membership in such an organization entails professional 
and even legal risk. Nevertheless, ikd.ru, the central website, includes a list of founders, all of 
whom work as professors, either in political science or sociology departments. These individuals 
believe that social rights and solidarity are “not empty words and abstract phrases, but values that 
must be brought to life”. Through free information exchange, the founders hope to accomplish 
their goals. And by leveraging this information, I hope to adequately operationalize my dependent 
variable.  
Namarsh.ru, like the redwood forest conservation activists at elksoft.com, includes both 
logistical and media resources. The site consists of sections titled dissident march, agitation, 
general protest in Russia, and eye-witness accounts. Dissident march (марш несогласных) is 
the title of a campaign waged by the website organizers. The movement began with street 
protests in 2005, in Moscow, Saint Petersburg, and around the country. Protestors called for an 
end to United Russia’s reign. Rallying cries of “Russia without Putin” began at this time and 
remain a standard of liberal protest marches. The agitation section includes advice for gathering 
supporters and carrying out successful campaigns. The two remaining sections serve a 
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journalistic function. Under general protest appear news reports culled from Gary Kasparov’s 
independent media project. Banned in Russia as “extremist propaganda,” Kasparov.ru is an 
“independent socio-political information-analysis web publication.” The chess-master turned 
politician organizes a network of regional correspondents to generate a counter narrative, 
providing coverage of contentious events, and opinion pieces addressing local and national 
Russian politics. Namarsh.ru culls only protest stories from the site, a collection representing a 
fraction of overall content. The final section, eye-witness accounts, is original material, gathered 
by individual contributors working across the country.  
The collective action institute’s website offers similar content. Ikd.ru includes resources 
for would-be organizers, as well as news stories. The organizational sections of the two sites are 
very similar. The collective action institute includes announcements and overviews of sponsored 
events.  Under a news-wire section, ikd.ru organizes stories describing protest events. Unlike 
namarsh.ru, however, the site’s digital archive includes non-protest topics, the release of protest-
inspired music, or a local election, for example. Each story is written by a contributing author, a 
member of the collective action institute. 
Each of the websites is a potentially useful resource for scholars of Russian contentious 
politics. Indeed, a small group of scholars, Graeme Robertson, Tomila Lankina, and Alisa 
Voznaya, have recently employed the activist sources to circumvent the severe biases described 
above. Practicalities of research drove the scholars to work exclusively with either ikd.ru 
(Robertson) or namarsh.ru (Lankina and Voznaya). Working with an alternative news source 
eliminates, or at least mitigates, the numerous biases associated with newspaper data. 
Unfortunately, the two sources overlap only partially: events captured by Kasparov’s group are 
not always captured by the collective action institute and vice versa. It is important to note then, 
that Robertson, Lankina, and Voznaya do not overcome reporting bias entirely, a common 
sacrifice to the “economics of research” (Dasgupta and Maskin 1987). Practical constraints force 
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me to follow their decision. With limited time, with limited resources, I am forced to choose one of 
the two sources, rather than merging the two into a master list.  
Gary Kasparov’s namarsh.ru is superior for three reasons. First, and indeed foremost, is 
data coverage. Ikd.ru has dramatically decreased its output of news coverage over the last 
several years. At the time of writing, in August, 2016, the collective action institute published only 
seven articles for the entire year. Over the same period of time, activists working at namarsh.ru 
published over 200 web articles. Political pressure may be responsible for the decline in material 
on ikd.ru. Stanslav Markelov, human rights lawyer, liberal activist, and founding member of the 
institute was murdered in Moscow in 2009, in the middle of a busy street, in broad daylight 
(Harding 2009). The second reason concerns broader media integration. Stories appearing on 
namarsh.ru frequently include links to related stories appearing in mainstream, state-supported 
publications, as well as other independent sources. For example, accounts of wage protests may 
include mention of Ria News articles on declining economic conditions. Such cross-references 
are less frequent on the collective action institute site. Thirdly, Lankina and Voznaya’s existing 
work serves as a solid foundation on which to build. The pair provides clear coding 
documentation, and their data is easily accessible in convenient format. The same cannot be said 
of Robertson’s work. For these three reasons, I selected to work with, and augment, the Lankina 
and Voznaya protest dataset.  
With an activist data source identified, the problem of data reliability remains. Research 
on media bias has determined that, while event details and descriptions are often distorted, 
journalists consistently get the core of a descriptive story “right” (Earl et al. 2004). No 
corresponding research that I know of has addressed activist-based news sources. Major news 
organizations construct layers of quality control to vet stories. A widespread readership creates a 
second layer of validation. Activist-based news sources do not enjoy either check to content 
validation. And furthermore, the political nature of underground journalism creates incentives for 
dissimulation. Lankina and Voznaya write that “namarsh.ru is maintained by opposition groups in 
 
 
  135   
    
Russia and is thus potentially subject to some degree of bias in its reporting of protest events” 
(2015, 23).  
What is to be done? Moving away from commonly-used newspaper-based data sources 
improves the researchers’ “hand of cards,” so to say. But is this the point at which scholars must 
play with the cards, flaws and all? I believe it is time to play the game. It will never be possible to 
have complete confidence in the quality of activist-generated data. It is clearly impossible to 
validate the veracity of each article on namarsh.ru, ikd.ru, or on any other analogous site. And 
furthermore, working with my definition of protest, a definition that includes very small-scale 
events, it will never be possible to capture every event; even the most thoroughly vetted 
dependent variable dataset will be a partial reflection of reality. There are two methods, however, 
that at least begin to address reporting bias.  
The first option is cross-discipline triangulation. Lankina and Voznaya note that regions 
ranked as having comparatively high levels of civil society activism in previous studies also 
appear among the most actively protesting regions according to namarsh.ru (Lankina and 
Voznaya 2015). Democracy scholars have followed the trajectory of contentious politics and 
begun to build a body of sub-national literature. Kelly McMann and Nikolai Petrov, an American 
political scientist and a Russian geographer, used a survey tool to quantify provincial levels of 
democracy in the Russian Federation. In their work, McMann and Petrov gathered data on non-
institutional political participation, including protests. Using this limited corroborative data, 
namarsh.ru data corresponds with public opinion polls. Areas in which respondents express 
interest in protest participation exhibit relatively high protest frequencies (Ibid.). 
 The presence of two disparate datasets creates another opportunity for cross validation. 
Should the namarsh.ru data confirm general trends that Robertson found when employing ikd.ru 
data, it would validate both datasets. Lankina and Voznaya conduct a very brief—puzzlingly 
brief—comparison of the two datasets. The two authors note that both sets present increasing 
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protest concentration in Moscow, particularly over the last two years, 2011–2012. The 
comparison begins and ends here. I conducted my own attempt at cross validation. The 
differences were significant. The collective action institute data, gathered by Robertson, produces 
consistently higher protest frequencies than namarsh.ru, over the period 2007-2011. 
Discrepancies range from a low of 267 in 2011, to 451 additional events in 2010. Many of the 
additional cases appear in the two capital cities. Still, considering only additional events recorded 
in other regions, the increase is significant: around 100 cases each year. 
What explains the disparity between the collective action institute and namarsh datasets? 
I hand-coded every article appearing on the two websites over a two-week period, chosen at 
random, for a glimpse into reporting discrepancy. Namarsh.ru published thirty five articles, 
compared with seventy five on ikd.ru. These 110 articles produced a common pool of thirteen 
protest events, with each site reporting an additional, unique set. Contributors to namarsh.ru 
reported ten events not reported in ikd.ru, and contributors to ikd.ru reported fifteen unique 
events. I was not able to identify any common characteristic among unique articles. It appears 
that the two networks simply catch different events, and further, that the collective action 
institute’s network is larger. Another potential explanation regards methodology. Robinson does 
not include coding decision details in any of his publications. He does not mention whether or not 
his dataset includes pro-regime demonstrations. Divergent coding rules could partially account for 
greater frequency counts. With more time and resources I would like to systematically study the 
discrepancies between the two sources.   
It is clear that both datasets are incomplete. Neither source provides a complete picture 
of protest in modern Russia. Despite the lack of overlap, Voznaya and Lankina are satisfied that 
namarsh.ru “data provide a reasonably accurate portrait of the general temporal and spatial 
trends in protest activism” (2015: 43). There is thus expert opinion on the side of the activist data 
source. Still, I would stress that only additional research can quantify the gap between protest 
activity and reported events. Even with unlimited time and ample resources it would likely be 
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impossible to eliminate the gap altogether. This is an important epistemological admission, an 
admission that the ability to generate knowledge in the area of protest event onset will always 
remain, at best, incomplete. 
I do share some of Voznaya and Lankina’s optimism, however. The partial overlap in 
events, revealed during my brief exercise, provide a preliminary data validity check. It does not 
appear that the activists are inventing events to report. Rough similarity in overall frequency 
counts provides further weak corroborative evidence. Discrepancies of around 200 cases per 
year are much smaller than the discrepancies between activist sources and large-scale 
automated programs—as discussed below. No single data source can create a perfect reflection 
of reality. Incomplete data can still be useful, fortunately. To conduct statistical testing scholars 
must eliminate “systematic bias” that shape reporting frequencies in certain areas (Little 1992). If 
omitted cases are randomly distributed, if observed patterns approximated patterns in reality, the 
dataset will not produce spurious conclusion. Social mobilization capacity represents a possible 
source of systemic bias. Where communication networks are thin, where chances for inter-
personal communication are limited, namrsh.ru contributions could systematically fall.  By 
recognizing and framing potential systematic bias, incomplete data can serve as a basis for 
correlational analysis. The incomplete nature of dependent variable data only strengthens the 
imperative, inherent in all social science research (Brady and Collier 2010), to supplement 
correlational analysis with a qualitative process tracing exercise.  
The Coding Decision 
After choosing to augment the existing namarsh.ru dataset, a major methodological 
decision arises. Despite the allure of machine coding, hand coding is the best way to gather sub-
national protest event data. My experience demonstrates the superiority of the human approach. 
This section presents a data vetting exercise, which exposes the relative shortcomings of leading 
automated projects, validating predictions from news worthiness theory.    
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To reiterate, automation is much, much more efficient than hand coding.  Large-scale 
international event-data generation projects employ machine coding to benefit from returns to 
scale. Machine coding increases speed by a breathtaking margin. Automated coding processes 
like GDELT or SPEED process millions of articles, from thousands of news sources. Coders take 
advantage of the relatively constant format of major news articles. A flexible template can parse 
headlines from the New York Times, El Monde, or RIA Novost with relative ease. Country-specific 
event collections, often the product of activist-based news sources, are the product of hand-
coding. This is not a coincidence. Generally country or area specialists focus on a small, 
contained are of the world, a small, contained set of contentious political events. The efficiency 
gains won through automated coding decline sharply with the number of cases at hand. Instead, 
scholars and their teams of research assistants read articles and code using the oldest 
processor, the human brain. The labor-intensive research variant requires no template. 
Researchers are not even aware of varying html tagging structures or spacing patterns. 
The best approach would combine human and machine strengths. Merging the sheer 
power and efficiency of the machine, with the local source and language knowledge of the 
human, this combination could vastly improve the accumulation of research on contentious 
politics. The TABARI program can code 26-million articles in 6 minutes (Schrodt and Van Brackle 
2013). Russia specialists have a lifetime of contextual knowledge. Can the two advantages align? 
The coding choice cuts along the fraught quantitative-qualitative boundary in the social 
sciences. Debates on the topic usually concern the centrality of statistical methods and their 
epistemological foundations (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994; Brady and Collier 2010). Just as 
important to the quantitative toolkit, however, are computer programing skills, especially when 
directed towards data management, collection, and analysis. Programming avoids the ubiquitous 
discussions of r-squared values and causality. But like more traditional quantitative 
methodological tools, programming brings up the question of academic training. The split is not 
an artificial talking point. It touches on academic identity. It touches on hiring and promotion 
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decisions—it is “incontestable that quantitative training makes scholars more productive, as 
measured by articles per year, than qualitative workers” (King, 2011). If a question of training 
accessibility separates the two sides, computer programming creates an even deeper rift. Gary 
King lamented the state of quantitative education. He saw universities offering an array of 
mathematical and statistical courses. Programming did not make the list.  
For this set of content, an error rate of 20-25% is unacceptable
4
. The total source set 
consisted of thousands of articles, not millions. The unquantifiable bias of missed reporting is 
unavoidable. Knowingly embracing a second source of bias was, in my view, unjustifiable. Aside 
                                                          
4
 Leveraging coding skill and contextual knowledge, and relying on Phil Schrodt’s Open Data Alliance for 
guidance, I created an automated data gathering program. Written in Python, the program logged onto the 
protest events section of namarsh.ru, sequentially accessed each article, and stored each one on a hard-
drive. Python Natural Language Processing Toolkit (NLTK), configured for Cyrillic, processed each article, 
one word at a time, and pulled out important information. Each article became a data record, holding the 
location, date, and type of protest event. Lankina and Voznaya’s existing dataset served as a useful 
sounding board. An automated run of a single year’s worth of Russian protest events produced a set of over 
1,200 articles.  
The margin of error between computer- and hand-coded results was acceptable for the quantitative 
methodologist, unacceptable to the qualitative methodologist. After a lengthy dialectic process, of calibration, 
evaluation, recalibration, and reevaluation, the success rate eventually rose to 80-85% for the trial year. This 
figure compares favorably with large-scale coding programs. For example, the Open Data Alliance’s 
TABARI system marks success at 80%, in an accuracy contest horserace against the Department of 
Defense’s Integrated Conflict Early Warning System (ICEWS) (Schrodt and Brackle 2013). Lockheed Martin 
has employed TABARI as an institutional resource. The defense contractor conducted a number of accuracy 
tests. Initial results were disappointing, clocking in at 58%. A concerted effort to improve the results, 
consisting of enhancing coding dictionaries, achieved an overall precision level of 75% with a 3% confidence 
interval (Ibid.). Human coders are themselves far from perfect. Scholars have devised projects that quantify 
the degree of inter-coder reliability, or the ability of coders to match a set of rules. Surprisingly, a reliability 
test, for the Comparative Manifestos Project, reported correspondence is less than half of cases, and for 
some indicators correspondence drops as low as 25% (Gemenis 2013). This is an extreme case, but the 
point holds: human coders are fallible. Concerns around research assistant training and inter-coder 
variability do not apply to my small-scale project. Even working against my own coding rules, however, it is 
naïve to think that I would match Voznaya and Lankina’s data with 100% accuracy. Schrodt notes that 
machine coding has crossed the threshold into utility, but “remains a work in progress” (Schrodt, Beieler, 
and Mark 2014). Lauding an error rate of between 20 and 30% may seem surprising. Surprise dissipates 
when considering the scale of material. Indeed, the scale is so striking it warrants one last example. Schrodt 
describes the arithmetic as follows: six minutes of automated coding compares with 500,000 labor-hours of 
manual coding, probably costing on the order of $10 million when labor and administrative costs are taken 




  140   
    
from error, hand-coding offered a second significant benefit. Reading through thousands of 
articles gives the reader access to rich, contextual detail. Aside from specified details, automated 
coding obscures general processes at play. Hand-coding allowed me to develop a feel for 
Russian protest events and offered material for a qualitative exercise. Lankina and Voznaya’s 
(2015) dataset includes coverage for five years, 2007-2012, coded from reports published on 
Kasparov’s namarsh.ru. I hand-coded roughly 1000 source articles, translating from Russian to 
English, noting the most refined geographical information available, along with the date and 
reason for protest. Following my working definition of protest, the dataset includes anti-regime 
events of any size.  
A comparative exercise demonstrates the utility of the updated Lankina and Voznaya 
dataset. Such an exercise contributes to media studies and contentious political studies alike. 
Like Lichbach and Almeida’s work, the exercise systematically compared reporting of 
transnational protest in activist-based web sources to the coverage in conventional media 
sources. Comparisons of this nature quantify the difference between mainstream and alternative 
event data sources. This particular comparison provides a look at coverage provided by two 
major projects. Scholars have uncovered serious flaws with the GDELT program (Spath 2014). 
Even critics of past event data projects have lauded SPEED, a mixed-method event data 
aggregation project, one that has the highest likelihood of avoiding major pitfalls associated with 
automation (Ulfelder 2015). Scholars still use mainstream news sources, many of which featured 
automated parsing (Day, Pinckney, and Chenoweth 2015). This brief comparison can support, or 
challenge, the practice. The results were startling. GDELT and SPEED both performed terribly. 
This simple exercise indicates that both projects are completely inappropriate sources of 
contentious politics event data.  
Even before beginning the data gathering phase, GDELT appeared to be an unreliable 
data source. In light of this data validation exercise, the decision was well justified. I compared 
GDELT data against my updated Lankina and Voznaya data for the years 2007 to 2013. At first 
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glance, the two sources differ dramatically. The automated coding program reports 10,000 more 
events over the six-year period. One of the two has to be incorrect, and badly. Brief analysis 
revealed major problems with GDELT’s Russian protest data. 
A brief presentation elucidates the problems facing large scale web-scraping and coding 
projects. False positives in the GDELT database immediately called to mind problems that arose 
in the development of my Russian-language coding algorithm. An event dataset should include 
one record for each event of interest. Newspapers, however, may include several mentions of 
planned events, before the fact, articles describing the event itself, and often, a set of articles 
discussing the event after the fact. Trimming articles surrounding the central event is an important 
error correction technique. This represents a problem for the automated database. An article 
describing a planned protest march in Moscow is recorded as the event itself (Sputnik News 
2010). The Greenpeace protest aboard Artic Sunrise spawned several follow-up articles, 
incorrectly appearing as protests (BBC 2013). The GDELT database even includes a protest 
event tied to an interview with an Australian protester after he had returned home (Nelson Mail 
2013) The incarceration and trial of Pussy Riot, the art collective responsible for several high-
profile acts of civil disobedience, offers another example of erroneous article proliferation. Over 
the course of the women’s time in prison, protest events were incorrectly generated by articles 
discussing court proceedings, demands, and eventual amnesty (The Guardian 2012, Jobs&Hire 
2013). Perhaps the most colorful example of failed coding algorithm came from an article titled 
“Putin: On Top Of the World.” According to the author, an opinion piece writer for Dawn, a 
Pakistani political weekly, Putin was enjoying the apogee of his powers, despite recent protests in 
Moscow. The fact that this op-ed became a protest event after flowing through the coding pipeline 
highlights the extent of GDELT’s problem. 
Where GDELT’s failure was overreporting, SPEED’s failure was dramatic underreporting. 
The SPEED team at the University of Illinois currently makes available only a small subset of 
data. I was able to access Russian data for years 1998 and 1999. Unfortunately, corresponding 
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years are not available from the updated Lankina and Voznaya dataset. Robertson’s ikd.ru 
dataset thus offers basis for comparison. SPEED reports dramatically lower frequencies across 
these two years. In 1999 the total frequency is 117 compared to Robertson’s value of 800.  Even 
more striking is the comparison for the last year of Putin’s first term, 1998. Robertson’s value, 
over 1,300, dwarfs the ten events reported by SPEED.  The source column reveals the source of 
discrepancy. Each of the records appearing in the civil unrest database originated with an article 
in the New York Times or the Wall Street Journal. These results are all the more striking because 
the SPEED campaign includes a range of event-types, only a portion of which correspond with 
the definition of protest used here. Border incidents, assassinations, public executions, and 
kidnappings or hostage situations appear in the automated database. Even with an expanded 
definition, SPEED’s reliance on mainstream, English-language news sources leads to extreme 
selection bias.    
Ideas for Further Study 
This chapter echoes earlier claims regarding newspaper data reliability, while making 
novel claims about automated data projects. Consensus holds that researchers should carefully 
approach the biases inherent in newspaper data (Earl et al. 2004; Ortiz et al. 2005; Ulfelder 
2013). Still, mainstream newspaper sources are widely used in the field (Almeida and Lichbach 
2003; Day, Pinckney, and Chenoweth 2015). This chapter suggests that, at least in the Russian 
case, scholars cannot use mainstream news sources to build representative contentious politics 
event datasets. I have presented an argument for activist-generated event data sources as a 
viable alternative. Furthermore, in my experience, hand-coding was more appealing than 
automation, given a relatively small number of cases, and given a relatively large error rate. I thus 
follow Lichbach and Almedia in urging scholars to approach activist-based data with hope and 
caution. As recently as 10 years ago, before the advent of web archives, newspaper issues were 
accessible to those enjoying a surplus of financial and temporal resources. Before the spread of 
cheap, accessible web-domains, activist sources were available only to local actors, or dedicated 
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communities like Tahrir Documents. Today, both mainstream and alternative media is readily 
available. In today’s technological climate scholars must make use of all possible resources. 
Comparison indicates that, for Russian protest events, activist sources are the most 
reliable. I acknowledge that scholars will never be able to precisely evaluate the gap between 
reality and observation. If incomplete activist-generated data represents the best hand available 
to scholars, is there hope for improvement? There are ways forward. Programming savvy 
scholars can continue to refine tagging algorithms, continue pushing towards 100% accuracy. 
Hand-coders can improve reliability by pooling and vetting complementary datasets. Given time 
and resources, I would merge ikd.ru and namarsh.ru data, hand-code each article, removing 
duplicates and false positives. The result would be the best approximation of reality available to 
Russian contentious politics scholars. 
Activist-based datasets are the product of collaboration, explicit or not, between activists 
and scholars. This chapter’s findings have important implications for both groups. The cumulative 
weight of mainstream news biases, discussed in this chapter, matters for Russian scholars, and it 
matters for Russian activists. In order to create reliable event data sources in contentious politics, 
scholars must end the practice of bystander scholarship.  
They must actively work with alternative news sources to improve research. Unless 
activists themselves circumvent censorship, their message will remain unheard. It is only when 
the “bystander public” receives accounts of protest that activists can hope to win public support 
(Koopmans 2004). Whether trying to improve the human condition, or trying to improve 
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V - Structural Conditions of Russian Protest, 2007-2013 
Introduction 
The structural methodological position is an attempt to dramatically decrease the 
complexity of the social world. Faced with a nearly limitless amount of data, the structural lens 
creates broad, abstract concepts that explain events of interest. The position emerged over a 
century ago alongside the academic discipline of sociology. Emile Durkheim founded the first 
French department of sociology at the University of Bordeaux in 1895. Durkheim advocated 
explanations that obscured entirely the motivations and desires of individuals. It was instead, for 
the Frenchman, “social facts,” or the prevalent structures of norms, values and behavior, that 
shaped outcomes (1895). In this context, the word structure signifies the patterns or milieus in 
which individuals’ lives are embedded. Durkheim himself focused on ideational rather than 
physical structures, a move that would exclude mountainous terrain, infrastructure networks or 
weather patterns. The foundational work nevertheless serves as an exemplar of structuralist 
epistemology, a particular approach to knowledge generation.  
The reward of an analytical shift from individual to structure is parsimony. Examples of 
the position span the history of social science, from the classical period to modern day. In his 
influential book, The Spirit of Laws, French philosopher Montesquieu proposed that geography 
and climate shape the nature of “men and societies” (1748). The theory emerged from his 
observation that people living in warmer countries exhibited emotional, violent personalities, 
whereas northerners appeared more staid.
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 Montesquieu’s conclusions and logical reasoning processes appear misguided to the 
modern student of social science. That slavery proliferated in unusually hot countries due to a 
weakening of the body and subsequent “slothfulness of mind” appears as outdated as Ptolemy’s 
geocentric universe, the phlogiston theory of combustion, phrenology, or the miasma theory of 
disease. To the modern student, still, the analytical power of Montesquieu’s gamble is 
remarkable. Instead of spending years’ worth of time and funding on field work, the social 
scientist could turn to the thermometer for explanation. Contemporary scholars have continued to 
test the analytical gamble. Examples of high-profile structural work include the correlates of war 
project (Singer and Small 1968; Vasquez 1987); modernization theory (Lipset 1959, 1994); 
political risk indicator creation (Gurr and Moore 1997); the quantitative study of civil war (Fearon 
and Laitin 2003a; Hegre and Sambanis 2006) and political protest (Eisinger 1973; Walton and 
Ragin 1990; Arce and Mangonnet 2013). 
Correlation analysis is one method used to implement the broader structuralist 
methodology. The methods employed by a social scientist serve to gather evidence, in support of 
hypotheses, which derive from theory. For a structuralist theory, hypotheses take on the following 
generic form: conditions X, Y and Z increase or decrease the likelihood of event A. The 
structuralist begins the process of gathering evidence by quantifying important concepts. Once 
both the independent and dependent variables are quantified, the scientist can evaluate whether 
conditions do, indeed, shape the likelihood of events. Correlation is, of course, this characteristic 
held by variables that occur or change together. As defined in the Merriam-Webster dictionary, 
correlation is “a relationship existing between phenomena or between mathematical or statistical 
variables which tend to vary, or occur together in a way not expected on the basis of chance 
alone.” This is the evidence needed to validate the structuralist gamble. It is not surprising, then, 
that Durkheim pioneered the use of correlational statistics in the social sciences. The sociologist’s 
early theory posited that suicides were more likely to occur under conditions of anomie, in which 
social groups were poorly integrated. Durkheim’s evidence took the familiar form: suicide rates 
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appeared higher in societies in which Protestants outnumbered Catholics and the Jewish, in 
societies in which marriage rates were relatively low. These simple results provided support for 
the analytically powerful structural position. Of course, additional research would explore causal 
mechanisms and rule out spurious relationships.  
The greedy structuralist wager, its potential for explanatory power, has drawn more and 
more scholars to quantitative methods over recent decades. Gary King collected data on every 
article published in the American Political Science Review from 1906 to 1988. From 1906 to 
1960, 24.5% of the 2,500+ articles involved quantitative analysis. Then the 1960’s behavioral 
revolution erupted, and the proportion of articles using quantitative data and methods increased 
from under a quarter to over half. Behavioralists popularized the idea of quantification, and 
applied it to many new substantive areas. For King, this methodological shift reflected a growing 
appreciation of the benefits inherent in quantitative approaches, the fact that “they are abstract 
representations of the political world and are, thus, much clearer” (1998, 43). More recently, in 
2003, Andrew Bennet, Aharon Barth, and Kenneth Rutherford undertook a similar survey of the 
top ten American political science journals. The authors tracked a stark continuation of the trend 
identified by King decades previously. They reported that the number of quantitative studies has 
continued to climb (2003).  
Structuralist quantitative studies simultaneously evaluate two propositions. First, does 
statistical evidence support specific, proposed hypotheses? Do indicators of group cohesion 
covary with suicide rates? Secondly, and by extension, such studies evaluate the structuralist 
gamble itself. Can scholars generate compelling explanatory accounts while working with abstract 
categories?  Across the broad field of contentious politics, scholars have published thousands of 
quantitative studies, suggesting that the data-savvy analyst can, to some extent, gain explanatory 
value from structural models. Stock-taking exercises have accumulated a set of insights derived 
from studies of civil war and state failure  (Robert Adcock and David Collier 2001; Hegre and 
Sambanis 2006; Dixon 2009). In the field of social protest studies, the field in which this study 
 
 
  147   
    
appears, evidence of the structural gamble is less clear. Scholars working at the national level 
(Maher and Peterson 2008) and sub-national level (Eisinger 1973; Arce and Mangonnet 2013) 
have produced positive results. However, Ponticelli and Voth (2011) and more recently 
Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015a) produced negative results, suggesting greater emphasis on 
context specificity and agency over structure in explaining movement onset. 
This chapter will apply the Idea of the State theory of protest onset, to the Russian case. 
Through traditional correlational analysis, I will produce evidence of the sort common in the social 
sciences since the behavioral revolution; I will attempt to “find significant statistical effects even in 
the presence of noisy data” (Dixon, 2009: 713). This chapter will thus evaluate the general 
structuralist position, as an alternative to agent-centered theories. More specifically, this chapter 
will produce what I believe to be the only comprehensive test of social protest onset. Leading 
theories of social mobilization capacity, grievance or political opportunity structure all offer 
explanations. As Chapter 2 outlines, the Idea of the State is a promising alternative. Leveraging 
my original sub-national Russian data, and the updated Lankina and Voznaya protest data-set, 
this chapter will evaluate the promise of the full set of theories, in Russia, over the recent six year 
period 2007-2013.  
As the previous two chapters have argued, scholars often fail to adequately test 
structuralist theories in contentious politics. While the structuralist position simplifies reality, 
scholars have relied on simplistic quantifications of independent and dependent variables.  Every 
quantitative study must address problems associated with missing cases and model selection. 
Chapter 3 demonstrated, however, that methodological nationalism represents an even more 
serious, and more widespread, threat to valid inference. Chapter 4 highlighted the importance of 
carefully selected dependent variable data, data that include refined location tags, data that are 
not restricted to mainstream news sources. Only equipped with such sub-national datasets, which 
are rarely easily accessible, can scholars evaluate the relationship between structural conditions 
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and the onset of contentious political events. This chapter brings together the preceding 
theoretical and quantitative work to test hypotheses.  
The first section presents state capacity profiles for all eighty three Russian federal 
subjects. The Idea of the State Theory expects correlations between protest onset frequency and 
a triad of driving factors. Each descriptive profile thus includes operationalizations of state 
coercion, cooptation, and cooperation, along with operationalizations of grievance, social 
mobilization, and political opportunity theory. Profiles also include descriptive statistics of the 
dependent variable, protest event frequency from 2007 to 2013. The second section briefly 
restates theoretical expectations; it presents a set of hypotheses derived from the Idea of the 
State and the big three from Social Movement Studies, as well as several rival explanations from 
Russian area studies work. Employing a negative binomial regression model, the third section 
evaluates the strength of correlations between state capacity and protest onset. A concluding 
section discusses policy implications and directions for further research. 
Descriptive Trends 
As the Latin translation “something given” indicates, data are the foundation of any 
inquiry into the social world. By recording the occurrence of events, and mapping trends over time 
and space, scholars move beyond notional thinking, or intuition. As observations become data 
points and data points become lines, invisible patterns of human events become visible. Doctor 
John Snow, a 19
th
 century British physician, produced a touchstone example of the value of 
descriptive statistics. In the 1850s, a sudden and severe cholera outbreak baffled doctors in 
London’s Soho district. At the time the transfer of cholera infections, and infectious disease in 
general, were not well understood. Prevailing wisdom regarding cholera identified airborne 
miasma as the method of transmission. Snow began investigating the problem by mapping 
incidence locations, marking each case on a Soho street plan. Gradually, the collection of marks 
presented a clear picture. Hash marks clustered around a central hub, the Broad Street water 
pump.  Snow subsequently determined that a nearby sewage line had contaminated the water 
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source. The traditional story often involves colorful accounts of Snow puzzling over the immunity 
of local brewery workers, who consumed treated water, and then, in a flash of understanding, 
demanding authorities remove the well’s pump handle. Modern commentary has removed some 
of the luster from the romanticized descriptive statistics legend. Edward Tufte, statistician, political 
scientist, and author of several data visualization guides, argued that Snow’s map failed to control 
for the number of people living in the Broad Street region. John Snow’s captivating study 
nevertheless illustrates the power of empirical observation in the social sciences. 
An exploration into the structural causes of Russian protest events naturally begins with 
data. While the Idea of the State theory operates at the abstract conceptual level, effective testing 
requires precise data gathering. National-level operationalizations of state capacity and protest 
frequency are easily accessible, but they are not useful. The exploration requires, first, a 
quantification of protest onset frequency, reported at the level of federal subject. And secondly, 
given the Idea of the State theory of protest onset, the exploration requires quantification of 
coercion, cooptation, and cooperation. This section will first explore trends in protest onset across 
Russia at the national level and at the federal district level to offer a high-level overview. Next, the 
lens will focus on the federal subject level. A state capacity profile will describe the structural 
conditions in each of the eighty three subjects.  
By quantifying state-society relations at the local level, I follow the example of perhaps 
the forefather of Russian descriptive statistics, Peter the Great. Tsar Peter Alexeyevich earned 
his superlative sobriquet for a set of modernizing reforms in the economic and military spheres. 
Peter’s reforms began with empirical observations, in the form of census application.  An effective 
population count was necessary to plan military conscription, plan tax programs, and gather 
forced laborers for factory work during war time. The Tsar utilized census figures to solve 
problems facing the country. Protest and state capacity profiles of the Russian federal subjects 
similarly begin my inquiry. The dataset underlying the profiles, however, could serve as a 
foundation for any number of inquiries into the forward and backward linkages of state capacity.  
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Figure 3: Annual Russian Protest Events, 2007-2013 
 
The national level provides a general impression of protest-onset trends. Figure 1 plots 
event frequency data from the updated Lankina and Voznaya dataset. As discussed in Chapter 4 
this collection represents the only modern event dataset of Russian protest. I have extended the 
coverage to include 2013, using source articles from the internet-journalist community operating 
Namarsh.ru. The chart indicates that protest events are relatively common. Even the lowest 
annual value, 475 protests in 2013, is a high enough frequency to satisfy two important criteria for 
structural inquiries into the social world. Charles Ragin’s (2008) exhortation to study phenomenon 
that are common clearly holds—see Chapter 1. More practically, the number of observations, in 
total and per year, is high enough to warrant the use of statistical methods.  
The national level aggregation of protest events shown in Figure 3 renders the object of 
study visible, but in a crude focus. Describing protests as having occurred in Russia can be a 
useful heuristic when comparing frequencies across countries, or looking for a snapshot of 
longitudinal trends. For any effort to understand where and why protests occur, the national-level 
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Source: Updated Lankina and Voznaya Protest Data (Appendix i) 
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and protest onset, it is not useful. The structural conditions that shape the likelihood of these 
events—according to the Idea of the State theory—do not exist in Russia. They exist in local 
municipal bodies of Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Novosibirsk, Magadan, or Altai Krai. Durkheim 
theorized a structure of inclusive relationships driving the onset of suicide. Montesquieu theorized 
a climatic structure driving the development of personality traits and institutional development. In 
order to test the theories, the Frenchmen each quantified structural variables. Quantifying the 
Idea of the State, the structure of the social contract, requires federal subject statistics, along the 
dimensions of coercion, cooptation, and cooperation.  
The following section disaggregates Figure 3, showing the onset of protest events by 
federal districts. Vladimir Putin created these divisions (федерaльные округa) in 2000 by 
presidential decree. Putin hoped to bring federal authority to the subjects, and streamline 
economic planning and enforcement of Russian federal law. So far the goal remains unattained. 
Russian legal scholar Gordon Hahn notes that ”federal authorities' effort to reintegrate Russia's 
legal space suggest that a mix of administrative and judicial means is being used and that the 
results to date are likewise mixed” (2002:501). Here, the seven districts serve to disaggregate 
protest frequencies in a step-wise manner. Moving in steps from macro to micro gradually reveals 
regional variation driving major national trends, as contentious political scholars have 




     
    
Figure 4: Protests by Federal District 
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Figure 4 begins to reveal the “rich spatial-temporal palette” (Lankina and Voznaya 2015: 
15) of protest activism across Russia. Disaggregating dependent variable data adds nuance to 
national trends. It is immediately clear that the dramatic spike in protest, in 2009—as displayed in 
Figure 3—is the product of events in the high frequency Central region. This region includes 
Moscow, and not surprisingly accounts for a large portion of total events reported each year in the 
updated Lankina and Voznaya dataset. In the Ural and Volga districts the peak is less distinct, 
matched by a similarly high value in 2008, before declining over the next several years in 
accordance with the national pattern. The remaining six federal districts—the Far East, North 
Caucasus, Siberia, and Southern—exhibit no noticeable conformity with the national trend. These 
districts, which report between 10 and 100 events each year, hold relatively constant over the 
2007-2013 time horizon. The federal district level of analysis reveals uneven geographic 
distribution of protest frequency. This lack of uniformity is not surprising given the Idea of the 
State theory. The theory expects sub-national municipal units to reflect underlying differences in 
structural characteristics associated with coercion, cooptation, and cooperation. What Figure 3 
suggests, then, is that the federal districts exhibit variation along independent variable indicators. 
Even if a common exogenous factor influences all regions simultaneously—say the global 
financial crisis—the theory expects local drivers to shape the linkage to protest.  Of course, 
protest events do not occur at the district level either. In order to describe the structural drivers of 
Russian protest, only the federal subject level will suffice. This second refinement in analytical 
scope will increase the number of regions by a factor of ten, from eight to eighty three.  
Abandoning national and even federal district levels of aggregation comes with a cost: 
complexity. The loss of parsimony is apparent in the moves from one to eight to eighty three 
cases. Increased complexity is a requirement for answering the research question at hand. The 
goal of this project is to evaluate a structural relationship between Russian protest event onset 
and a three-dimensional conception state capacity. Coercive, cooptation, and cooperative 
capacity only exist at the immediate location in which protestors take to the streets, organize sit-
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ins or otherwise demonstrate civil disobedience. In order to test the theory, I will conduct 
correlational analysis of the variables that shape the relative protest frequencies across federal 
subjects
5
 from 2007 to 2013. Subject level disaggregation represents the smallest geographical 
unit featuring the financial and political characteristics necessary to test the full set of structural 
theories. This is the first such test. Even Lankina and Voznaya themselves, creators of the 
original dependent variable data-set, restricted their analysis to trends in onset and anecdotal 
observation. Before moving to statistical testing the following section presents state capacity 
profiles for each region. In order to preserve clarity of presentation, the section will display profiles 
of each federal subject, grouped by federal district. The following demonstration is necessarily 
lengthy. It is necessary as a lead-in to hypothesis testing. It is further necessary, because—as 
Chapter 3 argues—developing local-level measures of state capacity is an inherently meaningful 
academic exercise.  
  
                                                          
5
 As mentioned in Chapter 1, Russian Federal subjects encompass numerous designations. Despite varying 
nomenclature, legal and practical differences are minor. Russian federal scholars treat the subjects as 
generalizable, choosing to rely on financial and political indicators to capture autonomy (Stepan 2000). The 
two most common types, krais and oblasts, were formed as primary districts during the early years of the 
USSR. Originally, krais were territorially larger than oblasts, and located on the edges of Federation Land—
the word Край means edge or frontier. Republics were originally created as homelands for non-Russian 
ethnic groups. As such, the regions maintain the right to establish their own official language. Some, 
Tatarstan for example, continue to feature a large titular ethnic population. Others have become nothing 
more than historical relics. This is especially true of the farcical Jewish Autonomous Oblast, created by 
Stalin as a homeland, which never attracted many residents and today features a Jewish population of less 
than 1%. Upon their creation, republics were also given autonomy not found in other federal subjects. 
Agreements limited federal oversight on taxation, judicial system, police force, citizenship, and diplomatic 
connections. During Vladimir Putin’s reign, all agreements have expired. 
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Central  
Figure 5: Protest Events, Central District 
 
The Central federal district contains 16 federal subjects, situated in the European section 
of Russia, bordering Ukraine and Belarus to the west. The title “Central” is more historical than 
geographical. The region made up the core of the Grand Duchy of Muscovy, the medieval 
predecessor to the Russian Federation. As Figure 4 indicated, the district reports significantly 
more protests each year than any other. Much of the discrepancy emerges from the inclusion of 
Moscow City, which averages over 220 events across the modified Lankina and Voznaya 
dataset. The capital city is geographically embedded within an oblast of the same name, Moscow 
Oblast, but remains a separate political entity. Figure 5 presents the values of yearly protest 
onset for each federal subject. For purposes of scaling and readability Moscow City values do not 
appear on the plot. The capital city’s values dwarf all other regions, with over 1,200 reported 
events. Voronezh and Moscow Oblast each report over 130 events over the time horizon. In a 









*Not shown: Moscow City: 1,200 
 
Source: Updated Lankina and Voznaya Protest Data (Appendix i) 
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remaining regions—Belgorod, Bryansk, Ivanovo, Kaluga, Kostroma, Kursk, Lipetsk, Smolensk, 
Tula, Vladimir, and Yaroslavsk—each report fewer than twenty five protest events. 
With the dependent variable captured and visualized the next step is to explore state 
capacity structures present in each region. Using a number of data sources—primarily the 
Russian national statistical office—I have created operationalizations for the tri-part structure 
described by the Idea of the State theory, as well as major strains of Social Movement Theory. 
The following table displays values for each indicator, for each federal subject in the Central 
region. The dataset includes entries for each year from 2007 to 2013, corresponding with the 
dependent variable data. For ease of interpretation and spacing Table 1 contains mean values 
across the seven years, with the exception of electoral support for United Russia in the 2008 
presidential election, located in the final column. 
 
 
     
    




















Belgorod 1532 66% 9.1 1148 4.3 22323 65.3 25 
Bryansk 1275 69% 7.9 1791 7.0 17013 61.7 26 
Ivanovo 1062 81% 5.3 1768 6.6 18103 60.7 29 
Kaluga 1010 76% 4.8 1811 5.3 23307 61.6 36 
Kostroma 669 70% 3.5 1490 5.4 19800 56.3 30 
Kursk 1132 65% 6.5 1691 6.3 19273 62.7 36 
Lipetsk 1172 64% 6.2 1418 4.3 20845 62.3 29 
Moscow City 11589 100% . 1755 1.4 52794 54.1 30 
Moscow 
Oblast 7060 80% 32.1 1695 3.2 30078 60.2 35 
Orel 788 66% 4.3 1852 6.9 19643 59.9 32 
Ryazan 1155 71% 6.0 964 6.2 20289 57.1 27 
Smolensk 987 73% 4.4 2061 6.7 19692 53.9 40 
Tambov 1092 59% 5.9 1369 7.3 17423 59.7 27 
Tula 1554 79% 7.7 1039 4.6 19818 61.7 34 
Tver 3797 75% 6.4 1679 5.4 23168 81.0 39 
Vladimir 1441 78% 6.7 1785 5.9 18910 56.7 34 
Voronezh 2337 64% 12.5 1356 6.2 18334 57.4 33 
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Recall, the Idea of the State framework theorizes state capacity as the product of three 
dimensions, coercion, cooptation, and cooperation—which must be considered alongside the 
dominant three positions from Social Movement Studies. Coercion represents the government’s 
ability to restrict the behavior of its population. Coercive tools are water cannons, batons, 
barricades, jail time, and fines. This dimension represents the state as police officer. Table 2 
contains Central district values for an indicator of coercive capacity, crime prevalence, as well as 
three measures of social mobilization capacity, total population, urban population percentage, 
and number of secondary education graduates, those passing the Unified Governmental Exam 
(Единый Государственный Экзамен, or ЕГЭ). A set of benchmarks frame the table values. 
Percentiles facilitate quick data comparison by displaying relative standings within a group of 
observations. A percentile reports the percentage of scores in a dataset that fall below a 
particular score. For example, an SAT score in the 90
th
 percentile is higher than 90% of all 
scores. Each state capacity profile table will highlight relatively high and low values when they 
appear. Red shading indicates a score in the bottom quintile, that is, at or below the 20
th
 
percentile. Green shading indicates a score in the top quintile. The Idea of the State theory 
dictates the valence for each indicator. Red(green) scores represent particularly low(high) levels 
of state capacity, not necessarily low(high) numerical values. 
Coercive capacity and social mobilization capacity vary within the Central District. Most of 
the subjects hold populations close to the national mean. The populations are remarkable, 
however, in their urban clustering. Of the fifteen central subjects, only three fall in the first quartile, 
and a full seven fall in the third quartile. The crime measure is the number of reported crimes per 
10,000 people in the region. On this second indicator Moscow city loses its usual position as an 
outlier.  The subjects exhibit a range of values from 964 in Ryazan, to over 2000 yearly, 
populated-weighting crimes reported in Smolensk. Education profile results hint at significance: 
Moscow and Voronezh, sites of far and away the highest protest frequencies, both exhibit high 
graduation figures.  
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The second dimension of the Idea of the State framework, cooptation, similarly varies 
among federal subjects in the Central District. Recall, that state capacity to coopt signifies the 
ability to “buy-off” potential dissidents. Cooptation in practice takes the form of government 
subsidies, pension payments, and government spending targeted towards public education and 
health systems. This dimension describes the state as provider. Like coercion, the state’s ability 
to coopt is shaped by society. Table 2 includes an operationalization of cooptation capacity, a 
measure of government spending directed towards socio-cultural projects, expressed in per 
capita terms. For grievances, the table displays the unemployment rate of each subject.    
Table 2 suggests that, across the region, federal subjects possess high cooptation 
capacity and low levels of grievance. None of the subjects in the region possess high levels of 
unemployment, relative to national percentiles. In fact, nine of the federal subjects are among the 
highest performers Russia-wide on unemployment. On the final indicator, social spending per 
capita, members of the region are decidedly middle of the pack. Only two fall into the extreme 
quartiles. Bryansk’s leadership spends relatively less on socio-cultural projects, and Moscow’s 
leaders spend relatively more.  
The third and final element of the Idea of the State is cooperation. Cooperation is the 
internalized acceptance of the social contract on the part of citizens. Table 2 includes a single 
measure of cooperation: the percentage of the vote won by the governing United Russia party in 
2008, the party of Vladimir Putin and Dmitri Medvedev. The Carnegie Center’s Openness Index 
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The final two columns suggest that Central District local governments do not enjoy high 
cooperation capacity, and face relatively open political opportunity structures. Seven of the 
thirteen federal subjects reported voting totals that appear in the 1
st
 quartile of all subjects. None 
of the remaining subjects report totals that place them among the most supportive of United 
Russia. On the Carnegie Index, subjects fall close to the mean, or in the relatively open category, 
with the exception of Belgorod, Bryansk, Ryazan and, Tambov.   
 
 
   161   
     
Far East 
Figure 6: Protest Events, Far East District 
 
The Far East Federal District, located near the American, Chinese, Japanese, and North 
Korean borders, reports an uneven frequency of protests over 2007-2013.  As a whole, the region 
accounts for 200 of all 1700 Russian events, or just over 11%. Within the region Primorsky 
dominates the picture, with over 100 reported events. Meaning maritime in Russia, the Primorsky 
Krai includes Vladivostok, a trading hub connected to Asia countries and the largest city in the 
Russia east. Conversely, three Far Eastern subjects failed to report a single event over the seven 
year time span. Chukotka, Magadan, and a peculiar historical relic, the Jewish Autonomous 













Source: Updated Lankina and Voznaya Protest Data (Appendix i) 
 
 
      
     



















Amur 829 67% 2.3 2325 6% 34240 69% 29 
Chukotka 51 65% 1.7 1716 4% 136778 78% 18 
Jewish AO 176 68% 2.3 2374 9% 32143 66% 22 
Kamchatka 324 77% 1.8 1802 7% 66296 63% 32 
Khabarovsk 1348 82% 2.8 2849 7% 35186 60% 26 
Magadan 157 96% 2.4 2400 5% 70314 55% 25 
Primorsky 1959 76% 2.8 2864 8% 22603 54% 35 
Sakha 956 64% 1.7 1764 8% 65647 63% 36 
Sakhalin 500 80% 2.4 2413 7% 61649 62% 37 
Table 3 shows the state capacity profiles of Far Eastern District member regions. The table reveals a fairly uniform weakness along 
the coercion dimension and strength along the cooptation dimension. Six of the nine regions appear in the top quintile of urban population 
percentage—though all nine feature very low education graduation figures. Five of the nine regions similarly fill ranks among the most crime-
ridden Russian regions, with over 2300 reported crimes each year, per 10,000 inhabitants. Member regions exhibit greater variability along the 
unemployment indicator. Average unemployment in the Jewish Autonomous Okrug, Primorsky Krai and Sakha are relatively high, and all other 
regions except Magadan report mid-range values. However, regional governments enjoy natural resource wealth.  Far Eastern subjects host 
oil, gas, and precious metal mining operations, which catalyze government revenue and spending. The subjects all fall in the top quintile for 
socio-cultural spending per capita. Chukotka province offers an example of regional state-society relations. The region exhibits the highest per 
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Oligarch Roman Abramovich served as governor of Chukotka, during which time he 
instituted training programs and attracted investment in local oil, natural gas, coal, and tungsten 
plants.  As governor, Abromovich was named person of the year by the Russian business journal 
Expert (Эксперт). Cooperation indicators, the percent of the vote garnered by United Russia, was 
correspondingly high in Chukotka, as well as Amur and the Jewish Okrug. Of the remaining 
regions Magadan and Primorsky Krai reported relatively low support for the ruling party. Political 
opportunity structures appear closed, not conducive to protest, with the exception of Sakha and 
Sakhalin. 
North Caucasus 
Figure 7: Protest Events, North Caucasus District 
 
The North Caucasus federal district, bound between the Black Sea to the west, the 
Caspian Sea to the east, Georgia and Azerbaijan to the south, and the Russian Southern District 
to the north, is more often associated with war than protest. The region has a history of civil war, 











Source: Updated Lankina and Voznaya Protest Data (Appendix i) 
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Chechnya declared independence. Deep-seated local resentment stemmed from the World War 
II years. In 1944, Chechens were among the groups Stalin accused of collaborating with the 
Nazis. Half a million Chechens were forcibly herded onto cattle cars and sent to western Siberia. 
As Masha Gessen writes “the exiles were literally dumped into the open snowy fields and left to 
fend for themselves” (2013). Boris Yeltsin led the Russian army to suppress independence 
claims, starting a civil war that would last nearly two years. A tense ceasefire lasted only two 
more years, before the second Chechen War erupted in response to the invasion of Dagestan by 
the Islamic International Brigade. Today, tensions in the region remain. An active insurgency has 
claimed responsibility for terrorist attacks in Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-
Balkaria, and North Ossetia.  The members of this region feature a small portion of the protests 
reported in Russia between 2007 and 2013. With the highest figures reported in Dagestan and 
North Ossetia, the modified Lankina and Voznaya dataset features forty events in the North 
Caucasus, or just over 2% of all protest events.   
 
 
     
    





















Chechnya 1275 35% 8.9 356 37% 29409 99%        16 
Dagestan 2890 45% 23.6 460 13% 13933 89% 28 
Ingushetia 427 38% 3.3 436 49% 19432 98% 19 
Kabardino-
Balkaria 861 54% 
7.2 
1038 13% 15495 96% 
20 
Karachai 471 42% 2.9 994 12% 18403 92% 27 
North 
Ossetia 709 64% 
5.3 
1034 9% 16485 71% 
32 
Stavropol 2781 57% 14.8 1403 6% 17096 62% 42 
Again, Table 3 displays the state capacity profile of each federal subject in the North Caucus District.  A quick glance at the percentile 
shading reveals a clear uniformity across subjects, from Chechnya to Stavropol. The legacy of civil war appears to have produced a set of 
local governments possessing very high coercive capacity. Crime rates in each of the seven federal subjects are among the lowest in the 
Russian Federation, a trend that is exemplified by very low rates in the most historically violent regions of Chechnya, Dagestan, and 
Ingushetia. Social mobilization capacity influences the state’s ability to control protests. Each of the seven federal subjects fall among the least 
urbanized, and Dagestan and Stavropol alone produce high secondary graduation figures. Ramzan Kadyrov embodies the iron fist of North 
Caucasian states. After years of terrorist violence, including an attack that killed his father, the previous governor of Chechnya, Kadyrov 
launched a hardline anti-insurgency program. In the early 2010’s the number of yearly causalities has steadily declined, while the number of 
alleged human rights violations has risen (Amnesty International, 2015). For his commitment to harsh social order Kadyrov has received the 
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Kadyrov’s Chechnya further reflects high cooptation capacity, with a very high level of 
socio-cultural spending per capita. The remaining six regions, however, exhibit low or medium 
scores on the spending indicator, and nearly all of the North Caucasian subjects report low 
scores on the grievance operationalization, unemployment rates. Strong state capacity remerges 
on the cooperation dimension. Each of the seven federal subjects, with the exception of 
Stavropol, reported high levels of support for United Russia in the 2008 election. Political 
opportunity structures are correspondingly open, with the exception of Stavropol. 
Northwestern 
Figure 8: Protest Events, Northwestern District 
 
The Northwestern Federal District occupies the northern section of European Russian. The 
district borders Finland, Norway, and the Baltic states to the west, the Central and Volga Federal 
Districts to the south and east, and the Arctic Ocean to the north. This region contains a variety of 
dissimilar federal subjects. Kaliningrad is the only non-contiguous land mass, situated between 
Poland and Lithuania. Saint Petersburg, or Peter in slang, the second capital, a cosmopolitan 








*Not shown Saint Petersburg : 550 
 
Source: Updated Lankina and Voznaya Protest Data (Appendix i) 
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Circle research centers and remote fishing villages. Inhabitants of the northern region live through 
more than 160 days of snow each year on average, and spend winter months in complete 
darkness. Bolstered by Saint Petersburg, the Northwestern District accounts for 850 protest 
events over 2007-2013, or just around 50% of all events. The remaining eleven federal subjects 
report a variety of protest frequencies. Kaliningrad and Murmansk report high frequencies of 102 
and 70. Nenets Autonomous Okrug and Novgorod do not report a single event. And Arkhangelsk, 
Karelia, the Republic of Karelia, Komi, Leningrad, Pskov, and Vologda report between seventeen 
and thirty events.  
 
 
     
    



















Arkhangelsk 1225 76% 6.8 2156 6.3 30518 56.7 35 
Kaliningrad 947 78% 4.9 1850 7.9 23040 57.3 36 
Karelia(Rep) 646 78% 12.9 2082 8.2 32165 57.2  
Komi 902 77% 5.6 2327 8.7 37546 62.0 27 
Leningrad 1726 66% 6.7 1651 4.9 23390 59.2 29 
Murmansk 796 93% 4.3 2046 7.6 41176 55.1 29 
Nenets AO  42 67% .25 1859 7.6 143178 48.7 38 
Novgorod 636 71% 3.11 2046 5.1 23575 63.1 39 
Pskov 676 70% 3.66 1832 7.9 22096 56.7 26 
St. 
Petersburg 4927 100% 
. 
1486 2.2 36194 50.3 
31 
Vologda 1205 71% 5.5 2239 6.4 26958 60.4 29 
Table 5 shows the state capacity profile for the twelve Northwestern federal subjects. The quartile shading reveals a fairly consistent 
pattern across indicators. Urban population percentage and population-weighted crime statistics suggest low to medium coercive capacity. 
Five of the twelve subjects contain over 77% urbanization, placing them in the top quintile. Of the remaining regions, only Leningrad and 
Nenets Autonomous Okrug fail to cross the median urbanization value of 70%. Social mobilization capacity scores are uniformly middle-of-the-
pack, with the exception of Saint Petersburg’s relatively low value, and with the exception of education outliers Karelia and Nenets. Trends in 
the following indicators are similarly uniform, but high rather than low. Five of the regions report average unemployment of under 6%, the 
value corresponding with the 80
th
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Cooptation capacity produces a set of values near the mean, with the expectation of 
Saint Petersburg, and Nenets, which reports a dramatically high value of socio-cultural spending 
per capita. Located within the Arctic region of Archangelsk, Nenets’ local economy is dominated 
by oil and gas. According to Rossstat, over 95% of economic output in the region is tied to oil and 
gas production. Government rubles flow to local spending projects, particularly infrastructure 
development projects. The third dimension of state capacity, cooperation, is uniformly low 
throughout the region.  The Northwestern federal subjects do not identify with political 
leadership—as proxied by support for United Russia in the 2008 election. Outside of Komi and 
Pskov, closed political opportunity structures characterize the area.   
Siberia 
Figure 9: Protest Events, Siberian District 
 
The Siberian Federal District occupies a land mass in Asian Russia, covering over 
5,000,000 square kilometers, or roughly half the size of the United States. The district borders the 








Source: Updated Lankina and Voznaya Protest Data (Appendix i) 
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ocean, and the southern border includes Mongolia, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. Despite holding 
a reputation for desolation and emptiness, the Siberian district accounts for 400 protests 
according to the revised Lankina and Voznaya dataset, or roughly a quarter of total events. The 
twelve member subjects report protest frequencies ranging from over 100 to zero. The high mark 
appears in Novosibirsk Oblast, home to a metropolitan hub of the same name, which features a 
large international airport and a lively international scientific enclave in Akademgorodok. The low 
mark, on the other hand, appears in Altai Republic, a sparsely populated mountain region known 
for seismic activity and eco-tourism. Three other member regions, Buryatia, Khakassia and, 
Zabaikalsky Krai reported fewer than five events between 2007 and 2013. And Altai Krai, Irkutsk, 
Kemerovo, Krasnoyarsk, Omsk, Tomsk, and Tuva all reported between twenty and sixty events. 
All of these federal subjects are closely nestled in the southern edge of the district. The Siberia of 
Cold War and literary fame, of forced labor camps and endless taiga expanse, can be found in 
the northern section of Krasnoyarsk. 
 
 
     
    



















Altai Krai 2424 55% 14.8 2131 8.4 18614 54.6 35 
Altai 
Republic 207 28% 
1.5 
2594 11.9 35796 69.4 
31 
Buryatia 971 58% 6.5 2921 10.6 27384 65.6 31 
Irkutsk 2436 80% 13.2 2925 9.0 26478 58.5 42 
Kemerovo 2761 85% 13.6 2371 7.5 25008 76.8 30 
Khakassia  533 67% 3.1 2429 7.6 23884 59.5 32 
Krasnoyarsk 2843 76% 18.0 2525 6.8 35476 60.0 23 
Novosibirsk 2683 77% 14.1 2569 7.2 24879 59.0 28 
Omsk 1983 71% 11.3 1810 7.7 22372 60.1 28 
Tomsk 1051 70% 6.3 2558 8.1 25080 58.4 30 
Tuva 1354 75% 6.4 2238 5.7 22426 59.7 23 
Zabaikalsky 1104 66% 6.8 2843 11.4 33475 
 
29 
Keeping with the sequence, Table 6 displays the state capacity profiles for each member of the Siberian federal district. Coercive state 
capacity for the twelve federal subjects appears to be uniformly weak. Strong social mobilization capacity increases the difficulty of controlling 
protest. Seven of the subjects exhibit relatively high or mid-level concentrations of urban population. The exceptions are Altai Krai, Altai 
Republic, and Buryatia, each of which exhibit urban population concentrations of less than 60%. Indeed, the mountainous Altai Republic holds 
the lowest value of urbanization in all of Russia at 28%, along with one of the lowest graduation figures. State coercive capacity is even more 
clear-cut. All but two of the regions, Altai Krai and Omsk, score in the top quintile for reported crimes. State capacity improves somewhat along 
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Grievance measures, unemployment scores, fall in the bottom quintile for six of the 
subjects. However, the state component of cooptation is less remarkable, with three regions 
exhibiting relatively high levels of socio-cultural spending. Greater variation emerges along the 
cooperation dimension of state capacity. Two of the Siberian regions supported United Russia 
relatively strongly. Three regions supported the party weakly. Political opportunity structures are 
more homogenous, middle-of -the-pack with, Krasnoyarsk and Tuva exceptions on the open end, 
and Irkutsk on the closed end. 
Southern 
Figure 10:Protest Events, Southern District 
 
The Southern Federal District lies between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, to the 
west and east, between the Volga district and the Northern Caucasus district to the north and 
south. The Southern district has served as a meeting place between cultures for hundreds of 
years. Since the 4th century, empires have fought to control trade routes along the numerous of 
rivers that snake through the six Southern member subjects. Scythians, ancient Greeks, 
Genoese, and Ottoman Turks each held outposts in what is today Rostov and Astrakhan. The 
Source: Updated Lankina and Voznaya Protest Data (Appendix i) 
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Volga river delta area was the site of the Golden Horde’s Russian capital, witnessed a siege from 
Tamerlane’s army, and hosted battles in the Russo-Turkish war of the 16th century. The 
Southern district’s natural environment continues to drive cultural and economic life. The resort 
town of Sochi, located in Krasnodar Krai on the Black Sea, hosted athletes from around the world 
for the 2014 Winter Olympics. The Volgograd Hydroelectric Power Station is the largest 
hydroelectric dam in Europe.  According to the updated Lankina and Voznaya database, federal 
subjects in the district exhibit high frequencies of protest between 2007 and 2013.  Astrakhan, 
Krasnodar, Rostov and Volgograd each report 49 or more protest events. The sparsely populated 
enclaves of Adygea and Kalmykia each report fewer than ten. In total the district, account for 200 
events, or roughly 12% of the total. 
 
 
     
    



















Adygea 442 51% 2.3 1034 8.5 17850 70.9 25 
Astrakhan 1011 67% 5.1 2554 8.4 20337 58.0 30 
Kalmykia 288 44% 2.6 1529 14.5 20194 72.4   22 
Krasnodar 5259 53% 24.1 1326 6.1 20642 62.0 40 
Rostov 4275 67% 21.3 1575 7.0 18631 71.8 30 
Volgograd 2602 76% 14.4 1746 7.5 18381 57.7 36 
Table 7, once again, presents the state capacity profile for each of the Southern District member subjects. Across the coercion, 
cooptation, and cooperation dimensions two types of profile seem to emerge.  Adygea and Kalmykia exhibit relatively strong coercive and 
cooperation capacity, coupled with relatively weak cooptation capacity. The regions produce few secondary school graduates and hold small 
populations that are not concentrated in urban areas. Both regions exhibit crime statistics at or below the median value. On unemployment 
and social spending per capita, however, both regions fail to provide jobs or amelioratory spending. Despite the weakness on cooptation, 
support for United Russian was strong in the 2008 election, and political opportunities are scant. The remaining four subjects are much more 
highly and densely populated, and produce more graduates. With the exception of Astrakhan, each exhibits average to low crime rates. 
Cooptation capacity varies among Astrakhan, Krasnodar, Rostov, and Volgograd. Along cooperation, Rostov joins the two small enclaves in 
support for United Russia, while Astrakhan, Krasnodar, and Volgograd voiced low support. Political opportunities are correspondingly more 
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Ural 
Figure 11: Protest Events, Ural District 
 
The Ural District spans the eponymous mountain range, stretching from the Arctic Sea to 
Kazakhstan, bound from west to east by the Volga and Siberian Federal Districts. Forming the 
border between Europe and Asia, the Urals hold dozens of ore and mineral species, from nickel, 
gold, and platinum, to coal, bauxite and talc. The six subjects that make up the mountainous 
district provide the center of industrial production for the Russian Federation. Across history the 
forges have hosted serfs, forced laborers, and free men and women. The Bolsheviks found 
support among the region’s workers and established their first headquarters in Yekaterinburg and 
Perm during the October Revolution. As Hitler pushed the eastern front across Poland and onto 
Russian soil, Stalin relocated industrial plants to the Ural region to protect supply lines. Today, 
Magnetegorsk embodies the industrial history of the district. The factory-city is located in 
Chelyabinsk Province, on the Magnitnaya Mountain, a construct of almost pure iron, the only 
geological formulation of its type in the world. The factory at Magnetegorsk continues to produce 
output today, although at a much lower rate than during the war years. Modern day protests in the 
Source: Updated Lankina and Voznaya Protest Data (Appendix i) 
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Ural District are concentrated in the Chelyabinsk and Sverdlovsk regions, which report sixty three 
and 121 events over 2007-2013. Khanty Mansi and Kurgan report between twenty and forty 
events over the time horizon. And the small enclave of Yamalo-Nenets reported a single event. 
With a total of 230 events the Ural District accounts for roughly 13% of total protest events.  
 
 
     
    



















Chelyabinsk 3487 82% 16.4 2348 5.9 20548 61.1 36 
Khanty Mansi 1544 91% 10.1 2251 6.6 73981 65.9 31 
Kurgan 908 60% 4.8 2639 9.9 21120 64.4 21 
Sverdlovsk 4315 84% 21.0 2271 6.5 26508 62.0 28 
Tyumen 3429 78% 22.8 2451 6.0 17155 73.5 30 
Yamalo-
Nenets AO 530 85% 
4.2 
1854 3.9 106461 78.3 
28 
Table 7 further continues the trend by presenting the Idea of the State profile for Ural federal subjects. The six regions score nearly 
uniformly poorly on coercive capacity and average or strongly on cooptation and cooperation. Kurgan and Yamalo-Nenets are the only two 
subjects that hold relatively small populations, with only 60% of Kurgan’s population living in urban centers. They are also the only two 
subjects with low secondary education figures. Governments of Chelyabinsk, Khanty Mansi, Sverdlovsk, and Tyumen all face a difficult 
societal context vis-à-vis efforts to curtain protest activities. By the measure of yearly crime reporting, these governments do not display the 
ability to shape the behavior of their subjects. Of the Ural districts, only Yamalo-Nenets reported a score outside of the top 20th percentile of 
crime-ridden regions. Despite a recent decline in Russian industrial production, only Kurgan exhibits a particularly high unemployment value, 
however. Khanty Mansi and Yamalo-Nenets even exhibit very high levels of cooptation capacity as measured by socio-cultural spending per 







  178   
    
And even more striking, Yamalo-Nenets accounts for over 90% of all Russian natural 
gas.  Scores along the cooptation dimension cluster around the median value, with the exception 
of Yamalo-Nenets and Tyumen, the oil production center of Russia during the Soviet era. Other 
than the relatively open Chelyabinsk and relatively closed Kurgan, political opportunity structures 
also cluster around the mean.  
Volga 
Figure 12: Protest Events, Volga District 
 
The Volga District occupies the southeastern section of European Russia. The district 
borders, moving clockwise around the compass rose, the Southern, Central, Northwestern, and 
Ural Federal Districts, and Kazakhstan to the south. The fourteen federal Volga subjects span the 
ethnically diverse, fertile region along the largest river in Europe, referred to as Mother Volga 
(Волга-матушка). In addition to providing land and soil for crop-based agriculture, the region is 
heavily forested—over 70% of Perm Krai’s land area is covered in coniferous forest, for example. 
Ports throughout the district, in Kirov, Nizhegorodskaia, Samara, connect food products, beer, 
Source: Updated Lankina and Voznaya Protest Data (Appendix i) 
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timber, printing, and biochemical industries to consumers abroad and throughout Russia.  
Economic production is not limited to primary and secondary products. Local facilities export 
tertiary products, including automobiles, computer processors, and space exploration hardware.  
The Bashkir, Chuvash, Mari, Mordavian, Tatar and Udmurt groups all enjoy federal republic 
status in this region. In each ethnic republic the titular group rivals Russians for majority 
demographic and linguistic prevalence. Local resources and infrastructure, land and water 
transportation routes, generate wealth for inhabitants of the Volga District. The verdant climate 
fostered by Mother Volga allows biologists to study a range of rare flora and fauna. Protest 
frequencies in the Volga district range from fewer than five, in three of the republics, to nearly 
250, in Samara. The remaining ten federal subjects reported between forty and 110 events in the 
updated Lankina and Voznaya dataset. In total, the district’s 750 events accounts for nearly 30% 
of all recorded protests from 2007 to 2013. 
 
 
     
    
Table 9: Volga District 

















Bashkorostan 60% 4068 26.5 1762 7.1 19562 83.1 24 
Chuvashia 59% 1253 8.9 1581 8.2 18303 62.2 31 
Kirov 74% 1344 6.5 1712 7.7 20632 55.3 34 
Mari El 63% 696 4.5 2120 8.9 17845 67.5 18 
Mordovia 60% 833 4.8 1147 4.5 22964 93.4 30 
Nizhegorodskaia 79% 3318 17.1 2283 6.0 21864 60.6 22 
Orenburg 60% 2036 11.3 1749 6.7 22189 60.3 27 
Penza 67% 1384 8.3 1340 6.1 19576 70.3 43 
Perm 75% 2648 12.0 2965 7.7 25214 62.0 32 
Samara 80% 3216 15.9 2282 4.6 23148 56.0 30 
Saratov 75% 2524 14.4 1483 6.8 18604 64.8 26 
Tatarstan 53% 308 3.8 2082 19.2 35571 89.2 37 
Udmurtia 69% 1523 8.4 2358 7.5 21671 60.5 31 
Ulyanovsk 73% 1292 7.8 1508 6.8 18724 66.2 30 
For one final time, Table 9 displays the multi-dimensional state capacity profile for members of the Volga Federal District. Along the 
three dimensions of coercion, cooptation, and cooperation the fourteen federal subjects exhibit variation. Few patterns emerge from the 
quintile visualization impression. Between Tatarstan at the low end, and Nizhegorodskaia and Samara at the high end, the subjects exhibit 
population sizes across the entire percentile distribution. Urbanization and education figures are similarly variable throughout the Volga 
District. Cooptation strength ranges between mid and low across the subjects, with several exceptions. The unemployment rate in Tatarstan is 
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Tatar-inform, a local news agency, opined that “the rate of unemployment in Tatarstan 
has grown in spite of receiving massive anti-crisis subsidies over the last decade” (2016). The 
effort, while not reducing unemployment, may have won a measure of cooperation capacity.  
Bashkortostan, Mari El, Nizhegorodskaia, and Orenburg join Saratov in reporting closed political 
opportunity structures. Indicators in Penza and Tatarstan point the opposite direction. Political 
opportunity structures are similarly closed, with the exception of the two outlier subjects. 
Hypothesis Formulation 
The preceding section rendered the Idea of the State visible for all eighty three Russian 
federal subjects. The lengthy presentation demonstrates the variation along the three state 
capacity dimensions. At the same time, the tables demonstrate levels of social mobilization 
capacity, grievance, and political opportunity structure. With variation in coercive capacity, 
cooptation capacity, and cooperative capacity, the regions exhibit a range of state-society 
relations. For example, across the North Caucasus District the state rules with an iron fist; in the 
polar climes of the Northwestern District and the Far East District, the state coopts loyalty with 
social spending tied to natural resource wealth. The state capacity profiles presented in tables 1-8 
facilitate hypothesis testing. With the independent variables operationalized for federal regions 
statistical testing can finally answer the question: is there a relationship between state capacity 
and protest onset? The state capacity profiles would facilitate similar investigations, into similar 
research questions that explore the causes, or the effects, of state capacity along the three 
dimensions.   
State Capacity  
The Idea of the State produces numerous hypotheses. The theoretical framework posits 
that state capacity, through three dimensions, holds explanatory power vis-à-vis protest onset. 
This structuralist wager would provide analytical efficiency of the sort hoped for my Montesquieu’s 
climate theory, or Durkheim’s suicide theory. The Idea of the State posits that local governments 
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have the ability to check social unrest in their territory, by fostering coercive, cooptation, and 
cooperative capacity.  
As a proxy for the state component of coercion, crime rates are expected to increase 
along with protest frequency. In general, the theory expects subjects characterized by weak 
coercive capacity to exhibit high frequencies of protest onset. As a proxy for cooptational power, 
socio-cultural spending should win loyalty among the population. In general, the theory expects 
higher likelihood of protest onset among subjects possessing weak cooptation capacity. As the 
population identifies with national leadership, and internalizes an affinity for the Russian state, an 
environment of cooperation will dampen protest onset stemming from all causes. This ideational 
effect reduces the likelihood of protest onset, regardless of other prevailing structural conditions. 
Support for the ruling United Russia party serves as the proxy for cooperational capacity. The 
Idea of the State framework expects a higher likelihood of protest onset among subjects 
possessing weak cooperative capacity.  
H1: Coercive state capacity is negatively related to protest onset 
H1a: Crime rates per capita are negatively related to protest onset 
H2: Cooptational state capacity is negatively related to protest onset 
H2a: Social spending per capita is negatively related to protest onset 
H3: Cooperational state capacity is negatively related to protest onset 
H3a: United Russia vote share is negatively related to protest onset 
Social Movement Theory 
Social Mobilization Capacity 
H4: Social mobilization capacity is positively related to protest onset 
H4a: Urban population % is positively correlated with protest onset 
H4b: Total population size is positively correlated with protest onset 
H4c: Secondary education graduation rates are positively correlated with protest onset 
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As the population increases, and as the population clusters around urban centers, social 
mobilization capacity grows. Large student populations are expected to serve as a particularly 
rich pool of potential activists. Regardless of the state’s resources or abilities, high population, 
high density, student heavy federal subjects will prove more difficult to regulate.  
Grievance 
H5: Grievances are positively related to protest onset 
  H5a: Unemployment is positively correlated with protest onset 
As the unemployment rate rises, as more and more people lose their jobs, grievance will 
drive them to the streets. The theory assumes that grievance arising from unemployment will 
engender a broad distain for government performance. Regardless of the state’s resources or 
abilities, aggrieved populations will threaten to gather more frequently. 
Political Opportunity Structure 
H6: Political opportunity structure openness is negative correlated with protest onset 
  H6a: The Carnegie Institute Openness Index is positively correlated with protest onset 
As independent relationships thrive, in economic, political, and civil activities, 
opportunities for protest will proliferate. According to the theory, opening of political opportunity 
structure, broadly defined, spurs protest onset through the demonstration effect, and hope.  
Alternative Explanations: Russian Studies 
Security studies and area studies scholars focused on Russia provide several alternative 
hypothesis that do not neatly fall under the Idea of the State framework, nor under the big three 
theoretical traditions of Social Movement Studies.  
The relationship between regime stability and natural resource wealth has long occupied 
security studies scholars. Lucrative extractive industries have been shown to strengthen regime 
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durability and reduce the likelihood of political protests (e.g., Smith 2004). In the Russian context 
natural resource production shapes federal subjects’ financial relationships with the center; 
Putin’s regime recycles tax revenue from oil, mineral, and natural gas to relatively poor regions. 
The cycle turns heavy production regions into net exporters of federal transfers. By this logic, low 
or even negative transfer flows should correlate with low levels of protest activity. 
On the other hand, Russia scholars argue that federal funding itself represents a channel 
of political control. The federal government may be able to buy loyalty through fiscal transfers 
(Robertson 2011). Where transfers make up a significant portion of subject financial resources 
local leaders should be loyal to Putin’s regime. As mentioned in the previous section, this is one 
explanation of Chechnya’s relative quiescence in modern times.  
H7: Natural resource wealth buffers federal subjects from social unrest 
H7a: Federal transfers are positively correlated with protest onset  
H8: Generous federal support creates loyal subjects 
H8a: Federal transfers are negatively correlated with protest onset 
Additionally, Lankina and Voznaya (2015) posited a theoretical relationship between 
regional economic profile and protest onset frequency. Share of privately-owned industry drives 
the hypothesized relationship. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union privatization has proceeded 
unevenly across Russian federal subjects. State control remains in spheres of agriculture and 
heavy industry. Where agricultural and industrial jobs make up the majority of labor markets, 
Lankina and Voznaya see populations dependent on the government, loyally abstaining from 
protest activities. These workers are “likely to have a generally low incidence of and turnout at 
protest, largely due to these regions’ heavy dependence on state salaries or subsidies from the 
federal government” (331).  
H9: Government-owned businesses engender loyal among local populations 
H9a: Share of publically owned businesses is negatively correlated with protest onset 
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The comprehensive nature of the seven hypothesis presented above allows for a test of 
the general structuralist position, as well as sub-theories from Social Movement Studies. Testing 
the influence of, say, grievance or social mobilization capacity alone on protest onset generates a 
model with possible omitted variable bias. Theoretical tools generated over the past five decades 
posit that all elements of the Idea of the State must be tested in addition to the main strains of 
social movement theory. Any single source of social unrest can be deemed unimportant or less 
important than others only after a comprehensive test. Jeffery Dixon argues that incomplete 
theoretical models produce incomplete statistical models, or models suffering from omitted 
variable bias (2009). The following test avoids this pitfall. The nine hypotheses attempt to 
operationalize all major theorized structural drivers of protest onset. Thus, empirical tests will 
evaluate the more fundamental question: do any structural factors shape the likelihood of protest? 
As an alternative hypothesis then, H* expects at least one of the nine drivers to be significantly 
correlated with protest onset.  
H*: Structural conditions systematically shape the frequency of protest onset 
H*a: Variables other than population size are significantly correlated with protest onset 
Modeling Unrest 
An effective test of the Idea of the State hypotheses requires systematic exploration of 
variance in structural conditions and onset frequency. The only existing test of sub-national 
Russian protest onset is restricted to anecdotal analysis. Lankina and Voznaya claim that 
protests are most frequent in “sophisticated and more developed urban metropolises,” and where 
grievances arise from “socioeconomic issues, such as those related to large Soviet-era factory 
closures, labor market restructuring, or wage arrears” (2015: 445). The authors do not conduct a 
systematic test of their claims. Indeed, they do not even elaborate on terms like “sophisticated” or 
“deprivation.” For each of the four hypotheses an interested observer can find an example of the 
expected relationship among the eighty three state capacity profiles. But this is not the sort of 
evidence used to evaluate a structural theory. The Idea of the State is a probabilistic theory, and 
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as such must be evaluated using statistical methods– as Lass Fridstrom and Siv Ingebrigsten put 
it: “use of a statistically formulated conceptual framework seems virtually unavoidable” (1999:43) 
when evaluating probabilistic theories. 
In the 1960s and 1970s several scholars articulated the ontological position underlying a 
probabilistic theory of causality. Scholars working in the philosophy of social science addressed 
the concern in Patrick Suppes’ A Probabilistic Theory of Causality (1970) and I. J.  Good’s A 
Causal Calculus (1961). The phrase “probabilistic causality” appears, at first glance, to be an 
oxymoron, or at least conceptually confusing. However, humans operate under the assumption of 
probabilistic causally in scientific research, and in more mundane contexts. Wesley Salmon, in his 
review of the concept, presents several examples. Salmon examines the idea of cause in cancer 
research. Laboratory studies determine that various substances cause cancer in test animals, 
even when every animal exposed to the substance does not developed malignancy. Similarly, 
drivers say that a skid on a patch of ice was the cause of an automobile accident, even when 
many cars pass over the slick spot, some of them skidding upon it without mishap. Cause is 
established when two conditions occur together frequently. The Idea of the State theory assumes 
that such patterns will be visible between state capacity and protest onset. This project evaluates 
the presence of the correlation in the Russian case. 
Statistical methods capture and generalize the relationship between dependent and 
independent variables, offering a test of probabilistic causality. Regression analysis is a 
particularly common tool. The anachronistic title emerged from Sir Frances Galton’s pioneering 
social statistical work. Galton studied data on relative sizes of parents and their offspring in 
species of plants and animals. He observed that a larger-than-average parent tends to produce a 
larger-than-average child, but the child is likely to be less large than the parent in terms of its 
relative position within its own generation. Galton termed this phenomenon a regression towards 
mediocrity. The scientist captured the relationship between family members by describing his 
dependent variable, child size, in terms of his independent variable, parent size. The connecting 
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relationship took the form of a simple line. Today, regression models express the relationship 
between independent and dependent variables in terms of various functional forms, from straight 
lines, to exponential curves, to probability distributions.  
Functional forms describe either a deterministic or statistical relationship between 
variables of interest. A deterministic relationship is an exact relationship between an independent 
variable, x, and the dependent variable, y. Consider, for instance, the conversion relationship 
between temperature in degrees Celsius (C) and temperature in degrees Fahrenheit (F). The 
linking relationship between the two takes the form of a steep line, expressed mathematically as  
   (   )    . The formula produces an exact relationship between two temperature 
measurement systems. Statistical relationships, on the other hand, are not exact. Instead, they 
capture a trend existing between independent and dependent variables. Galton’s linear 
regression computed the line that best fit his observed weight data. This linear trend produced 
expected values of offspring weight for any given parent weight, or the expected change in y for a 
one unit change in x. Expected values are the best fit without fitting the data exactly, differing by 
an error or scatter term. Thus, without being deterministic, statistical relationships quantify the 
strength of relationships between quantities of interest. In order to quantify relationships tied to a 
complex theory like Idea of the State, multiple predictors are required. Multiple regression moves 
away from simple lines to planes and hyper planes to describe the relationship between multiple 
independent variables and the dependent variable. Predictors or independent variables are, in 
this case, structural measures of state capacity. The predicted value is the count of protest events 
per Russian federal subject, over the time horizon 2007-2013. 
For event count data, probability functions define the statistical relationship between 
independent and dependent variables. Random events, by definition, are unpredictable in a 
deterministic sense. However, mathematicians have demonstrated that frequencies of random 
outcomes over a large number of events are often predictable. For example, when casting 
two dice, the outcome of any individual roll is unpredictable, but a sum of seven will occur twice 
 
 
  188   
    
as often as four. The result of a single coin flip is unpredictable. Sports officials and indecisive 
individuals leverage the random process to facilitate decision making. Empirical studies have 
established the probability function of coin flipping. John Edmund Kerrich tossed a coin 10,000 
times while serving a prison sentence during World War II. Kerrich employed the results of his 
tedious data gathering exercise to prove that, as the number of tosses approaches infinity, the 
proportion of heads or tails approaches .5. Social scientists are able to rely on probability 
distributions to establish statistical relationships between count data variables, such as protest 
onset counts, and independent variables. A probability curve replaces Galton’s line as a 
quantification of relationship strength.     
For protest event counts the Poisson probability distribution becomes the relevant tool. 
Simon-Denis Poisson discovered the distribution while studying the behavior of juries and artillery 
strikes in the 19
th
 century. Ladislaus von Bortkiewicz independently published evidence of the 
distribution in his 1898 book The Law of Small Numbers (Das Gesetz der kleinen Zahlen). Von 
Bortkiewicz built his probability distribution from more sensational events than Kerrich’s prison 
study. He gathered data on the number of deaths from horse kicks in the Prussian army, as well 
as suicide frequencies among children. Returning to regression analysis, independent variables 
condition the shape of the estimated Poisson distribution; the set of predictors shapes the 
probability distribution through the parameter lambda (λ). A parameter is simply a constant or 
variable term that determines a function’s specific but not general form—e.g., the slope 
parameter of a linear function determines the direction and tilt of the line. In general, regression 
parameters define the direction and strength of the relationship between dependent and 
independent variables. 
The Poisson distribution for a random variable Y has the following probability mass 
function for a given value of Y = y: 
 ( )  
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Here Y denotes the number of discrete, Poisson distributed events occurring within an interval of 
time, and λ is a parameter that defines both the mean and the variance of Y. In Poisson 
regression the independent variables shape the distribution by shaping the parameter λ. The 
mathematical expression relating the set of independent variables and the Poisson parameter is:  
          where X is the set of independent variables, or predictors, and β is the set of 
coefficients. Values of β are calculated to maximize the likelihood that the computed Poisson 
distribution approximates the data. An estimation of the probability function demonstrates that as 
values of the predictor variables change, so too change the expected likelihood of higher or lower 
counts occurring. 
Poisson regression rests on two assumptions. First, the response variable Y must follow 
a Poisson distribution. And secondly, the mean and variance of the response variable Y must be 
equal. A histogram plot offers a plausibility test of the first assumption. The plot does not include 
Moscow City or Saint Petersburg.  
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Figure 13: Onset Distribution 
 
The histogram indicates that data are skewed right, and thus non-normally distributed. 
This visual test suggests that the Poisson regression method may be appropriate. However, the 
second assumption does not hold. The dependent variable variance is not equal to the dependent 
variable mean. The mean value of protest (M=36.85) is much smaller than the variance (s = 
1750). This outcome indicates the presence of over-dispersion, which renders the Poisson model 
inappropriate. A related probability function, the negative binomial distribution, allows the mean 
and variance of count data to diverge. A Poisson distribution is, in fact, a particular form of 
negative binomial distribution. Instead of lambda, the negative binomial function includes two 
parameters, the mean and alpha. Alpha measures the extent of over-dispersion. Numerous 
political science scholars have recently employed negative binomial models to model over-
dispersed event count data (e.g., Bremer 1993; Schneider, Barbieri, and Gleditsch 2003; Hendrix 
and Young 2014).   
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Russian protest data includes multiple observations for each federal subjects, measured 
yearly over the time horizon. In other words, function parameters contain numerous values: in the 
expression           X and β would each be arrays of values. Such datasets, known as panel 
or cross sectional time series, necessitate additional testing and a set of specialized analysis 
techniques. Panel models estimate a set of standard errors that control for the fact that cases are 
not independent of each other—each federal subject includes five temporally separated 
observations, controlling for autocorrelation. 
Before moving on to model specification and evaluation, two checks are in order. First, is 
non-stationarity an issue: is time itself causing a problematic trend?  A non-stationary series can 
produce spurious regression coefficients, as well as spurious significance determinations. The 
data are a strongly balanced panel, according to Stata. According to a Harris-Tzavalis unit-root 
test, the protest dataset features stationary panels (p = 0.000). (The Levin-Li-Chu test, an 
alternative, is ill-suited for the dataset, as it includes many panels and relatively few time periods.) 
Autocorrelation is a second potential problem. It arises when values of the same variable are 
themselves correlated, reflected in non-normally distributed error terms, a condition known as 
heteroscedasticity. Correlation of this sort violates model assumptions of observation 
independence and randomness, leading to bias in test statistics and confidence intervals. A 
Breusch-Pagan test reports the presence of heteroscedasticity in the data.  Time-series 
transformations, with random or fixed effects, are a common solution. I generate models with both 
specifications below.    
Testing for multicollinearity among independent variables is a third important diagnostic. 
This problematic condition results from linear relationships between independent variables. At an 
intuitive level, when independent variables exhibit high levels of multicollinearity, the model 
cannot determine which predictor should be credited with explaining variation in the dependent 
variable. Multicollinearity can cause serious problems for inference, as the estimated regression 
coefficients and significance levels become sensitive to minor changes in model specification. 
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The only potentially problematic correlation occurs between population and total socio-cultural 
spending. To remedy the problem, I substitute spending on socio-cultural projects for a per capita 
expression of the variable, which is depicted in the state capacity profiles in the previous section. 
The correlation between population and the new per capita spending measure is low.  
Results 
This section presents the empirical findings. Model 1, displayed below, presents results 
of a negative binomial regression conducted in the Stata statistical package. The regression 
model captures all elements of the Idea of the State framework: three dimensions of state 
capacity, as well as the three major strains of Social Movement Studies. The time horizon is 
2007-2013. The dependent variable is protest events per year for each Russian federal subject, 
in the updated Lankina and Voznaya dataset.  The model includes random effects error 
transformations, to address heteroscedasticity. A Hausman Test identified random effects as 
most suitable choice. Nevertheless, as a robustness check, I run the model with fixed effects 
specifications—displayed below.   
Following hypotheses 4a and 4b, social mobilization capacity shapes the likelihood of 
protest onset at the sub-national level. Both population-based operationalizations report a 
significant relationship with protest onset frequency. And both variable coefficients possess the 
hypothesized positive sign: an increase in population or urbanization is associated with an 
increase in protest frequency. Almost all of the population effect is absorbed by changes in urban 
concentration. Because log-likelihood coefficients can be difficult to understand, I compute 
incidence rate ratios (IRR) for each variable. With all other drivers held constant, a 1% increase in 
urban population leads to a 1% increase in expected onset rate. On the other hand, neither the 
education operationalization nor the coercive state capacity variables were significant. The 
correlation coefficient generated for crime is very small, and not close to significance. 
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Turning to the second set of hypothesized drivers, results provide stronger validation of 
the overall structural position, and for the Idea of the State position. Here, both state capacity to 
coopt and grievances are significant. Model 1 demonstrates a strong negative relationship 
between the social spending variable and the level of sub-national protest, suggesting that the 
more funds local governments dedicate to socio-cultural projects, the lower the levels of protest 
activity.  Holding all other variables constant, a one unit increase in per capita spending, 
measured in millions of rubles, reduces the expected rate of protests by over 3%. Supporting 
hypothesis 5a, a one unit increase in federal subject unemployment rates increases expected 
protest onset rate by around 1%. 
The final two variables do not produce significant results. The final dimension of state 
capacity, cooperation, fails to register an expected, significant relationship. The percent of the 
regional population voting for United Russia in the 2008 legislative elections does not exhibit the 
sign expected according to hypothesis 3a. The Carnegie Openness Index—the political 
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Significant relationships between population, urban population, social spending, and 
unemployment all support hypothesis *a. In order for model results to provide reliable evidence 
for the broader structural position, however, the theoretical model must offer more explanatory 
power than an empty model. A Likelihood Ratio Test offers an appropriate metric. For linear 
regressions employing least squares estimation, an F-test determines superiority of fit between 
models. The Likelihood Ratio Test accomplishes this task for generalized linear models like the 
Poisson and negative binomial (Meier 2011). Stata output includes a significance test for the 
model as a whole. The predictor model using independent variable data was indeed an 
improvement over a model in which all predictors were set to zero (p = 0.0).  
The core findings hold under several robustness checks. Displayed above, Models 2 and 
3 feature alternative operationalizations of social mobilization capacity and grievance. Model 2 
replaces university student population with the number of local rail passengers. Any model 
omitting urban population would clearly suffer from omitted variable bias, so the new variable 
accompanies the original specification. Like the education variant, the rail passenger coefficient is 
not significantly related to expected protest onset. Model 3 replaces unemployment with a 
morbidity indicator, a measure of disease prevalence. Unlike unemployment, morbidity rates are 
not significantly related to expected onset. Model 4, also displayed above, is a replication of the 
original under fixed effects specifications. The results underscore the importance of socio-
economic public spending and unemployment, as they remain significant even as population and 
urban population do not.  
Appendix ii displays results for alternative explanations concerning natural resource 
wealth and economic ownership. Model 1 contains the full set of drivers from the Idea of the State 
framework. Models 2 and 3 add fiscal transfers from the federal center and percentage of jobs 
provided by private companies. Neither produced significant relationships with protests. 
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In summary, federal subjects with small, dispersed populations experienced relatively low 
levels of protest onset. Where unemployment is low and the populace benefits from social 
economic spending, low levels are similarly expected. Empirical testing provided supportive 
evidence for only four of the nine hypotheses presented above: 4a (population), 4b (urban 
population), 5a (unemployment), and 2a (social spending). Student population, crime rates, ruling 
party voting share, and the openness index all failed to reach significance levels. Alternative 
hypotheses concerning natural resource wealth, government transfers, and economic ownership 
similarly failed to produce significant results. These results produce supportive evidence for the 
general structuralist position, expressed in hypothesis *. The next section discusses political 
implications and directions for case study analysis. 
Implications 
These results begin to explain why subject regions located within the same authoritarian 
federation exhibit differing levels of social unrest. To date, the majority of studies on the onset of 
contentious political events have restricted analysis to the national level—as discussed in 
Chapter 3. This strain of literature fails to adequately test any of the theories developed across 
civil war studies, social movement studies and the foregoing study of revolutions. By considering 
sub-national variation in patterns of protest and structural conditions, the Idea of the State avoids 
this pitfall. Empirical results suggest that cooptational state capacity, measured at the sub-
national level, does indeed condition the frequency of protest in Russia from 2007-2013. 
Population measures and unemployment also shaped protest frequency. Only cooptational 
capacity, however, is completely within leaders’ control.  
As local governments allocate more funds to socio-cultural projects—to public health and 
education, to unemployment assistance, or to public park maintenance—the frequency of protest 
declines. It appears, then, that targeted public spending serves as a tool with which the state can 
coopt public obedience; Russian local governments can employ revenues as a tool to maintain 
social order. These findings begin to outline the shape of the social contract across the Russian 
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Federation. Moreover, these findings bring to light implications of international politics, particularly 
implications of commodity prices fluctuation and the ongoing wars in Ukraine and Syria. 
The empirical findings sketch an indirect connection between primary commodity prices 
and social unrest. Russia’s national revenue is heavily dependent on natural resources. In 2015, 
the country derived nearly half of all government revenue from oil and natural gas. The year’s 
budget was planned around oil averaging $50 a barrel. A drop in prices has subsequently led to a 
sharp increase in deficit spending. In October of 2015, finance minister Anton Siluanov addressed 
the threat of continued low prices. Siluanov announced that, should prices remain under the 50$ 
a barrel mark, the country’s Reserve Fund, a sovereign wealth fund designed to shield 
government finance during commodity busts, could be entirely exhausted within two years 
(Andrianova and Khrennikova 2016). The current predicament reflects a failure to diversify the 
national economy. Vladimir Putin, speaking at a parliamentary address in 2001, described 
diversification as a matter of national security. At the time, oil and gas generated around 30% of 
federal budget revenues. In 2015, the figure reached 44%, according to the finance ministry 
(Ibid.). 
Oil and gas shocks would affect state revenue at both the central and local levels. Natural 
resource wealth in the Russian Federation translates to revenue through two channels. First, 
export duties accrue to the central federal government. Tax revenue on extraction and 
refinement, on the other hand, accrues partially to the central government and partial to local 
government. Until 2002, the split was 60% local and 40% central. Boom conditions in oil and gas 
markets in the 1990s saw budgetary revenues of oil- and gas-producing regions greatly outpace 
non-producing regions. Since 2002, budget laws have steadily decreased tax share accruing to 
local governments, to 20% in 2003, 15% in 2004, and less than 5% since 2005. Galina 
Kurlyandskaya argues that the change in revenue split arose from increasing expenditure needs 
across federal subjects lacking oil or natural gas reserves (2007). The boost in central revenue 
cycled back to these “have-not” subjects in the form of central-subject budget transfers. 
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According to data from Rossstat, twenty six of the regions rely on central transfers for over 40% 
of state revenue, across 2007-2013. Indeed, only ten of the eight three federal subjects receive 
less than 20% of their state revenue from central transfers over the time horizon. The more self-
sufficient subjects include Bashkortostan, Kemerovo, Khanty-Mansi, Komi, Leningrad, Nenets 
Autonomous Okrug, Nizhegorodskaia, Perm, and Sverdlovsk, all of which are rich in oil or natural 
gas reserves, or both. International commodity markets thus feed forward to state budgets in all 
Russian regions, oil and gas producers and non-producers alike. As prices remain low the funds 
available for socio-cultural spending projects will shrink, forcing spending cuts in the short term, 
and potentially limiting local governments’ ability to coopt the population into civil obedience. 
International sanctions represent another potential threat to Russian central and local 
revenue streams. Sanctions threaten revenue by jeopardizing the country’s general economic 
outlook. Financial analysts at Credit Suisse (2014) recently identified several sources of potential 
deterioration in the Russian economy. The two key risks were ballooning of the external debt-to-
GDP ratio and the stability of Russia’s banking sector. International sanctions hold the potential to 
trigger both risk areas. First, sanctions have already damaged Russia’s external debt position. In 
2014 and 2015 foreign direct investment has declined along with the industrial production index.  
Capital flight is a major concern. Measures of the national economy report annual growth of just 
over 1% since sanctions took effect. These trends are accompanied by a corresponding increase 
in subjects’ cumulative debt. Sanctions provide a direct threat to the Russian banking system as 
well. Under current sanctions, borrowing is not an option. By traditional metrics Russia is credit-
worthy—public debt is only 10% of GDP (Ibid.). However, as the Credit Suisse report put it, “if you 
don’t have access to financial markets, then it doesn’t matter how credit-worthy you are” (Ibid.). 
Since the onset of sanctions the federal government has injected money into the banking system. 
For example, the government purchased 307 billion rubles ($5.15 billion) of VTB bank shares to 
prevent a mass sell-off (Zaslavskiy, 2015). If the sanctions continue to hurt the banking system, 
and the sovereign continues to intervene, a negative feedback loop between sovereign debt and 
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bank solvency could emerge, as seen in the European debt crisis. A prolonged recession, or an 
economic crisis, would threaten revenues throughout federal subjects. International actors would 
do well to bear in mind the relationship between Russian economy performance and social 
unrest.  
Aside from sanctions, Putin’s costly wars in Ukraine and Syria could limit local 
governments’ capacity to coopt. After annexing the Crimean peninsula central federal revenue 
funds were used to establish the region’s governmental structures, issue Russian passports, pay 
pensions, raise public sector employees’ salaries to Russian standards, and solidify local 
transport networks (Fischer and Rogoza 2014). The official budget for 2015-2017 estimates that 
the cost associated with new federal subjects will exceed $2.5 billion per year (Ibid.). These funds 
reduce the total available for redistribution through transfers to other regions. Putin’s ongoing 
Syrian engagement puts a similar strain on federal and subject budgets. Russian air strikes in 
Syria are currently costing up to $4 million per day, according to data collected by a defense think 
tank and reported in the Moscow Times (Hobson 2015).  British military intelligence provider 
Jane’s Information Group reported that bombing raids, supply runs, infrastructure and ground 
personnel — along with cruise missiles fired into the conflict zone — have cost Russia over $100 
million since strikes began (Ibid.). If economic conditions in Russia worsen, if commodities prices 
remain low and sanctions continue to restrict investor sentiment and credit availability, Putin may 
have to choose between pursing adventurous foreign policy and limiting protest onset at home.    
The results of this study elucidate the domestic implications of international politics. 
Local-level government spending patterns condition the frequency of protest events. But this 
spending does not occur in a vacuum. Local government revenues are inextricably tied to 
international politics and to the international economy. Russian scholars must recognize the 
connection between the international and the sub-national. International actors, as well, in the 
United States, Europe, and elsewhere, must recognize the potential knock-on effects of 
commodity prices, sanctions, and international conflict.  
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Further Research 
Thus far, this project has simply identified correlations between independent variables 
and protest frequency. Statistical results provide supportive evidence for several hypotheses, 
along with the general structural position. The results do not validate casual mechanisms. In 
order to gain an understanding of how and why relationships hold, the following chapter will 
conduct a process tracing exercise. Such a qualitative exercise will further serve to evaluate 
whether or not findings are spurious; qualitative case study analysis evaluates evidence produced 
by the statistical testing presented here. Case studies will additionally serve to refine the Idea of 
the State theoretical framework. Several hypotheses derived from the Idea of the State did not 
hold under empirical testing. Coercive capacity, measured by crime rates, was not significantly 
related to protest onset; cooperative capacity, measured by United Russia vote share, was not 
significantly related; nor was political opportunity structure, measured by the Carnegie Institute’s 
Openness Index. Are the relationships truly insignificant, or were the operationalizations faulty? 
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VI - Protest in Siberia 
Introduction 
In Zakhar Prilepin’s novel Monastery prisoners watch in amazement as guards escort two 
Chinese men into a labor camp. The new arrivals have been charged with espionage in 
Leningrad, where they were living. The would-be spies, an entry search reveals, do not speak 
more than a word of Russian. One prisoner turns to another and jokes, “how did these two plan to 
gather intelligence, by counting the number of people, cows and trolley cars?” (2015, 278) This 
fictional episode provides a caricature of quantitative social science work. Statisticians attempt to 
generate explanations from a similarly detached perspective.  Restricted to a superficial level of 
information, relying on sophisticated forms of counting, is it possible to generate useful 
explanations of sociopolitical phenomena? The structuralist methodological wager posits an 
affirmative answer. Regression analysis sets up an equation or sets of equations that describe 
phenomena of interest. Results present solutions that best predict the dependent variable from 
one or many independent variables, based on observations. This is the Humean search for 
constant conjunction, the attempt to “make no longer any scruple of foretelling one the 
appearance of another” (Hume 1748, IV), that has become embedded in positivist epistemology, 
dominant in social science (Kurki 2008, 24).  
This dissertation project evaluates constant conjunction surrounding a class of important 
sociopolitical events: protests in Vladimir Putin’s Russia. It attempts to develop a structural 
understanding of when and where protests occur. 
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Since the Bolotnaya Square gatherings of 2011, Russian protests have become a 
pressing international political concern, and as such, a potential target for social inquiry. Alexei 
Navalny, in a recent interview with Echo of Moscow, described Putin’s aggressive foreign policy 
as a ploy to ensure domestic tranquility. The anti-corruption crusader and political aspirant 
accused Putin of displaying military superiority to distract his citizens from gross inferiority in 
basic living condition provision (Navalny 2016). Successful anti-regime movements in Kyrgyzstan 
and Ukraine demonstrate the catalytic power of even small-scale protests, occasionally starting in 
or supported from provincial regions (Wolchik 2012). Tracing the contours of dissent and 
repression in Putin’s Russia has thus become the duty of regime defenders and dissident 
politicians alike. Events of 2016 have propelled Russian politics to the very top of the international 
security agenda. A brief tour of headlines paints a grim picture.Alarming actions range from 
meddling in the American presidential election campaign and abrogating nuclear weapon 
containment treaties, to delivering missile defense systems to Aleppo and even to central Europe, 
to Kaliningrad. These recent events have focused the attention of Putin’s regime and the 
international community, as well as academic audiences working in the contentious politics 
tradition. Attention is not likely to wane in the near future. Russian presidential elections in 2018 
loom on the horizon.  A repeat of the Bolotnaya Square movement, or a larger wave of protest, 
could hold serious implications for citizens of Russia, Syria, the United States, and all of Europe.    
The previous chapter empirically tested the Idea of the State theoretical framework. The 
preceding four chapters laid groundwork by developing theory and building independent and 
dependent variable databases. The goal was to create a novel, valuable explanation. Returning 
to the words of Fearon and Laitin, as quoted in the opening chapter: “the goal of the structural 
approach is the identification of stable conditions that systematically determine where an event is 
likely to occur” (2003b). In executing the structural test, this project twice contributes to 
contentious politics research. First, it evaluates a set of theories, developed over the last half 
century, at the correct, sub-national level. Secondly, the test evaluates the general structural 
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position, the hope that analytical tools can indeed drive understanding of important political 
events.  
A negative binomial regression model provided positive results. Statistical analysis 
suggests that structural factors can facilitate understanding protest onset in contemporary Russia. 
The quantitative test produced answers to several hypotheses derived from the Idea of the State. 
In particular, federal subjects characterized by small populations, generous social spending 
programs, and low unemployment feature relatively lower frequencies of protest over the years 
2007-2013.  
This chapter subjects findings to close scrutiny through a structured, focused 
comparison. A quantitative skeptic might consider such methods no better than misguided 
fumbling behind a language barrier. Like a deaf, mute spy, the statistician gathers and employs 
data without even an elementary understanding of context. Thorough social science researchers, 
then, must take a closer look at the data to make sure their conclusions are not the result of 
miscommunication or a basic failure of understanding. Researchers can move beyond correlation 
to avoid the real threat behind such playful rebukes. The task of this chapter is to guard against 
specious quantitative findings through case study analysis.  
Case Study Analysis 
This chapter will present case study analysis of contemporary Russian protest events. 
Regression analysis displays correlations between structural factors and protest outcomes. The 
Idea of the State theoretical framework provides an explanation for the patterns; the framework 
argues why the reader should believe that the patterns are neither mere coincidence nor the 
product of external factors.  In their entry in the Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology, 
Fearon and Laitin describe this set of steps amounting to “a sort of story the researcher tells 
about the associations observed in regression results”(2008). Under this interpretation the body 
of academic work becomes an agglomeration of compelling stories about sociopolitical events. 
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But these stories must be fact checked in so far as possible. The academic audience provides an 
initial test by sounding theoretical logic and examining statistical methods for flaws. Case study 
analysis, and other forms of qualitative research, subject hypotheses to further testing. Qualitative 
analysis allows researchers a closer look at the constant conjunction captured in quantitative 
models. In order to move beyond correlation, to provide a second test, case study analysis will 
evaluate the Idea of the State explanation.  
Case study analysis will accomplish three tasks. First, a close examination of cases will 
evaluate causal links presented in the previous chapter. Statistical analysis functioned at the level 
of sub-national statistics, of population figures, oblast-level budget outlays, and transit 
infrastructure connections. The case study will look at life on the ground in the Russian regions.  
Secondly, case study analysis will eliminate the threat of spurious correlation and omitted variable 
bias. The Idea of the State and Social Movement Studies include numerous structural protest 
drivers. Still, it is important to eliminate the possibility that decades of contentious politics 
research failed to consider a critical element.  And thirdly this phase of analysis will evaluate 
operational choices made in chapter 4.  Each independent variable was operationalized as 
optimally as possible given data constraints. An in-depth look at state-society dynamics will reveal 
which operationalizations were satisfactory, and which were not.  Conclusions will inform possible 
next generations of the regression model. 
This dissertation project in particular benefits from the qualitative approach. The Idea of 
the State posits a complex causal logic that traditional statistical models can only partially capture 
(Braumoeller 2003). Bennet and George (2005) identify several types of causal complexity. 
Causal relationships in the social sphere may be characterized by equifinality and complex 
interaction effects.  Russian protest events are characterized by both forms of complexity. The 
Idea of the State framework posits three paths to high onset potential. Low levels of coercive, 
cooptational, or cooperative state capacity may lead to high levels of onset. The framework does 
not, a priori, predict the superiority of any path in a given context.  
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As mentioned in the previous chapter, concerns surrounding dependent variable data 
further heighten the need for qualitative validation. I chose to work with activist data sources 
because mainstream alternatives are irreparably flawed. Mass-scale aggregators were either 
dramatically under-representative (SPEED) or characterized by staggering numbers of false 
positives (GDELT). Two available alternatives are not free from problems. A brief comparison 
exercise revealed a partial lack of overlap between namarsh.ru and the collective action institute 
(ikd.com). Taken alone, neither data source appears to completely reflect the reality of modern 
protest in the Russian federation. Experts in the field have argued that, despite incompleteness, 
namarsh.ru provides a representative protest dataset; while the total number of events may not 
reflect reality, the relative positions of sub-regional onset frequencies do (Lankina and Voznaya 
2015). By tracing the causal processes in Russian sub-regions this chapter’s case study analysis 
will address potentially spurious correlation generated by incomplete—though likely 
representative—data.  
So, a qualitative exercise is needed to increase the credibility of the story provided in 
chapter five.  With methodological motivation established, the task turns to selection. Many 
different types of case study analysis are available, designed for different purposes and for 
different research phases. Bennet and George describe two “very different” approaches to case 
study analysis (2005). Process induction appears in the early phases of research. Researchers 
thoroughly explore several cases in an attempt to identify causal mechanisms as a baseline for 
theory crafting and future hypothesis testing. Process verification, the second approach, is a 
means to evaluate correlational relationships. In the study of the resource curse and intra-state 
war, a researcher would evaluate established findings in, say, an oil-rich, conflict-ridden country. 
Process verification serves to eliminate spurious correlation, and facilitates investigation into 
variable operationalization.  
To further test the causal story presented in the previous chapter, I will conduct a process 
verification exercise while employing the method of difference. John Stuart Mill’s logical 
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framework, developed over 150 years ago, remains popular within the academic community 
(Sprinz and Wolinsky-Nahmias 2004). The method of difference, or most similar system design, 
identifies a structure of drivers in which all elements but one correspond and the outcome 
variable differs. Mill’s method of correspondence, most different system design, reverses the 
configuration. Here, all elements but one differ, and the dependent variable outcome is consistent 
between cases.  Both approaches logically “control” for comparable elements, offering a rough 
analogue of experimental logic. The refined lens of qualitative research first evaluates logical 
conditions: are the two cases, in fact, most similar or most different systems? The approach then 
moves on to evaluate the causal role of each independent variable. Such “structured, focused 
comparisons” facilitate hypothesis testing (George and Bennett 2005).  
I consider the following combination of George and Bennett’s and Mill’s conceptions a 
type of theory guided process tracing (TGPT). Sociologist Ronald Aminzade (1993) provides a 
definition of TGPT. According to Aminzade, the researcher has to provide “theoretically explicit 
narratives that carefully trace and compare the sequences of events constituting the process” 
(1993, 108) of interest. By making the theoretical framework explicit, explanatory logic is not lost 
amid the chronicle of events.  My case study analysis is focused and analytically driven. Purely 
historical accounts paint a rich picture while engaging audience attention. Case study analysis 
takes history and casts it into an explanation, couched in theoretical variables developed 
previously. 
Analytical Narrative: Idea of the State 
A most similar systems design process tracing exercise will test hypotheses derived from 
the Idea of the State framework for a second time. It will trace the occurrence of protest events in 
two Russian sub-regions. In each case, I will focus attention on three factors: the cause driving 
protest actions, government response, and the actors responsible for organization. I will further 
look for ways to improve the structural model. Before moving into case studies, this section will 
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briefly reiterate each of the hypotheses. Here I also reiterate quantitative findings and variable 
operationalization. 
The first dimension of state capacity, coercive capacity, casts the government as 
enforcer. This is Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan.  Coercive capacity is high when the state effectively 
shapes subjects’ behavior through force or the threat of force.  Coercion is represented by police 
officers standing on corners, prison facilities looming outside city limits, and video surveillance 
cameras hanging on eaves.  As the state’s ability to repress increases, frequency of protest 
should decrease. Regression analysis did not support the hypothesized positive relationship 
between crime rates and protest onset. 
The second dimension of state capacity casts the government as provider, provider of the 
social safety net and predictable rules of the game. The Idea of the State describes cooptation 
capacity as the ability buy off citizens, to win loyalty, through the provision of public goods. 
Protest frequency should decline as government education, health and, employment programs 
grow.  Regression analysis supported the hypothesized negative relationship between social 
spending and protest onset. 
The third and final dimension of state capacity shifts to the realm of ideas. Again the 
state’s aspect morphs, this time to government as embodiment of national sentiment. By 
appealing to emotions of trust and duty, the government creates an atmosphere of cooperation 
between rulers and the ruled. In the Russian case red-clad mother Rodina, brandishing war 
recruitment orders, vividly offers a symbol of cooperative capacity. This side of capacity is the 
most difficult to get an empirical handle on, here operationalized as percent of the vote won by 
the dominant United Russia party. Regression results did not support the hypothesized negative 
relationship between vote share and protest onset. 
Moving to the triad of theories from Social Movement Studies, grievance theory captures 
socioeconomic contexts in which would-be activists live.  As living conditions deteriorate, more 
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and more protest events should occur as anger and frustration find outlet. The primary 
operationalization, unemployment rates, was positively and significantly related to protest onset. 
Social mobilization capacity theory ties protest onset to catalyzing networks and 
resources. Symbols become active civil society organizations and social entrepreneurs, 
individuals, like Alexei Navalny or Gary Kasparov, dedicated to organizing dissident opinion. And 
as society’s ability to organize resistance increases, frequency of protest should increase. 
Negative binomial regression analysis revealed a positive correlation between population size 
and urbanization, and onset. A more focused operationalization, student population, was not 
significantly linked to onset frequency. Alternatives based on public transit infrastructure similarly 
failed to produce significant results. 
Political opportunity structure places explanatory power with electoral system 
accessibility and responsiveness.  As locals direct demands and hopes for change into traditional 
political channels, impetus for civil disobedience should dissipate.  The operationalization, the 
Carnegie Institute’s Openness Index, was not significantly related to protest onset frequency. 
The statistical results dictate the form of the following narratives. Explanations of protest 
frequency, couched in the complex analytical framework, test the casual story provided in the 
previous chapter. The exercise will evaluate reliability of quantitative results, while also identifying 
possible improvements to the model.  
I will utilize the analytical power of the paired comparison to thoroughly test the proposed 
relationship between public spending and protest frequency. As mentioned in Chapter 1, insights 
from state capacity theory, and particular state capacity to coopt, are absent from much Social 
Movement Studies work. Published attempts to explain protest frequency across Russian sub-
regions, few and incomplete (Voznaya and Lankina 2015), all fail to consider cooptational 
capacity. Moreover, cooptational capacity, especially as operationalized as public spending is a 
short-term tool, directly under leadership control.  
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Paired Comparison: Novosibirsk and Krasnoyarsk 
Any case study must begin with a definition. Depending on the research question at 
hand, a case can take the form of a military intervention, a government project, a country, an 
individual, a decade, a year, or a century.  Here, the phenomenon of interest is protest frequency 
in the recent past. I thus define a case as the complete chronicle of protest of events occurring in 
a federal subject over the years 2007-2010. Due to length constraints I exclude three years 
included in statistical analysis, 2011, 2012, and 2013. To constitute a process verification 
exercise, suitable federal subjects must exhibit the hypothesized outcome, at least some level of 
protest.  Furthermore, in order to set up Mill’s logical test, the subjects must differ in outcome 
magnitude, and differ across all hypothesized drivers minus one. As mentioned above, I 
thoroughly test the hypothesis concerning state cooptational capacity: the more generously local 
government provides for citizens, the less likely citizens will protest. A pair of federal subjects 
should exhibit differing levels of social spending. Scanning the eighty four federal subjects 
Novosibirsk Oblast and Krasnoyarsk Krai are the most suitable pair. The subjects’ profiles are 
similar with the exception of social spending and protest frequency. As an additional control for 
variation, Novosibirsk and Krasnoyarsk are located in Siberia and share a border.  
Constructing the narratives, I supplement original activist reports with activist and 
mainstream sources. The additional support will address two threats to inference. Triangulation 
between sources reduces the threat of activist fabrication. And increasing the number of sources 
addresses the threat raised by incomplete data. Source materials include articles from the 
Collective Action Institute’s ikd.ru, the Communist Party’s kprf.ru, and local newspapers Soviet 
Siberia, Evening Novosibirsk, Krasnoyarsk Newspaper, and Our Krasnoyarsk among others. As a 
secondary reason, in addition to length concerns, data availability drives my choice to focus on 
years 2007-2010:  the collective action institute curtailed reporting activities significantly 
beginning in 2011.  
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Each case contains numerous protest actions. Concretely, over thirty individual protest 
actions occurred in Krasnoyarsk, and nearly sixty in neighboring Novosibirsk. Each case thus 
contains numerous actors, numerous grievances and numerous government responses. An 
organizational technique is required to effectively, and clearly, trace protest developments over 
the four-year time period. Proceeding year by year, I will first introduce the types of events 
occurring. An initial overview of source material revealed two broad categories: quality of life 
protests, and ideologically-driven protests. Under each heading I will work through three 
questions: Who are the protestors? What are they protesting? Was there a response from the 
government? Using the Idea of the State as an analytical lens, I will discuss the drivers of each 
broad category, paying particular attention to catalysts and mitigating factors.  
2007 
Novosibirsk 
2007 provides an initial look at Siberian protest dynamics. Perhaps the most striking 
takeaway from the first year is the sheer diversity of events. The analytical framework offered by 
the Idea of the State helps bring order to the description, but the range of drivers, actors, and 
responses remains vast. Any ability to draw conclusions without descending to the contextual 
level would be analytically powerful for precisely this reason. The section will describe events in 
Novosibirsk, before moving on to Krasnoyarsk.  
In Novosibirsk, over the course of the year, particular events and a general deterioration 
in living conditions drove protestors to the streets. Price increases in information and 
communication technology, specifically telephone network services, triggered several marches. 
Activists wryly warned locals of an impending New Year’s present: a new system of phone 
payment (Novaya Gazyeta 2007, Kasparov.ru 2007a).The local telecom giant, Sibertelecom, 
chose to raise per-minute costs for landline usage throughout the oblast.  Those most affected 
were multi-child families, pensioners, and the handicapped, according to reports. As the year 
proceeded, breadth of protestor grievances expanded. The local Communist Party organized 
 
 
  211   
    
against a rise in cost of living. Protestor slogans specifically focused attention on housing-related 
expenses and Sibertelecom’s decision(Kasparov.ru 2007c). Concern over quality of life drove 
pensioners to take part in several protest actions over the course of the year. Participants 
demanded “a right to life and a right to suitable pension,” suitable to keep up with high apartment 
maintenance costs (Kotenkov 2007). Aside from housing cost, housing investment schemes 
spread discontent across Russia in 2007. In many cities defrauded investors took to the streets in 
response to a widespread pyramid scheme (Kasparov.ru 2007d; Petrenko 2007). Those 
responsible were arrested, but protestors demanded government compensation. The national 
attention inspired local victims of real estate fraud to speak up. Novosibirsk residents, defrauded 
in the same way, by a different company, connected themselves to the movement with a hunger 
strike (Ikd.ru 2007a). Three additional groups took a focused approach to improving their quality 
of life. Bread deliverers (Ikd.ru 2007b) and grain producers (Vasiliva 2007) separately struck for 
pay increases. Automobile owners protests rising gas prices and poorly maintained roads 
(Kasparov.ru 2007k). And in Akademgorodok, a small university enclave outside of the capital 
city, students resisted a pay implementation for web access(Kasparov.ru 2007e). 
Who organized these events? The main organizer of quality of life protests was the 
Communist Party. The Communists demonstrated the ability to serve as an umbrella for activist 
groups. Actions against the Siberian telecommunications company were organized by the party’s 
so-called committee of solidarity action, which included two related movements. The Avant Guard 
of Red Youth (AKM) is a social offshoot of the party dedicated to politicizing fights for pay, 
adequate housing, access to health and educational services—or in short “battle against any form 
of exploitation” (AKM Novosibirsk 2017). Working Russia is a similar offshoot dedicated to 
publicizing social injustice. The group was formed after the fall of the USSR as a Moscow-based 
organization and spread throughout the oblasts. In addition to party affiliates a local women’s 
collective, Kindness, and the union of retired army officers participated. Pensioners organized 
several events themselves, under the name “The Social Council for Pensioners in Novosibirsk,” 
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or just the Social Council (Hamraeva 2011). More narrowly defined groups also played an 
organizational role. Investors held their hunger strike indoors, connecting to the national 
movement through media attention. Bread drivers organized thanks to the group’s unions. Grain 
producers self-organized and marched with support from locals near the factory. The automobile 
owners used the internet to found a social action group.  And students rallied without additional 
support in the forest enclave.    
What kind of response did the events evoke from local leadership? The initial push from 
protests won government attention. Officials voiced empathy and publicly discussed increasing 
payouts for benefits tied to phone lines. Hope quickly dissipated. The telecommunications 
contract was approved by the government, and is now in force in the area. State responses to 
Communist and pensioner gatherings took the form of soft repression. Protests were sanctioned, 
but limited to thirty participants. Across protests police presence observed the events, but no 
arrests were reported. Events were, furthermore, subject to a local law banning sound 
amplification of any sort at public demonstrations. Local leadership also demonstrated state 
capacity to coopt. The bread transporters were able win a positive outcome. The company 
agreed to negotiations with the drivers’ union, and after a series of talks, offered a wage increase 
as well as inflation-indexed pay. Novosibirsk politicians arbitrated the negotiations. 
A second set of protests arose from ideological concerns, rather than living conditions. 
Movement entrepreneurs made their voices heard in several incidents. Members of the coalition 
“The Other Russia” tried to spread awareness.  Along with leading marches, activists distributed 
pamphlets informing readers of developments related to the national movement “March of the 
Dissidents” (Kasparov.ru 2007g). Participants quizzed passers-by on their knowledge of local 
oppositional politics and were subsequently granted an interview on the largest local radio station. 
The group further established a presence in the area with weekly discussions in a jazz café under 
the name “the pipe” (Kasparov.ru 2007h). In Akademgorodok a string of protests arose against 
planned construction and deforestation (Solovyova 2007). Group organizers rallied local support 
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for green space and ecological conservation through signature gathering. Participants specifically 
voiced their displeasure with the un-inclusive nature of construction plans, informed exclusively 
by local government officials and construction firms. 
Social movement entrepreneurs were members of several activist organizations. The 
Other Russia is an umbrella term used to describe followers of founding members, Gary 
Kasparov, the politician Mikhail Kasyanov, and the writer Eduard Limonov. The organization, 
often represented in logos as a grenade, formed in 2006 as a vehicle to unite dissident political 
groups, particularly liberals, economic reformers, and nationalists, roughly represented by the 
three founding members. Limonov attempted to establish the group as an official political party in 
2010, before impending elections. The attempt did not succeed, and The Other Russia has since 
been banned as an extremist group (Lenta 2012). The ecological protests were organized by the 
Novosibirsk Housing Initiative, a group dedicated to preserving green space across the region. 
After the initial protest two local groups added their support to the cause: Protest City-Forest 
Akademgorodok and the small group Academ-garden are two narrowly-focused groups centered 
in the university enclave. 
Reported government response was minor. March of the Dissidents literature distribution 
continued without repressive response. The Novosibirsk state did however challenge The Other 
Russia’s support structures with attacks on the media and the internet. The oblast attorney 
ordered local providers to block access to several sites deemed extremist in his opinion 
(Kasparov.ru 2007g). The move was reversed by local courts shortly after its introduction. In a 
more effective move, a television host was fired and his show cancelled after discussing protests 
and protestor demands in the oblast (Kasparov.ru 2007h). The forest protests ended 
disappointingly for protestors. Groups supporting the action were invited to a meeting but 
reportedly ignored entirely (Solovyova 2007). 
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Krasnoyarsk 
Events in Krasnoyarsk in 2007 continue to demonstrate the interaction between state and 
society. Driving factors were roughly similar across the two regions, and several of the 
Novosibirsk protests saw a reflection in the neighboring region.  Krasnoyarsk’s leadership, 
however, appeared more willing to respond to protests, both with batons and with offers of 
appeasement.   
Quality of life concerns drove a variety of groups to the streets over the course of 2007. 
The telephone pricing change evoked protest in the northern region. Again the local Communist 
Party organized resistance to the impending decision from Sibertelecom (Kasparov.ru 2007b). 
And again financial and employment concerns catalyzed several protests. Unlike in Novosibirsk 
though, reported events were all focused on narrowly-defined grievances.  A group gathered to 
voice opposition to a planned increase in public transportation fees (Kasparov.ru 2007l). A 
nationwide ban on gambling halls evoked a similar reaction. Those picketing were not gamblers, 
but employees. Among placards outside of casinos appeared slogans, “give us the right to work,” 
and “we need to pay for housing” (Kasparov.ru 2007j). Construction workers initiated a march and 
hunger strike to demand back pay after their employer’s bankruptcy (Kasparov.ru 2007n), as did 
workers at a heavy machinery factory (Kasparov.ru 2007f). Housing concerns again spurred a 
string of protests. In a small village, inhabitants protested a forced relocation by the government. 
Korkino was a labor town outside of an aluminum refinement factory. When the factory closed 
and was demolished, the town was declared unfit for inhabitants. Those with deeds to homes 
were awarded housing elsewhere. Those without deeds received nothing other than an order to 
vacate (Ikd.ru 2007d). In another case military families kicked off a hunger strike after a zoning 
law change reduced the number of apartments designated for veterans  (Kasparov.ru 2007m). 
Echoing Novosibirsk, defrauded investors “sat in” at an unfinished construction site and invited 
journalists to witness their occupation (Ikd.ru 2007c). 
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Reactions from Krasnoyarsk government, when reported, offer a clear look at 
cooptational capacity in action.  The telecom gatherings did not elicit any response according to 
sources. During the price hike protest, participants were allowed to carry on in peace. Police 
stood by but did not intervene—despite the fact that events were unsanctioned (Kasparov.ru 
2007b). Two of the professional groups won concessions.  Workers at the Krasnoyarsk heavy 
machinery factory reportedly went without pay for eight months. Through their union the workers 
called attention to the fact that they had kept production lines open throughout this lengthy period. 
Under threat of impending strike, the group directly asked for government intervention. Mayor Lev 
Kuznetzov acquiesced, initiating payment transfers almost immediately (Kasparov.ru 2007f). 
Workers for the state-owned construction company also received concessions. Government 
officials offered a deal: rather than receiving money, the aggrieved workers would have their back 
pay deducted from personal debts and credited towards future housing bills. Some workers 
accepted the deal and others carried out a fruitless hunger strike. One of the three housing 
complaints won a conciliatory response from local government. The former aluminum factory 
workers were awarded housing ownership certificates and paid transfer to an inhabitable region 
(KPRF News 2007).  
Ideological protests in Krasnoyarsk arose in response to perceived government 
illegitimacy, often connecting with nation-wide movements.  In 2007 March of the Dissidents held 
a large anti-Putin rally in Moscow. In many oblasts around the country displays of solidarity arose, 
including in Krasnoyarsk (Kasparov.ru 2007i). Six months after the first action, and in the face of 
increasing opposition, organizers once again took their message to the streets (Skovorodnikov 
2007). Protestors voiced outrage against the ruling regime, and particularly against restriction of 
freedom of expression and freedom of assembly in public places. Local supports of the March 
organized another show of solidarity against Duma election results. Protestors refused to 
acknowledge results carried out under conditions of “complete falsification and government terror” 
(Kasparov.ru 2007o). Towards the end of the year The Other Russia and the Krasnoyarsk 
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Communist youth movement organized a so-called “Wake for the Constitution.” Organizers 
picketed outside of the local parliament, where participants performed a dramatic reading of 
constitutional articles guaranteeing freedom of expression and movement in the Russian 
Federation (Kasparov.ru 2007i). 
Unlike in Novosibirsk, the Krasnoyarsk local government reacted to protests with 
repressive force. Initially the Krasnoyarsk manifestation of March of the Dissidents was prohibited 
based on a fictional conflict of interest. Government representatives claimed that an ecological 
protest was already approved for the same date and time. No such event occurred. The 
discontents gathered in the free square, where they met an overwhelming police presence. 
Reports described around 100 protestors observed closely by around 1000 armed police officers. 
No arrests were reported (Kasparov.ru 2007i). Repressive response was not absent. Repression 
simply began before the event, or took place well afterwards. Two days before the march, two 
high-profile activists were arrested while handing out fliers. Two of the participants, The Other 
Russia Duma candidate Rim Shaigalimov, and organizer Catherine Fatyahova, were arrested in 
their homes. Police charged the pair with distributing extremist literature and thoroughly searched 
the premises. Several days later another activist was detained and questioned while handing out 
Other Russia stickers (Skovorodnikov 2007). Undeterred, the protestors provoked the latent 
threat looming over the first meeting.  A coalition of police and special forces tactfully dispersed 
the second March of the Dissidents solidary action. Supporters walking towards the central 
square met road blocks and law enforcement encouraging them to avoid the center of town. Party 
leaders awoke to cordons preventing them from leaving their homes (Skovorodnikov 2007). One 
amusing example underscores the atmosphere in the oblast in 2007. The dramatic reading, a 
response to increasing regional tension, again brought threat without action. A bus full of police 
watched the entire performance (Kasparov.ru 2007i).   
Again, who organized the events? The organizer profile resembles that of Novosibirsk.  
The Communist Party played primary role in telecommunications protest, with support from the 
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Krasnoyarsk chapters of The Other Russia and the Avant-Garde of Communist Youth. The 
principle organizers of the transportation picket were again the Communist Party, with assistance 
this time from the local pensioners. The worker-led events, on the other hand, were not supported 
by local political parties. The blackjack dealers and their colleagues, construction workers, and 
factory workers organized without assistance. Of the three groups, the factory workers alone 
organized with the help of a union. The various groups protesting housing travails similarly 
operated within a narrow circle of participants and organizers. The Other Russia clearly drove the 
ideological protests, with no reported support from the main branch of the Communist Party. 
Additional supporters of the cause were the Revolutionary-Patriotic Union of Krasnoyarsk (РПСК) 
a group consisting of Working Krasnoyarsk, a group of Communist activists not officially linked to 
the party, and a women’s rights group. 
Summary 
Applying the Idea of the State analytical framework, several takeaways emerge through 
the swirl of events. Many protests went ignored by local government, at least according to 
material from activist and mainstream news media. Other protests received a promise for 
cooperation that proved empty, as in the cases of Sibertelecom’s price plan change and Academ-
Garden’s deforestation movement in Novosibirsk. Reported responses reveal a potential pattern. 
Grievance-driven protests were addressed with cooptational responses, whereas repressive 
responses appeared in response to ideologically-driven, social-entrepreneur-organized events. 
Furthermore, efforts to discourage or limit gathering in both sub-regions demonstrate the softer 
side of repression. Caps on attendance and bans on amplification check protestor actions without 
offering direct resistance, as do claims of occupied public spaces, and public festival 
cancellations. 
Furthermore, leadership in the northern-most Siberian subject appears more willing to 
employ cooptation and coercion.  Krasnoyarsk responded to demands of construction workers, 
heavy machinery factory workers, displaced veterans, and displaced workers. Novosibirsk 
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responded similarly to demands of grain producers. In each instance, aggrieved segments of the 
population received monetary or in-kind compensation, in exchange for which they ceased 
protest activity. At this point, evidence does not clearly indicate that Krasnoyarsk is more prone to 
buying-off dissidents. Novosibirsk did not experience housing displacement of particularly the 
same type. The bread delivery workers did go unrewarded, however, unlike all such worker-
initiated events in the northern region. Krasnoyarsk leadership also seems to have employed 
harsher tactics. Repressive state capacity was visible in response to Other Russia’s planned 
gathering a march. In Novosibirsk, the group limited behavior to educational pamphlet 
distribution, and went unmolested, with the exception of censorship.  
2008 
Novosibirsk 
In 2008, the majority of protest events centered on inflation, satisfactory employment, and 
calls to replace the ruling United Russia party. Housing disputes, ecological concerns, animal 
cruelty, and freedom of expression likewise drove people to the streets. Despite exhibiting fewer 
events, Krasnoyarsk again reported more examples of effective cooptational state capacity. The 
second year also produces a crosscutting comparison of the two regions, thanks to a common 
grievance and differing responses.   
Quality of life protests continued in Novosibirsk.  A series of protest marches erupted 
throughout the oblast in response to price increases. Over the course of 2007 the oblast’s 
statistical service reported increases to consumer goods, public transportation, housing costs, 
and child care services (HGS Novosti 2008). Participants marched with posters, crying out 
against “Communal Robbery,” and “Medvedev’s key project—price increases” (Kasparov.ru 
2008b). Various groups voiced a need to cope with the changing, challenging socioeconomic 
environment. The Communist party and unions demanded increases in wages and increases in 
housing assistance (KPRF News 2008b). Inhabitants working in the auto-transport industry 
organized a set of disruptive actions. Heavy freight drivers parked trucks around a main square, 
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adorned with slogans protesting gas price increases (Kasparov.ru 2008g). The difficult economic 
climate cut across organizational boundaries. After Communist Party groups organized a follow-
up meeting, pensioners and auto driver unions gathered nearby to echo displeasure with inflation 
(Kasparov.ru 2008i). Aside from the joint event groups waged their own campaigns. Auto-workers 
faced sources of grievance not directly related to price changes. A group of municipal bus drivers 
refused to work until wage arrears were paid (Ikd.ru 2008a). Another protest targeted a monopoly 
on service driving jobs, leading to a hunger strike. A local competition for government 
transportation contracts was opened only to groups owning a large number of vehicles, blocking 
participation of small-scale groups (KPRF News 2008d). Pensioners too held their own set of 
protests, demanding a dignified life and a right to affordable housing. In a particularly alarming 
example, at one of the protests, an elderly pensioner immolated himself to call attention to 
injustice (PolitSibr 2008, Kasparov.ru 2008j). After the immolation gatherings continued, at which 
calls for better living conditions intertwined with memorials for the dead man (Ikd.ru 2008g, Ikd.ru 
2008h).  
The majority of protests passed without response from the government, positive or 
negative, according to media sources. None of the price increase protests sparked a response. 
Neither concerns over the driving job monopoly nor concerns over fuel availability were 
addressed. Interestingly, the auto-transport protests explicitly called to emulate Krasnoyarsk’s 
approach. Protestors called governor Victor Tolokonski to create a working group dedicated to 
mitigating fuel market fluctuations (KPRF News 2008c). No response was forthcoming. State 
reactions in 2008 included one example of repression and one example of cooptation. Pensioner 
protests brought a harsh government response. After the self-immolation incident, Novosibirsk 
leadership began to employ repressive tactics. Participants in follow-up protests were themselves 
arrested, when turning the dead man’s portrait into a rallying symbol. The official cause for arrest 
was leading an “unsanctioned gathering” (Ikd.ru 2008g). Municipal bus drivers, on the other hand, 
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won a positive response from the government. After a weeklong hunger strike workers  received 
unpaid wages (Ikd.ru 2008a).  
Ideological protests in 2008 centered on local issues, while also connecting to nationwide 
events. In many cities across Russia activists gathered to take part in the Communist Party’s “All 
Russian” protest event. In Novosibirsk the event took the form of several anti-Putin, pro-Gennady 
Zyuganov demonstrations. Rallying cries included “Putin Raises Prices, Zyuganov lowers them!” 
and “no lousy teddy bear, we choose Zyuganov” (KPRF News 2008a). Organizers looked to 
garner support for a future presidential campaign, while drawing on a well of dissatisfaction. Calls 
for social justice united a broad swath of concerns, focused against the ruling United Russian 
party. Ecological activists and labor organizers voiced their rejection of the dominant political 
milieu (Ikd.ru 2008b).  The ecologist sub-contingent spread their message at several events 
throughout the year (Kasparov.ru 2008d). The new round of actions took place in the city center 
as well as in  Akademgorodok, as activists pushed to declare the micro-region a center of culture 
heritage, a place free of new construction (Kasparov.ru 2008h). At protests dedicated to 
preventing deforestation ecological activists attempted to rely on in anti-corruption sentiment 
present in the area. Activists attempted to join forces with children’s rights activists protesting 
against corrupt orphanage management (Kasparov.ru 2008d).  
Responses to ideological protests continue to demonstrate hard and soft forms of 
coercive state capacity.  As in the case of material protests, no responses were reported to the 
Communist-led events, nor were arrests. The green space protests brought a crackdown, of 
particularly disingenuous design. One of the organizers was sent to solitary confinement for 
overdue book fees.  Others were arrested, under charges of assaulting a public representative 
during what was deemed an unsanctioned gathering. Activists reported that this cynical charge 
was the result of police assaulting a protestor, perhaps receiving scratches in the process (Ikd.ru 
2008f). The activists’ trial lasted over a year, with the court eventually assigning eighteen months 
of provisional arrest and six months of community service (NGS Novosti 2009).  
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Again the local Communist Party took the lead, organizing many quality of life as well as 
ideological protests. A number of leftist youth groups loosely tied to the party took part in actions. 
The smaller groups, in contrast to the official party, took part in ecological protests as well. The 
offshoots include, Working Russia, АКМ, and РКСМ, an Other Russian youth movement (KPRF 
News 2008a). The green space protests were primarily organized by a movement known as 
“Protectors of City-Forest Akademgorodok,” formed after construction reduced the square footage 
of forest by 600 hectares from 2006 to 2009. The group is informal with a stable core, comprised 
of two chemists, a local politician, and an artist. Activists rely on public demonstrations and 
petition signature gathering (Ikd.ru 2008f).  The corruption protests were organized by those 
working in a condemned orphanage, as well as the local chapter of women’s group Russia’s 
Hope (Kasparov.ru 2008d).  
Krasnoyarsk 
In Krasnoyarsk, in 2008, strands of grievance continue from the previous year, and new 
grievances arose. Quality of life protests echoed those reported previously, while ideological 
protests seem to have been connected to a single event: Duma elections held in December of 
2007. 
Like in the preceding year, the northern Siberian province saw narrowly-focused quality 
of life protests and housing conflicts. Workers at an aluminum refinement plant marched and 
threatened to strike, demanding unpaid wages(Ikd.ru 2008c). A hunger strike at a mine erupted 
as a machinist group, Octoberists, refused to vacate the professional committee building (Ikd.ru 
2008e). Airline workers were fired and demanded pay from the government. They marched in 
response and threatened to organize their own hunger strike (Ikd.ru 2008i). Automobile owners’ 
actions in the two federal subjects offer a clear parallel. While protests in Novosibirsk opposed 
fuel price hikes, activists in Krasnoyarsk convened a show of support for ongoing discussions 
between politicians and activists, hoping to find a cooperative solution(Kasparov.ru 2008e).  
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Ideologically-driven protests centered on legitimacy complaints targeting the ruling party. 
Disputed elections played the catalyzing role. The Other Russia broadly declared the 5
th
 duma 
gathering illegitimate. The political coalition penned an open letter to Krai leadership, in which 
they outlined violations of the Russian constitution as well as norms of international human rights. 
To spread their message, leaders organized a so-called Bread Revolt in the central town square. 
Participants revolted against price increases, living services and gasoline, in addition to bread.  
However, the demands were couched in a broader attack on an illegitimate political system. 
Organizers distributed political literature, arguing that a political system in which the people do not 
choose their leaders breeds social ills (Kasparov.ru 2008c). Later in the year The Other Russia 
tried to unite the local opposition. At an anti-United Russia event organizers announced the 
formation of the Revolutionary Patriotic Union of Krasnoyarsk, a group including Communist 
youth groups and members of the Communist Party, in addition to the core members of Other 
Russia (Ikd.ru 2008d). The remaining reported ideological protests were not related to politics, 
local or national. Members of Krasnoyarsk’s gothic sub-culture marched in response to school 
rules  prohibiting visible tattoos and piercing during school hours (Kasparov.ru 2008f).  
Organizers of protest activities in Krasnoyarsk include primarily groups identified in the 
previous year. Industry-specific payment grievances spurred workers to organize, with the help of 
professional unions. The housing protest saw occupants themselves joined by a subset of the 
Other Russia coalition, Working Krasnoyarsk and the Communist youth group AKM. As reported 
in 2007, Other Russia was responsible for organizing the bulk of ideological protests. The 
clearest difference from the previous year is the absence of reported Communist Party 
organizational pressure in either quality of life or ideological protests.  While the official branch 
was absent, unofficial offshoots took part. 
Government responses towards material and ideological protests expose a sharp 
dissimilarity.  On the quality of life side, Krasnoyarsk leadership produced two powerful examples 
of non-repressive state capacity. The society of auto-owners refused to take part in a larger wave 
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of protests because they agreed to cooperate with leadership. Representatives of the local 
department of economic planning and industry participated in a roundtable discussion with activist 
leader Ivan Smolin. The discussants announced that Krai officials would pressure representatives 
of RosNeft, the oil company, to increase delivery to the local market. As a second prong of the 
strategy, the transport activists worked with local government to send a bill to the federal level 
that would allow more local control over fuel taxes (Kasparov.ru 2008a). The local government 
showed cooptation power in the case of airline workers, as well as at the aluminum plant. Local 
transport minister called a meeting with airline company KrasAir and the union leader. The three 
parties came to an elegant solution. Fired workers changed their status to voluntary retirement, in 
exchange for guaranteed severance packages. Faced with the mere threat of protest activity, the 
power plant owners agreed to bargain. An agreement produced a schedule of back pay 
fulfillment. In an interesting turn, the concern’s representative refused to name the source of new 
funds, claiming he was able to attract “strategic investors.” Source indicate that Krai government 
was the mysterious savior (Ikd.ru 2008i). Negotiations between the union and factory leadership, 
produced a raise in average pay and a promise to renovate worker quarters (SoyuzSevodnya 
2008).  
The participants in ideological protests experienced the iron fist aspect of state capacity. 
As reported in 2007, several leaders of Other Russia were arrested during or after attending 
events. One of the leaders even received a yearlong sentence. Charges under which activists 
were tried include “public calls to social extremism” (Kasparov.ru 2008k). Krasnoyarsk authorities 
continued to challenge freedom of speech. One member of Other Russia was arrested and 
detained for two weeks for publishing obscene language to an internet message board 
(Kasparov.ru 2008l). 
Summary 
The pattern of responses evident in 2007 once again appears. Many events received no 
response. Quality of life protests received cooptational responses. And ideological protests 
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received repressive responses. Both regions demonstrated the willingness to coopt disaffected 
professional groups. Novosibirsk leadership gave in to municipal drivers demands for higher 
wages. Krasnoyarsk leadership orchestrated negotiations and an eventual conclusion between 
an airline company and employees. In Krasnoyarsk aluminum workers also won concessions 
from factory owners. In the south ecological activists experienced arrests and physical abuse 
from law enforcement. In the north Other Russia remained a target of such actions, as well as 
censorship. As an exception, pensioners began to face arrest after merging their push for decent 
living conditions with memorials for the immolated man. Again it is difficult to judge the 
inclinations of the two local governments. In Novosibirsk, in Krasnoyarsk, government responded 
to some events, not to others, and catalysts vary in the two regions.  
This year, however, in 2008, a cross-cutting grievance offers a telling comparison. Over 
the course of the year, in Novosibirsk, Communists, auto-owners, and pensioners held events in 
protest of price increases, together and in smaller groups. Sources did not report a state 
response. In Krasnoyarsk, the state successfully preempted auto-owner protests by engaging in 
cooperative negotiations. Auto-owners’ explicit call to emulate the cooperative process 
strengthens the contrast. Other than the auto-enthusiasts Krasnoyarsk did not witness inflation 
protests. Of course it is possible that price levels were not comparable across the regions. 
According to the RossStat, though, official levels of commercial goods and services inflation 
deviating by less than one percentage point in every month of the year (GKS, 2016). 
2009 
Novosibirsk 
With a third year of analysis, clearer patterns in protest dynamics begin to appear. 
Novosibirsk continued to see unrest driven by high cost of living and worker demands for higher 
pay or liquidation of back pay. Quality of life protests continued to be occasionally coopted. 
Ideological protests continue to be occasionally repressed.  
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Problems of the previous years continued to emerge in Novosibirsk in 2009. Several 
protests explicitly targeted housing prices. A group of dissatisfied tenants demanded rezoning of 
their apartment building to win city subsidies (Kasparov.ru 2009e), and a pensioner-led protest 
called attention to unsustainable rent and maintenance costs (Ikd.ru 2009a). Automobile owners 
played a role in the battle against untenable living conditions. Activists organized a march against 
housing and housing services prices, gas prices and gas taxes (Lebentsev 2009). The auto-
owners then organized a set of separate protests narrowly focused on gas prices (Aksenova 
2009). For the third straight year a number of professional groups also convened protest actions. 
Teachers struck and threatened a hunger strike, demanding greater compensation (Kasparov.ru 
2009d). Those working for an American-themed restaurant chain, New York Pizza, hit the streets 
together in order to demand back pay from their employer (Kasparov.ru 2009a). The service 
industry workers threatened mass walk-outs and threatened to sue the owners. In separate 
incidents security guards (Ikd.ru 2009b) and local national guard members threatened hunger 
strikes in the face of impending layoffs (Kasparov.ru 2009c). In two final examples of workplace 
unrest, workers at the Altai Tractor Factory (Krapotkina 2009), and the Linevski Construction 
company (Ikd.ru 2009d), picketed outside their company headquarters, demanding compensation 
for unpaid wages. Novosibirsk mothers focused a new source of grievances into a set of actions. 
The local March on Wheels saw a group of mothers strolling out their strollers to demand child 
care. Protestors’ primary demand was an increase in available spots in child care centers. More 
generally, however, the group protested budgetary relations towards women and families. 
According to the women’s slogans financial conditions effected the decision to have a second 
child. Despite the fact that the Russian constitution guarantees free public child care, before 
school age, thousands of children went without a spot in oblast classrooms (Vasiliva 2009c).  
Novosibirsk leadership did not respond to the majority of quality of life protests in 2008. 
And, ignored in previous years, auto-owners dissident actions were now met with repressive 
force. Despite the fact that auto-owners’ protest against price levels were approved by the 
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government, two of the group’s leaders, Alexei Umerenko and Sergei Kononov were arrested, for 
“failure to pay fines on time” (Aksenova 2009). After his release Kononov was again jailed. On the 
eve of a planned march he was placed in solitary confinement for “violating the peace” at a 
previous event. No conciliatory measures were forthcoming, and the Novosibirsk transportation 
department even decided to reduce spending on infrastructure maintenance (Vasiliva 2009a). Not 
all was bleak, however. The striking teachers canceled their action after winning a promise to sit 
down with lawmakers. The striking tractor assemblers saw their demands met in full. In their 
demands, the protestors cleverly leveraged the impending visit of then Prime Minister Putin. 
Failure to pay wages would incite a railroad blockade on the scheduled arrival day. Immediately 
before Putin’s arrival funds were dispersed to workers’ accounts. This instance lays the logic of 
cooptation bare. The signed agreement even includes legal language tying the repayment to 
cessation of further protest actions (KPRF News 2009). Striking workers at the construction 
company were not as fortunate, and the company filed for bankruptcy a year late. The pizza 
restaurant staff also failed to sway leadership. 
Ideologically-driven dissent continued in Novosibirsk across 2009. A nation-wide day of 
protest against United Russia included a local march in Novosibirsk (Druzhinin 2009). A march in 
remembrance of a murdered journalist, shot in Moscow, turned into a brawl when a group of 
nationalists engaged protestors (Ikd.ru 2009a). This year, however, the main flash point became 
tension between law enforcement and local residents. Activists gathered several times to call for 
wide-ranging reforms to police behavior in the region. Participants hoped to spread their message 
to politicians, residents, and members of law enforcement organizations. The local outrage 
appeared only after several cases of alleged brutality by members of the military and the police 
(Vasiliva 2009b). Later in the year a high-profile case brought Novosibirsk citizen-security 
organization relations to the fore.  A youth organizer, Artyem Loskutov, was arrested preparing to 
take part in the city’s annual “Monstration,” an apolitical demonstration of youth and creativity. He 
was only freed after protests in his defense in Saint Petersburg and Moscow. Support also came 
 
 
  227   
    
from high-profile anti-Putin deputy Ilya Ponamarev. Oblast courts refused to admit to wrongdoing, 
and upon his release Loskutov immediately organized a rally for police reform (Ikd.ru 2009f).  
Official responses were yet again largely absent. The anti-police brutality events saw a 
police presence accompany the marchers without intervention. Inaction turned to a form of 
repression in the nationalist attack. Sources report that police did nothing to discourage the 
violent attack against activists mourning the slain journalist (Ikd.ru 2009a). When a response did 
appear, in the Monstration case, repression appears to have been misguided. Artyem Loskutov 
was jailed under charges of possession of narcotic substances in large quantities. Official 
charges appeared several days after the arrest, and the young man claimed a bag of marijuana 
was planted on him. Loskutov himself interpreted his arrested as a preemptive attempt to 
discourage participation in social mobilization. He was not discouraged (Ikd.ru 2009f).  
Dissident acts in the southern Siberian oblast were organized by a rich array of groups, 
from well-established movements, to rising activist entrepreneurs, to single issue area groups. 
The auto-owners branded their organization TIGR and rallied members to protest gas prices. This 
year, however, they began offering support to causes well outside of their foundational area of 
concern. Solidarity sponsored the law enforcement reform protest, with support from “For Human 
Rights” and the Communist Youth Group AKM, as well as Communist party and Just Russia party 
members. Solidarity is a citizens’ rights movement founded by the slain politician Boris Nemtsov.  
The auto-owners’ movement pledged their support as well. TIGR even took part in rallies for 
accessible child health care. The March on Wheels was organized by a local movement under 
the name “Give Russian Children Access to Education.” As the name indicates, the group was 
formed in response to the issue at hand. Finally, the new, rising star in the activist community 
grabbed headlines even thousands of miles from Novosibirsk. The name Artyem Loskutov rang 
out in Moscow and Saint Petersburg over the course of the year as the activist attained the level 
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Krasnoyarsk 
Events in Krasnoyarsk in 2009 clearly demonstrate the power of protester demands. A 
promise to fulfill wage arrears brought an end to airline and factory dissent in 2008. Both workers 
were effectively coopted. As soon as the promises began to waver, protesters once again 
mobilized their threats. Cooptational state capacity, as would be expected, appears effective only 
when carried through to its conclusion. On the ideological side, protestors interpreted the 
mysterious death of a colleague as reason to fight, not succumb to repressive force.  
Two workplace conflicts led to protests in the region. In both cases local government 
initiated cooptational response in the previous year, in 2008. Once the promised aid began to 
disappear aggrieved citizens restarted their campaigns. The ongoing airline bankruptcy became 
the major source of contention in the region, and even across the country.  Unemployed 
stewardesses, baggage handlers, and ticket sellers returned to the streets after delays arose in 
the payment schedule negotiated the previous year.  The group decided to gather symbolically on 
a local holiday, the birthday of Krasnoyarsk’s aviation industry. Workers targeted local 
government to intervene with signs claiming “without a kopeck in our pockets,” and “we will fight 
to the end.” Without assistance, future actions were promised (Hadyezhdin 2009). A month after 
the initial action, gatherings moved to the nation’s capital. Workers repeated their claims in a 
central square in Moscow, paying particular attention to the fact that,  “the government is the 
primary stock holder in KrasAir” (Kasparov.ru 2009b). The battle continued in the oblast with a 
concurrent picket to support the capital campaign, and a hunger strike. Shortly thereafter 
electronic transfers began and actions ceased (Kasparov.ru 2009g). In a parallel case, workers at 
the Krasnoyarsk heavy machinery factory threatened to return to the streets after concessions 
ceased (Ikd.ru 2009c). 
The fluidity of government responses to the airline bankruptcy outlines a process of 
interaction between state and society. Several initial protests failed to elicit a response. The 
government only responded after a group of aggrieved workers enacted a hunger strike. 
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According to reports, at least several individuals reached critical condition, requiring 
hospitalization, before negotiations resumed (Kasparov.ru 2009g). Minister of Industry and 
Energy for the Krai met with representatives and agreed to initiate a transfer of funds. When the 
promised funds failed to appear immediately, the hunger strike continued. When the threat of 
death materialized, when more stewardesses were hospitalized, the funds materialized as well. 
Two months after the agreement the company filed for bankruptcy (Lenta Novosti 2009).  As 
before, Krasnoyarsk leadership intervened in the factory protest. The mayor ordered the company 
to declare bankruptcy, and organized partial compensation of worker debts (Ikd.ru 2009c).  
Ideologically-driven protests emerged in response to a specific incident occurring in 
Krasnoyarsk. On June 30 Rim Shaigalimov was pronounced dead in a Krasnoyarsk correctional 
facility(Kasparov.ru 2009f). Shaigalimov was an Other Russia activist, who died jumping out of a 
window, according to official reports. Members of his family reacted in shock. They rejected any 
insinuation of frail health or suicidal tendencies. Shaigalimov was transferred to solitary 
confinement after an unlikely suicide attempt. Police report that the 55 year old activists slipped 
free of handcuffs during transfer between facilities and used “sharp edges” of a nearby car to 
gash his wrists. After the incident his associates organized a series of protests in the area. Within 
a month of the incident Shaigalimov’s death threated to become a national rallying cry for the 
opposition. A show of solidarity took place in Moscow (Komsomolskaya Pravda 2009). Unrelated 
to the headline-grabbing story, members of Other Russia organized a march in protest of United 
Russia and in favor of a “worthy life.” Participants echoed the nationwide chant of “Russia without 
Putin” (Ikd.ru 2009e). 
The Krasnoyarsk state responded with denial and seemingly clumsy attempts at 
obfuscation. As protests against the mysterious death began the government failed to provide 
explanations for two perplexing factors. The solitary confinement cell featured a window, but one 
fortified by metal bars. And secondly, the prison claimed that footage from a round-the-clock 
surveillance camera had disappeared. The prison administrators further refused to acknowledge 
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the protestors’ primary demand: an independent investigation into cause of death. As protests 
continued, spreading to the capital in the west, official response turned darker. According to 
official reports Shaigalimov’s passport was lost during his incarceration, along with Xeroxed 
copies of his relatives passports. Without proof of identity the coroner threated to bury the activist 
as an unknown foreign national. More than in insult, the procedure would prevent anyone from 
examining the body before the burial (Radio Svoboda 2009). Additional responses were not 
reported. A similarly threatening response met the organizers of the “worthy life” protest. While 
handing out pamphlets the local leader of the Left Front was jailed. The individual was detained 
for less than 24 hours, according to reports, but in the mist of the Shaigalimov affair, even a short 
stay was cause for alarm (Ikd.ru 2009e). 
The aggrieved airline and factory workers each organized with the help of their unions. 
Shaigalimov’s colleagues at Other Russia organized protests in his defense. Leader of the 
National Bolshevik strand, Andrei Skovorodnikov, played the initial role in spreading the story. 
Once protests in the deceased’s honor began, the Revolutionary-Patriotic Union of Krasnoyarsk 
joined in. Additional groups joined once the movement spread to Moscow. The Communist youth 
groups and Solidarity both took part. The “worthy life” was organized by Other Russia alone. 
Summary 
State responses in 2009 offer the clearest indication yet that Krasnoyarsk may, in fact, be 
more inclined towards cooptational solutions. According to source data, Novosibirsk ignored 
demands of restaurant workers, builders, security guards, pensioners, mothers with young 
children, and automobile-owners. Krasnoyarsk leadership only faced two groups of aggrieved 
citizens, and reinvigorated faltering cooptation deals in both cases. The persistent nature of 
unresolved demands is another takeaway from this year’s events. In Novosibirsk inflation 
protests, especially those organized by TIGR, stretched into 2009. Both sources of quality of life 
protest in Krasnoyarsk were direct continuations of previous state-society negotiations. As 
witnessed in 2007 and 2008, some ideologically-driven protests were ignored, others were met 
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with repression. Interestingly, in both Siberian regions attempts to repress seem to have 
encouraged social mobilization. Activists argue that Loskutov was arrested as a method of 
deterrence. Activists argue that Shaigalimov was killed as a warning to Other Russia leadership. 
In both cases the repressive actions became rallying cries for local organizers. Even more 
disconcerting from the perspective of government officials, in both cases cries for retribution 
spread to Moscow and Saint Petersburg.  
2010 
Novosibirsk 
In Novosibirsk, in 2010, two unaddressed quality of life concerns generated protest 
waves. Demands for accessible childhood education and subsidized transportation spurred 
numerous actions throughout the year. The waves demonstrate the contagion potential of such 
movements, as each attracted followers critical of local leadership. Ideologically-driven protests 
continued, although with a wider range of driving factors.  
Quality of life protests raged over the entire year. In particular two concerns dominated 
the headlines and the local political landscape. In the oblast available spaces in pre-school 
classrooms dwindled. A group of parents gathered to protest what they considered a violation of 
their constitutional rights. The parents announced clearly-organized, specific demands. They 
petitioned the government for monetary compensation, exactly equal to the amount of budgetary 
funds required to support a preschool student for a year (Mikitik 2010a). Follow-up marches 
further expressed a well of outrage from citizens raising young children (Mikitik 2010b). After 
failing to receive attention, organizers ratcheted up their efforts, with a hunger strike and an 
initiative to boycott voting for United Russia (Krapotkina 2010b). Nearly six months after the initial 
wave of protests, the movement continued. Protest leaders began articulating their action as a 
defense of government education guarantees (Kasparov.ru 2010b). A combination of hunger 
strikes, gatherings, and marches spread across the region. On the traditional first day of school, 
Day of Knowledge as it is known, students present their teachers with flowers. The displaced 
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children’s’ parents marked the day with a theatrical event. Local leaders repurposed a 
kindergarten into a tax inspection facility. The parents blocked the entrance and handed out 
flowers to all passers-by, under placards warning that “knowledge is not for everyone” (Ivanovna 
2010).  
A proposed increase in transport fees for pensioners and government assistance 
recipients spurred the second wave of public dissent. Pensioners, handicapped, and the poorest 
citizens would have the number of subsidized rides per month capped at 30, according to a 
proposed bill. Outraged activists occupied the mayor’s office building until escorted away by 
police. Thereafter protests became a common occurrence (Mikitik 2010f). Once the bill began law 
demands shifted from prevention to annulling the transportation policy.  Actions continued and 
received political backing from the Communist Party. Protestors began taking on additional 
causes, including housing prices, eventually exhibiting familiar slogans of “pensioners for a 
worthy life,” and “protection of veterans.” Disconcerting for leadership, the final wave morphed 
into a condemnation of United Russia in general. The meetings continued for over a year, into 
2012 (KPRF News 2011b). 
Novosibirsk leadership responded with stubborn refusal to employ cooptational capacity. 
Dissatisfied parents managed to get their concern to the first threshold of political action. By 
protesting directly outside a Novosibirsk legislative meeting, their demand for compensation 
received a vote of consideration. Deputies voted down the measure. In a disingenuous move 
politicians declared the demands against the law. However, in Permsk Krai parents in the same 
position receive state funds (Mikitik 2010b). Several arrests for “distribution of extremist literature” 
are the only other reported responses. The initial response to transportation activists was 
analogous dismissal. Despite continued protests and solid political support from the Communist 
Party, officials did not budge. At a televised open forum the governor explained to those gathered 
that complaining about thirty trips is misguided, because the original plan called for twelve (KPRF 
News 2011a). After United Russia itself became the target, responses turned dark. Non-political 
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organizers were assaulted near their homes, or detained on unrelated charges. Several incidents 
of police brutality were reported (Ikd.ru 2010a). Finally, after around six months of protest a sign 
of cooptation appeared: leadership introduced the “social discount” card. Pensioners were 
allowed sixty rides at half price (KPRF News 2011c). From this point on protesters faced arrest 
and fines. It was only at this moment that local state forces chose to employ the “illegal gathering” 
law infringement that had been in effect since the initial event. The stubborn protesters were fully 
coopted by state power after fourteen months of constant agitation. In January of 2012, the 
mayor, announcing that the budget was now able to handle the strain, awarded unlimited 
transport to all subsidy categories (Ikd.ru 2012). 
In Novosibirsk activists cast themselves as defenders of the constitution. A group 
organized a meeting of solidary for Strategy 31, a national movement dedicated to protecting the 
31
st
 article of the Russian constitution, freedom of assembly. Participants were arrested 
(Kasparov.ru 2010a). A second event took the form of public educational exercise. Organizers 
gave a set of public talks, discussing the erosion of participation in the modern Russian political 
system. Comparing the current system to the 1990’s, passers-by were offered to vote on their 
preferred choice (Mikitik 2010a). Politically motivated protests then continued, drawing support 
from the city’s tradition of public assembly. The yearly expression of paradoxical slogans and 
colorful costumes took place; the Monstration proceeded through the city center and treated 
onlookers to “Earth: For Earthlings,” and other strange claims (Kasparov.ru 2010c). Organizers 
consistently insisted that the event was non-political in nature. The line between political and non-
political blurred on Halloween however. Organizers of the Monstration held a similar Demon-
stration. The date, the 31
st
, saw some Strategy 31 supporters attend with political slogans 
(Kasparov.ru 2010f).  Citizens’ fight against police brutality continued through 2010. Two separate 
events saw people gathered outside of local courthouses in support of prisoners jailed for 
endangering police, while they themselves were receiving beatings (Mikitik 2010c; Kasparov.ru 
2010e). Violent behavior of off-duty officers also became reason for protest, and even a hunger 
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strike intended to trigger a lawsuit (Mikitik 2010e). As the events continued organizers began 
uniting under the banner “little people and the system” (Mikitik 2010e). And finally, the area’s 
ecological activists failed to dissipate. Students and professors in Akademgorodok organized 
several marches and attempted to disrupt ongoing deforestation efforts (Ikd.ru 2012, Ikd.ru 
2010b).  
State responses to ideological protests in 2011 were narrowly-focused and minor. Police 
arrested several participants in the Strategy 31 protest. Other participants were allowed to march 
without hassle. Others never made it to the site. On the way to the protests Solidarity activists 
were reportedly detained by police (Kasparov.ru 2010a). Response to the Monstration event 
changed over time. This year, organizers lodged an official sanction request, which included the 
proposed march route. In the previous year Artyem Loskutov was arrested and fined for taking 
part in an unsanctioned event.  At first mayoral deputies refused the request. After an exchange 
with activist leadership, after organizers threatened to take the administration to court, the 
decision was reversed.  Repressive actions again Loskutov himself appear to have continued. 
After the march the artist was attacked by unknown assailants while sitting on a park bench in the 
middle of the city (Kasparov.ru 2010f). After the Halloween march was deemed political, Loskutov 
was once again escorted to a police station. Police detain him for a day, and levy a fine for, 
ostensibly, unrelated unpaid parking violations—a charge later changed to insulting police. The 
green defenders in the university enclave were not hassled until they approached machinery. 
Then several were arrested (Ikd.ru 2010c). 
Demands for early education compensation were organized by Novosibirsk’s Russian 
Children- for Accessible Preschool Education (also known by the unwieldy acronym (РДДДО). As 
time passed the group expanded their areas of concern beyond education, even taking part in the 
transport subsidy protests. Additional participants included a small citizens group, Citizens Tired 
of Waiting, and the local TIGR. As the cause gained momentum, the Communist Party got 
involved and played a role in publicizing grievances. Several members of the Novosibirsk 
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assembly gave speeches and directly addressed leadership, in an appeal to citizens not eligible 
for subsidized rides. Budget cuts at the expense of the elderly were simply not fair, according to 
the speakers. Attendance continued to grow, along with the breadth of participants. As the 
movement continued into 2011 organizers were able to gather 15,000 signatures on a petition to 
the governor. Anti-police brutality protests likewise demonstrate a ratcheting up of organizational 
support. Friends and acquaintances of the victims called together early events, before attracting 
support from TIGR and eventually Solidarity.  The year’s ideologically motivated protests likewise 
demonstrate a merging of actors and goals. Solidarity played the primary organizational role in 
Strategy 31.  Artyem Loskutov used his Monstration network to contribute to event organization. 
Krasnoyarsk 
Compared to its southern neighbor, Krasnoyarsk appeared tranquil in 2010. Very few 
quality of life protests were reported, and the state responded quickly and effectively in each 
case. Protestors did organize several ideologically-driven events, however. Like in Novosibirsk, 
the national Strategy 31 found local support.  
Two cases of living conditions grievance arose over the course of 2010 in Krasnoyarsk, 
one of which did not lead to any protests. Workers at a local combine factory organized a strike in 
response to accumulating back pay. The men and women constructing agricultural and industrial 
machinery reportedly worked without pay for several months. As the debt accumulated, work 
continued uninterrupted thanks to leadership’s promises of imminent compensation (Ikd.ru 2012). 
When patience expired, the workers, en masse, stopped reporting to their stations. A second set 
of laborers suffered from a lack of housing.  
State responses demonstrate the effectiveness of both cooptation and coercion. Merely a 
week after combine workers began their strike, Krasnoyarsk news outlets reported a complete 
fulfillment of back pay. The region’s anti-crisis working group convened with representatives from 
the governor’s office to discuss a solution. After the meeting, which occurred behind closed 
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doors, workers reportedly received electronic transfers. Reports very clearly reveal the direct 
financial involvement of local government. The payment was pushed through only after 
employers received a government-guaranteed line of credit (NewsLab.ru 2010). The injection of 
funds turned out to be a temporary reprieve. Three years later, in 2013, the factory declared 
bankruptcy and shuttered for good (SibNovosti 2013). Coercive measures also seem to have 
deterred protesters. Workers at an aluminum plant saw their attempt to picket outside of company 
headquarters thwarted. The mayor informed the group that their plans violated Krai law. Any 
attempt to convene would result in mass arrests. As an extra layer of assurance the scheduled 
site was occupied by fire trucks and heavy machinery. No subsequent action was ever reported 
(Ikd.ru 2012).  
The majority of protests reported in Krasnoyarsk were driven by ideology. Over the 
course of the year, several gatherings convened as part of the national movement in favor of 
freedom of assembly, in support of Strategy 31 (Krapotkina 2010a). The group maintained their 
commitment to the cause and continued to convene, even after the government enacted a soft 
repressive response (Mikitik 2010d). Strategy 31 protests continued throughout the year as 
protestors formed an organizational committee dedicated to continuing the tradition (Kasparov.ru 
2010d). Another national movement directed feelings of discontent in a slightly different direction. 
The national Day of Anger focused on environmental and repressive concerns. Participants in 
Moscow and numerous cities, including Krasnoyarsk, exclaimed “Destruction of Parks—It’s a 
Crime,” and “enough killing journalists and activists” (Kasparov.ru 2010g). 
In response, local leadership flexed their judicial strength.  The first gathering in support 
of Article 31 of the Russian constitution was sanctioned by the local Krasnoyarsk government.  
The second and third meetings were allowed to proceed as well. Things changed after the July 
31 gathering. Leadership refused to allow a Strategy 31 protest planned for the last day in 
August, citing a scheduling conflict. In the fall the official response turned disingenuous. With the 
31
st
 of October on the horizon, a series of fences appeared around Krasnoyarsk’s central square. 
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Because of this announced “renovation,” protestors were forced to gather on a narrow curbside 
nearby (Kasparov.ru 2010d).  Despite the crowding out of judicial and physical space, no arrests 
were reported at any of the actions.  Local leadership continued their pattern of censorship. A 
television program on Krasnoyarsk’s channel “TV Center” allowed individuals to discuss their 
interpretations of national politics. After one of the habitual participants officially joined Other 
Russia, he was immediately banned from the air (Kasparov.ru 2010d). 
Organizers once again make up a list of well-known movements, with a few new 
additions. Strategy 31 is a major, national campaign that united various groups. The main thrust, 
in Moscow each month, was the product of national and international efforts. Russian leadership 
came from Nemtsov’s Solidarity.  Amnesty international contributed petitions to allow the 
meetings to proceed. The Siberian version of the event drew support from Other Russia as well 
as an even more radical League Against Illegal Immigration, a group subsequently declared a 
domestic terrorist organization. As time passed, as more and more protests occurred, the group 
attracted a broader group of supporters. The Communist Party reported participation beginning 
with the third event.  The Day of Anger gathered the same group, with participants from the 
Communists, Solidarity, and Other Russia. Again this is a national movement that even received 
international support.  
Summary 
2010 again strengthens patterns emerging over the previous three years of analysis. A 
difference in willingness to react to quality of life protests is perhaps most clearly on display in this 
year. Novosibirsk’s refusal to engage protestor demands emboldened two waves of protests. 
Both child health care and transportation subsidy protests turned into movements, even 
transforming into broad attacks on the governing party. The only quality of life protests in 
Krasnoyarsk centered on professional group demands. In both cases local government acted 
swiftly to intervene, once with financial assistance, once with repressive force. As in the 
preceding years ideologically-driven protests were met with varying levels of repression in both 
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federal regions. Local social mobilization structures do seem to have influenced the manifestation 
of events in cases. In Novosibirsk the peculiarity of the Monstration tradition merged with more 
political protests. And the presence of Other Russia appears to have been stronger in 
Krasnoyarsk, as reflected by Strategy 31 protests.  
Conclusion 
Case study evidence echoes, and thus supports, major quantitative findings. It appears 
that the Krasnoyarsk state was more inclined to employ cooptational capacity than its counterpart 
in Novosibirsk. It appears that grievances, particularly those associated with wages and bills, 
created a consistent catalyst for protest. Even in such a tense environment, cooptational actions 
did, in fact, dissuade protestors from organizing. This is not to say that Novosibirsk’s government 
completely refused to employ cooptation. Rather, in all four years under analysis the northern-
most region reported more incidents of “buying-off” protesters, despite reporting fewer protests, 
fewer opportunities for such a response. In 2007, out of eight quality of life movements, 
Krasnoyarsk demonstrated cooptational tactics in response to four of them.  Novosibirsk, faced 
with eight movements, responded with cooptation only in response to striking grain workers. In 
2008, Krasnoyarsk used a mix of cooptational and cooperational state capacity to “buy off” auto-
owners, alumni factory workers, and displaced airline workers, or three of five protest 
movements. In the same year, Novosibirsk reached an agreement with just one group, striking 
municipal bus drivers, when faced with eight quality of life movements. In 2009 and 2010, 
Krasnoyarsk’s protest environment was tranquil. Only four groups organized quality of life 
demands. The local state responded each time, three times with cooptation, and once with 
effective repression. Over the two years, twelve separate movements demanded assistance in 
Novosibirsk. Government responded twice, once to pay tractor factory workers threatening an 
official visit from Putin, and once to reverse a cut to subsidized transportation.  The difference in 
cooptational capacity does appear to drive differing protest outcomes in the two regions. 
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The fate of the automobile-owner movement offers a clear comparison of regional 
tendencies. In 2008, with inflation levels engendering grievances, Krasnoyarsk government met 
with protestors to plan a response. From this moment onwards gas prices did not catalyze any 
reported events in the Krai. In 2008, Novosibirsk’s chapter of TIGR explicitly requested to emulate 
the northern neighbor’s strategy. The request was denied. Protests continued for years.  
To further explore this incident, and cooptational capacity more generally, it would be 
interesting to investigate the real effects of the 2008 agreement. Did objective conditions facing 
drivers markedly improve, or was the state’s gesture enough to diffuse dissent? Immediate 
responses are only part of the story, of course. It appears that Krasnoyarsk’s government 
effectively “bought off” groups on the receiving-end of wage transfers and housing improvements. 
Satisfied would-be protestors ceased to organize, reducing the carryover in protests from one 
year to the next.  But what explains the fact that more new quality of life grievances appeared in 
Novosibirsk in each year? The answer to this question lies in the interplay between general living 
conditions and state assistance programs. A logical line of inquiry would trace the laws and 
policies passed by sub-regional government in scheduled legislative sessions, not in response to 
social pressure.   
Moving to model improvement, I am now convinced that repressive state capacity vis-à-
vis protest cannot be easily operationalized in a quantitative model. Case analysis reveals that 
coercion occasionally took the form of arrests and violence. Repression often failed to discourage 
organization, producing the opposite effect in some cases, even when prominent figures like 
Shaigalimov were killed. In contemporary Russia, however, coercion also takes a softer form: law 
enforcement detained activists temporarily for seemingly benign reasons—overdue library book 
fees, unpaid parking fines, and other trivialities just serious enough to hinder a planned speech. 
City officials prevented activists from gathering thanks to suspicious scheduling conflicts and city 
construction. Organizers in Novosibirsk and Krasnoyarsk also faced censorship, on the internet 
and on local television stations. It is difficult to envision a quantitative indicator that would capture 
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this creative set of coercive state tactics. But even an operationalization that included the softer 
side of coercive is unlikely to produce a significant relationship with onset frequency.  Attempts to 
thwart organization through censorship and lengthy legal processes were often unsuccessful, as 
in the Loskutov case.  
The case study exercise offers insight into social mobilization capacity operationalization 
as well. My initial choices were total population, urban population percentage, and local graduate 
population. Such a large number of protests were driven by unskilled laborers that education 
appears an insufficient driver of relative onset frequency—as indicated by statistical results. 
Would an alternative operationalization perform better?  The presence of activist movements 
represents one potential alternative, some measure of the size of groups like Other Russia and 
TIGR.  Still, protests driven by regional idiosyncrasies, from deforestation, to police negligence, to 
the Monstration tradition all organized without the help of dedicated organizations. And particular 
workplace grievances were numerous, often occurring even without the help of unions. Ad hoc 
groups spring up in response to both ideological and quality of life motivation.  
The case study offered little improvement for cooperational capacity and political 
opportunity structure operationalizations. The exercise supports negative findings regarding these 
final two independent variables. Support for the government, particularly for the ruling party, do 
not seem to have influenced protest trends in Krasnoyarsk and Novosibirsk. Anti-regime protests 
often emerged as offshoots of less political demonstrations, as quality of life concerns grew and 
evolved over time. Protestors do not appear to direct demands into the traditional political system. 
Many events arose in response to proximate grievances, to which activists gathered and struck 
as a first response.  Moreover, the catalytic effect of political pluralism may be subsumed by civil 
society groups. Process tracing identified Communist youth organizations as occasional 
organizers. These groups continue to organize whether or not the Communist party holds local 
legislative seats. Case study analysis suggests that neither United Russia support nor political 
openness is sufficient to ensure a relatively quiescent protest environment in Russia.  
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Finally, I am convinced that disaggregated statistical analysis represents the way 
forward. I am convinced that the quality-of-life/ideology dichotomy presented here would improve 
the search for structural drivers of protest. The next step in the dialectic that is social scientific 
research—from hypothesis, to testing, and back again—would evaluate the notion that quality of 
life protests are structurally predictable, while ideologically-driven protests are not. Case study 
analysis presented in this chapter suggests that attempts to statistically model all protest events 
in the contemporary Russian environment may be misguided. Including unpredictable ideological 
protests may have diluted regression model utility.  Even a more disaggregated approach would 
face difficulties, however. This chapter’s in-depth look at protest in two Siberian provinces 
revealed connections between quality of life protests and ideological protests. Categorical 
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Appendix i 
2013 protest onset figures coded from namarsh.ru. I add to Lankina and Voznaya’s existing 





Altai Krai 3 
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Khakassia  2 











Mari El 0 
Mordovia 4 
Moscow City 139 
Moscow Oblast 12 
Murmansk 4 
Nenets AO  0 
Nizhegorodskaia 14 
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